LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 



Chap^flJl^Copyright No.. 
ShelfJfj 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN THE 
REIGN OF HENRY III. 




-J^jy \(S o 



THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT 



IN THE 



EEIGN OF HENRY III. 



AND ITS 



CULMINATION IN THE BARONS' WAR 



BY 

OLIVER H. RICHARDSON, A.B. 

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN DRURY COLLEGE 



18l897J^ 1 .V,H-^r-\ 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., Ltd. 

1897 

All rights reserved 



N 



COPYRIGHT, 1896, 

By OLIVER H. RICHARDSON. 






Norfooott Ifkess 

J. S. Cushing & Co. — Berwick & Smith 
Norwood Mass. U.S.A. 






O 



®o tyy Mitt 



PKEFACE 

This book does not represent an attempt to rewrite 
the history of the beginnings of parliamentary govern- 
ment in England, nor does it contain an exhaustive 
account of the political history of the reign of Henry 
III. Its object is to portray, first, those movements 
which tended to denationalize the church and state of 
England by the perversion of the English constitution 
and by the introduction of the political doctrines of 
thirteenth-century France and the Empire- Church ; 
and second, those counter-movements which resulted 
in the complete triumph of the national principle as 
manifested in the dim beginnings of the revolt from 
Rome, in the completion of race unity, and the estab- 
lishment of the constitution upon a basis both national 
and popular. The literature of the period is both 
copious and picturesque, as befits an epoch in which 
the personality of the actors has unusual weight, and 
in which the study of motive is of unusual importance. 
If the author has been enabled to catch the spirit of 
the time from the pages of the historians who lived 
among the events which they so vividly describe, his 
object will have been accomplished. 

Heidelberg, Germany, Aug. 12, 1896. 

vii 



LIST OF AUTHORS AND EDITIONS CITED 

Bartholomaei de Cotton. Historia Anglicana. Ed. Luard. Rolls 

Series, 1859. 
Benedictus Abbas Petroburgensis. Ed. Thos. Stapleton. Camden 

Society, 1849. 
Blaauw, W. H. The Barons' War. London and Lewes, 1844. 
Bohmer, Joh. Fried. Regesta Imperii. Stuttgart, 1844. 
Calendarium Rotulorum Patentium. London, 1802. 
Fabyan, Robert. The New Chronicles of England and France. Ed. 

Hen. Ellis. London, 1811. 
Fiske, John. The Beginnings of New England. Boston. 
Freeman, E. A. History of the Norman Conquest of England. 

Oxford, 1876. 
Gardiner and Mullinger. English History for Students. New York, 

1881. 
Gneist, R. Englische Verfassungsgeschichte. Berlin, 1882. 
Green, J. R. History of the English People. London, 1877. 
Grosseteste, Roberti, Epistolse. Ed. Luard. Rolls Series, 1861. 
Guizot, M. Histoire des Origines du Gouvernement Repr^sentatif. 

Paris, 1851. 
Chronica Johannis de Oxenedis. Ed. Sir Henry Ellis. Rolls Series, 

1859. 
Chronicon de Lanercost. Bannatyne Club. Edinburgh, 1839. 
Lanfranci Opera. Ed. Giles. Oxford and Paris, 1844. 
Liber de Antiquis Legibus. Ed. Thos. Stapleton. Camden Society, 

1846. 
Lingard, John. History of England. 4th ed. Paris, 1826. 
Chronica de Mailros. Bannatyne Club. Ed. J. Stevenson. Edin- 
burgh, 1835. 
Matthsei Pariensis Chronica Majora. Ed. Luard. Rolls Series, 

1872-1882. 
Matthseus Westmonasteriensis. Flores Historiarum. Frankfort, 

1601. 

ix 



X AUTHORS AND EDITIONS CITED 

Migne. Patrologia Latina. (T. 159.) 
Annales Monastici. Ed. Luard. Rolls Series. 1864-1869. 
Vol. I. Annales de Theokesberia. 

Annales de Burton. 
Vol. II. Annales Monasterii de Wintonia. 
Annales Monasterii de Waverleia. 
Vol. III. Annales Prioratus de Dunstaplia. 
Vol. IV. Annales Monasterii de Oseneia. 

Chronicon Vulgo Dictum Chronicon Thornse Wykes. 
Annales Prioratus de Wigornia. 
Monumenta Franciscana. Ed. Brewer. Rolls Series, 1858. 

Pars I. Thomas de Eceleston De Adventu Fratrum Minorum in 

Angliam. 
Pars II. Adse de Marisco Epistolse. 
Nangis, Guillaume de. Chronique Latine. Ed. H. Geraud. French 

Hist. Soc. Paris, 1843. 
Pauli, Reinhold. 

Biider aus Alt-England. Gotha, 1876. 

Geschiclite von England. Hamburg, 1853. 

Simon von Montfort, der Schopfer des Hauses der Gemeinen. 

Tubingen, 1867. 
Tiibinger Programm. Tubingen, 1864. 
Pearson, C. H. History of England in the Early and Middle Ages. 

London, 1867. 
Chronicon Petroburgense. Ed. Thos. Stapleton. Camden Society, 

1849. 
Von Raumer. Geschichte der Hohenstaufen und ihrer Zeit. 5th ed. 

Leipzig, 1878. 
Raynaldus. Annales Ecclesiastici. (Mansi.) Lucca, 1747. 
Rishanger, Wilhelmi, Monachi S. Albani, Chronica. Ed. Riley. Rolls 
Series, 1865. 
Continuatio Matthsei Parisiensis. Ed. Wats. London, 1640. 

(Earlier edition of the preceding.) 
Chronicon. Ed. Halliwell. Camden Society, 1840. 
Robert of Gloucester's Chronicle. Ed. Hearne. London, 1810. 
Rymer, Thomas. Fcedera, Conventiones, etc. Ed. Clarke and Hol- 

brook. London, 1816. 
Shirley. Royal and other Historical Letters, illustrative of the Reign 

of Henry III. Rolls Series. London, 1866. 
Statutes of the Realm. 1810. 



AUTHORS AND EDITIONS CITED xi 

Stubbs, William. 

The Constitutional History of England. 5th ed. Clar. Press. 

Oxford, 1891. 
Select Charters, illustrative of English History. 8th ed. Clar. 

Press. Oxford, 1895. 
Taswell-Langmead, T. P. English Constitutional History. London 

and Boston, 1886. 
Trivet's Annales sex regum Angliae. Ed. Hog. E. H. S. London, 

1845. 
Walteri de Hemingburgh, Chronicon. Ed. H. C. Hamilton. E. H. S. 

London, 1848. 
Wood. Historia et Antiquitates Universitatis Oxoniensis. Oxford, 

1674. 
Wright, Thomas. Political Songs of England, from the Reign of 

John to that of Edward II. Camden Society, 1839. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I 

The Forces which made England a Nation in the 

Reign of Henry III. 

PART PAGE 

I. Introduction : Primary Forces ..... 1 
II. The Influence of the Friars 19 



CHAPTER II 

The Forces which roused England to Armed 

Resistance 

I. The Poetical Literature ...... 36 

II. The Alienation of London from the Crown . . 42 

III. The Alienation of Simon de Montfort from the 

Crown ......... 50 

IV. The Denationalization of England : the State . . 65 
V. The Denationalization of England : the Church and 

the Pope 84 

VI. The Denationalization of England : the Church and 

the King 105 

VII. The Sicilian Crown 113 

VIII. The Welsh War, and the Famine of the Year 1258 . 145 

xiii 



XIV CONTENTS 

CHAPTER III 

The Outbreak : and the Culmination of the 
National Movement 

PART PAGE 

I. The Reform Parliaments of the Year 1258 • . . .152 

II. The Government of the Barons : War and Peace . . 181 

III. Parties and Principles 203 



CHAPTER I 

THE FORCES WHICH MADE ENGLAND A NATION 
IN THE REIGN OF HENRY III. 



:>*X<x^ 



PART I 

Introduction: Primary Forces 

The reconciliation of individual freedom with social 
order is an ever-recurring problem whose solution has 
varied with each stage in the world's evolution and 
with the peculiar factors which constitute the life of 
different social groups. At the time of its inception, 
at least, feudalism was a form of government which 
allowed to the individual the maximum of personal 
liberty compatible with the maintenance of even toler- 
able order within the limits of the state and protection 
from foes outside its borders. It was the spontane- 
ous and inevitable creation of the liberty -loving Teuton 
when confronted with forms of life more complex than 
those of his ancestral forests. Liberty tended to de- 
generate into license ; the centrifugal forces of the 
social world to overcome the centripetal ; and the 
natural outcome of unrestrained feudalism was prac- 
tical social anarchy. Frequently, however, the force 

B l 



2 THE BABONS* WAB chap, i 

of the action engendered a reaction of corresponding 
magnitude, and a highly centralized form of govern- 
ment was the result. 

William the Conqueror, after his experiences with 
the turbulent vassals of Normandy, was not likely to 
neglect in the establishment of his rule in England the 
vantage offered by the undefined prerogative of an 
English king. If feudalism was introduced into Eng- 
land by the Conquest as the result of repeated con- 
fiscations of the estates of all who refused to recognize 
him as the lawful successor of Edward the Confessor, 
it was introduced not so much as a system of govern- 
ment as a mode of land tenure, and the worst feature 
of continental feudalism was abolished by the anti- 
feudal law 1 of the Gemot of Salisbury Plain. The 
government of William I. and his immediate successor 
was practically despotic, but necessarily so ; order in 
a government based in reality upon race-differences — 
however disregarded in theory — could be secured only 
through absolutism. The world-struggle between in- 
dividual liberty, typified in England by Anglo-Saxon 
local customs, and good order, typified by royal su- 
premacy, had entered in England upon a new phase. 2 
Speaking broadly, from the accession of William I. to 
the loss of Normandy under John, good order was 
maintained by the union of crown and English people 
against the baronage, — but at the expense of liberty : 
from the loss of Normandy to the reign of Edward I. 

i Stubbs' Select Charters, pp. 81, 82. 

2 Cf. Fiske's Beginnings of New England, chap. I. 



parti INTRODUCTION: PRIMARY FORCES 3 

liberty could be secured only by the union of barons 
and people against the crown, — but at the expense of 
good order. The road to permanent order and freedom 
led through the disorders of the Barons' War to the 
establishment of a parliamentary system. During the 
whole of this period the relation of the English church 
to the germinating constitution and to the Papal See 
was of paramount importance. 

The character of the church in England had already 
been largely determined before the arrival of the Nor- 
mans. Though abundantly grateful to the power which 
had founded and so carefully cherished it in its early 
days, — a gratitude evinced by the ready payment of 
Peter's pence, by the labours of many a missionary upon 
the continent, and in particular by the vast services of 
Winfred in favour of papal prerogative, — the church 
had been, nevertheless, at an early date stamped with 
the national seal. It is especially characteristic, that 
at a comparatively early period the sons of illustrious 
houses became enrolled among its members ; : that the 
clergy, ecclesiastical having preceded political unity, 
speedily exercised a healing influence upon state 
affairs ; then, later, as members of the witenagemot, 
influenced greatly the action of the central adminis- 
tration, while in the shire-moot, the highest organ of 
local government, the bishop exercised concurrent 
jurisdiction with the ealdorman. The clergy, com- 
posed of all classes in the community, identified com- 

1 Gneist's Englische Verfassungsgeschichte, p. 8. 



4 THE BARONS' WAR chap, i 

pletely with the government of the state, and having 
as their especial duty the care of the weak and op- 
pressed, naturally acquired a national feeling more 
profound than existed in any church upon the conti- 
nent. Moreover, the See of Rome was too distant to 
raise effective claims to the immediate headship of a 
community which was neither accustomed nor inclined 
to separate authority from personal presence. 1 

To the attribute of nationality was therefore joined 
the attribute of an independence which was almost per- 
fect as regarded the pope, less so with respect to the 
king. 2 In each case its basis was necessarily the 
strength afforded by national sympathies and popular 
support. The importance of this strong feeling of 
nationality existent in the English church before the 
Norman Conquest, and of the identity of interests 
established at that time between the masses of the 
clergy and the people, though too obvious to be over- 
looked, is too great not to be mentioned. Upon this 
thread hung the future liberties of England. The Nor- 
man Conquest, with all the changes which it introduced 
into the government of church and state, and into the 
mutual relations of church and state, never perma- 
nently shook this elemental force. Under the first 
sovereigns of Norman race, it was the best guarantee 

1 Gneist, Eng. Verf. Gesch., p. 29. Cf. Stubbs 1 Constitutional 
History, I., p. 267. 

2 For opposing views as to the king's share in the appointment of 
bishops, cf. Stubbs' Const. Hist., I., p. 150, and Gneist, pp. 20, 80. 
My indebtedness to these two authors, in this Introduction, demands 
a general acknowledgment. 



parti INTRODUCTION: PRIMARY FORCES 5 

against feudal anarchy ; under Stephen, it emerged as 
the only organized power whose integrity had not 
suffered serious loss ; under John, its alliance with 
the baronage offered the decisive check to royal abso- 
lutism. 

While the church in Norman and Angevin England 
maintained close and on the whole friendly relations 
with Rome, it is evident that pope and church were 
by no means synonymous terms, and that the policy of 
the latter frequently ran directly counter to that of 
the former. For this Englishmen can scarcely be too 
thankful ; in the great crises in which the popular 
liberties were at stake in its early history, the Eng- 
lish church, almost uniformly, warmly championed the 
cause of freedom ; papal authority at the most only 
succeeded in temporarily paralyzing its action, never 
in making it abjectly subservient. The first great 
crisis for papal power in England occurred in the lat- 
ter days of Henry II. and John, terminating with a 
seeming papal victory ; the religious crisis in John's 
reign blended with the political movement which 
evoked the Magna Charta and led to the critical 
periods of the reign of Henry III. ; these were crises 
for English national existence and the English system 
of representation, and in them the pope was the steady 
antagonist of English liberty. That after victory he 
counselled moderation from motives of policy is the 
highest praise which he can rightly claim. 1 

1 Gualo's case is only an apparent exception ; during John's reign, 
Innocent had done his worst against English freedom, supporting the 



6 THE BARONS' WAR chap, i 

The national character of the English church was 
preserved at the Conquest mainly through two causes : 
first, the bulk of the lower clergy remained Saxon 
and retained the Saxon speech, while their influence, 
largely expended in protecting the conquered race 
from the oppression of the nobles, necessarily became 
weightier and weightier as the fusion of races pro- 
gressed; second, the admirable position of William I. 
and Lanfranc toward one another assured their joint 
resistance to unreasonable papal demands. Said Will- 
iam to Hubert, the legate sent by Gregory to request 
more regular payment of Peter's pence and to demand 
fealty, " The one claim I have admitted, the other 
I have not ; I have refused to do homage and still 
refuse, because I hav.e neither promised it myself, nor 
do I learn that my predecessors have done it to yours." * 
Upon this statesmanlike declaration and upon the first 
of his three celebrated canons, 2 William sought to 
assure the freedom of the church from. Rome. 

He himself remained its master, but on terms which 
his Angevin successors found themselves unable to 
maintain. Under William, ample security for the obe- 

tyranny of a king whose power was largely based on foreign merce- 
naries ; and if Honorius, through Gualo, helped to drive out Louis of 
France, it was with the intention of securing Henry's power. No one 
can doubt that the cassation of charters of liberty was more congenial 
to the popes than their confirmation. 

1 Lanfranci Opera, I., p. 32. For correspondence between Gregory 
and William, Lanfranc and Gregory, vide Freeman, Norman Conquest, 
IV., pp. 432-437. 

2 Eadmer, Hist. Nov. apud Sel. Chart., p. 82. Migne, Pat. Lat. 
T. 159, p. 351. 



parti INTRODUCTION: PRIMARY FORCES 7 

clience of the church was found in the necessity for 
the royal confirmation of the decrees of provincial 
synods ; in the prohibition to excommunicate a crown- 
vassal or officer without the king's consent ; in the 
establishment of the dual character of ecclesiastics as 
at once clerk and feudal vassal ; and in the rigid super- 
vision of episcopal elections. 1 The celebrated decree 
of separation, 2 however, by which bishops and arch- 
deacons were forbidden to hold pleas in the hundred- 
court or to bring airy matter pertaining to the cure of 
souls before a lay tribunal, but instead were ordered 
to establish courts of their own in which all cases were 
to be tried by ecclesiastical law, was full of danger. 
However admirable the mutual intentions of prelate 
and king, and however well adapted to the reforming 
spirit abroad in the church this measure might be, yet, 
as Pearson 3 expresses it, " When William I. and Lan- 
franc concurred in a policy which dissolved the old 
union of the two bodies politic, they had unavoidably 
placed them in a condition of suppressed antagonism." 
Such great concessions had been made to the church 
and in such vague language, that encroachments were 
sure to follow as soon as the state fell into weaker 
hands. The actual results of a century of separation 
were that the clergy found law and discipline in the 
canon law alone ; their ideal, in separation from the 
laity ; and that a strong party, especially among 

1 Sel. Chart., p. 82. 

2 Rymer, I., p. 3. Sel. Chart., p. 85. 

3 Pearson, I., p. 495. 



8 THE BARONS' WAR chap, i 

the monks, stood decisively upon the side of Rome. 1 
To the archbishop of Canterbury the papal confirma- 
tion became speedily as essential as the royal, and 
Innocent III. could successfully nominate Langton in 
defiance of John ; the mode of election to bishoprics 
varied from the conge d'elire 2 of Henry II. to the abso- 
lute renunciation of royal right to interfere, contained 
in John's Charter 3 of Nov. 21, 1214 ; and in 1204, at 
the consecration of Peter des Roches, the pope "laid 
down the rule that where the electors have knowingly 
elected an unworthy person they lose the right of 
making the next election." 4 As the crown had already 
lost the right to determine contested elections, the 
appointment in such a case pertained to the pope. 

Legatine authority also greatly increased, as well as 
the custom of appeals to Rome. During the turbulent 
reign of Stephen such encouragement had been given 
to papal interference and the clergy had become as a 
body so independent 5 of the king's control, that Henry 
II. found himself face to face with a most difficult 
problem. If the secular authority were not to become 
impotent, drastic measures must at once be taken. 
The result was the Becket controversy. 



1 Gneist, Eng. Verf. Gesch., p. 193. 

2 Sel. Chart., p. 140, cap. XII. 

3 Ibid., pp. 288, 289. 

4 Stubbs' Const. Hist., III., 313. 

5 From Stephen's second Charter, Sel. Chart. , p. 120. Ecclesiasti- 
carum personarurn et omnium clericorum et rerum eorum justitiam et 
potestatem et distributionem bonorum ecclesiasticorum in manu epis- 
coporum esse perhibeo et confirmo. 



parti INTRODUCTION: PRIMARY FORCES 9 

Undoubtedly the Constitutions of Clarendon con- 
tained the true statement of English law and Eng- 
lish custom, and as such were accepted by barons 
and bishops, — by all, that is, except Becket and his 
immediate followers, the monks. Henry's glorious 
victory, however, was ruined by his own precipita- 
tion and rashness ; Becket's murder was followed by 
a popular reaction, and the king was forced to the 
double humiliation of Canterbury and Avranches. 1 
Appeals to Rome were henceforward allowed, and no 
clerk, though convicted of crime, was to be summoned 
before a temporal judge. Important in form as these 
concessions were, other consequences still more impor- 
tant resulted indirectly from this struggle. First, a 
limit had been set to the royal absolutism. Second, 
Henry's attention had been drawn from foreign affairs, 
and his whole strength confined to England, at exactly 
that moment when projects of foreign conquest must 
have seemed, and were, most feasible. The acquisi- 
tion of Poitou and Guienne through the marriage with 
Eleanor was fated to cause England a sufficiency of 
suffering in the reign of Henry III.; it may well be 
that the controversy with Becket prevented England 
from sinking into the position of a French subject- 
province. In a certain sense, therefore, if this con- 
jecture be allowed to stand, the controversy must be 
ranked as analogous to the loss of Normandy in help- 
ing to make England, England. Third, to resist the 

1 Benedictus Abbas, pp. 34-36. For practical result, vide Green, 
History English People, I., p. 178. 



10 THE BARONS' WAR chap, i 

archbishop successfully, the king had been forced to 
call upon the baronage for support ; and to resist the 
Canon Law, Anglo-Saxon institutions and customs had 
been cited : x the appeal ultimately proved dangerous 
to the crown, — memories of the witenagemot were 
stirred in the minds of its higher vassals, the lower 
baronage began to find community of interests with 
Saxon free-holders, and after Normandy had been lost 
and race-fusion fairly begun, the movement culminated 
in the Magna Charta. 2 

Reference has been already made 3 to the connection 
of the religious crises of Henry II. and John with the 
political crises of the same monarchs and Henry III. 
As early as 1204 by the appointment of Peter des 
Roches as bishop of Winchester, and again, still more 
unmistakably, two years later by the method of Lang- 
ton's election, Innocent III. had defined his position 
toward the independence of the English church ; it 
was reserved for following years to display in its 
fulness his baleful influence upon English popular 
liberties. 

But while the pope was posing as the champion of 
despotism, England reaped the benefit of possessing a 
church long the depository of constitutional law, and 
which was national and independent by heredity. If 
bishop Roger of Salisbury had been the creator of 
constitutional machinery, Stephen Langton, archbishop 



1 Vide Preamble to Constitutions of Clarendon, Sel. Chart., pp. 137, 
138. 

2 Pauli, Simon von Montfort, pp. 2, 3. 3 Supra, pp. 5, 9. 



parti INTRODUCTION: PRIMARY FORCES 11 

of Canterbury, was by his political genius and legal 
ability to be the main force in converting a constitu- 
tion largely unwritten and vague, into one written 
and definite. In Magna Charta itself the liberty of 
the English church is assured in the first article, and 
a second guarantee for its freedom occupies the most 
prominent place in the enacting clause at the end of 
the document, — silent witness to its prominence in 
the national movement. 

While the church of England since the Conquest 
had become more and more Romanized, more highly 
centralized, and more independent of royal control, 
— without, however, losing its national vigour, — the 
political government of England had been slowly chang- 
ing from an absolute to a limited monarchy. Anglo- 
Saxon institutions of local self-government, depressed 
by the Conquest, had been revived in proportion as the 
king had found himself obliged to rely upon the support 
of the native English ; the royal courts, under Henry II., 
had expanded into a kind of national assembly, and 
the very machinery of government by which the king 
exerted his power limited the facility of arbitrary action ; 
cities had been granted charters, — notably London, 
which, if it did not play in England the commanding 
role of Paris in France, nevertheless, in the crises under 
John, Henry III., and even as late as the Wars of 
the Roses, gave always a temporary and sometimes a 
permanent advantage to its possessor ; and finally, the 
new ministerial nobility of Henry I. and Henry II. 
had firmly established itself in the land. As the result 



12 THE BARONS' WAR chap, i 

of the Conqueror's separation of church and state had 
proved disastrous to the royal prerogative, so now 
the fruit of his separation of manors was fully ripe. 
Already in numerous rebellions the barons had been 
forced to combine with one another ; they were now 
compelled to court the assistance of the native English. 1 
The extent to which the constitution had developed 
may be partly measured by the fact that the rebellion 
against John was largely the work of the ministerial 
nobility, and that their objections to foreign service 
were couched in terms 2 which a modern lawyer would 
call "special pleading," and which plainly show the 
decay of feudal spirit. The language, no less than 
the terms of the Great Charter, is a valuable witness to 
the growth of the constitutional power of the baronage. 
Already — and Normandy only eleven years lost — a 
foreigner could scarcely appreciate, much less admin- 
ister, the laws of England. 3 

Under Henry II. and Richard, the crown had over- 
strained its power ; for this, as well as for his own 
misdeeds, John paid the penalty. At best, the Angevin 
system of administration had been the work of the 
deus ex machina ; it lacked utterly that vitality and 
organic unity which only a constitution expressive of 

1 Freeman, Norm. Conq., IV., p. 71. Taswell-Langmead, Eng. 
Const. Hist., p. 58, n. 2. 

2 Walt. Gov., II., p. 217. Sel. Chart., pp. 277, 278. Dicentes se 
propter terras qims in Anglia tenent non debere regem extra regnum 
sequi nee ipsum euntmn scntagio juvare. Cf. Bad. Cogges., p. 872 ; 
Sel. Chart., p. 277, and Stubbs 1 Const. Hist., I., p. 563, n. 3. 

3 Vide Matthew Paris, III., p. 252, and infra, p. 69. 



parti INTRODUCTION: PRIMARY FORCES 13 

popular life and crystallized custom can possess. It 
was too complete a system for the national incom- 
pleteness. The reigns of John and Henry III. cannot 
be logically separated ; the great problem of each was 
the same. The growing nation had to grow into a 
national form of government, and the only government 
possible for a reviving Anglo-Saxon community was a 
free one. This made the reign of Henry III. an epit- 
ome of English history. A conflict, then, between the 
royal power and popular liberty was inevitable ; John's 
conduct hastened it. Both sides sought to strengthen 
themselves by alliances, and in the character of these 
alliances as well as in the conduct of the struggle, the 
character of the reign of Henry III. was already fore- 
shadowed. 

Since John and Innocent had united in the consecra- 
tion of Peter the Poitevin to the See of Winchester, 
they had been at variance till May 15, 1213. At that 
time in dire distress, John took a step which, while it 
left no permanent mark upon the English constitution, 
was of paramount importance throughout the reign of 
Henry III. Because he had offended God and Holy 
Church so deeply as to be greatly in need of the divine 
mercy, and because no other sign of repentance save 
the humiliation of himself and his kingdom was 
adequate to the occasion, — such is the tenor of the 
document, 1 — John, led by the inspiration of the Holy 
Ghost, not constrained by force nor driven by fear, but 

i Rymer's Foedera, L, pp. Ill, 112. Sel. Chart., pp. 284-286. 



14 THE BARONS" WAR chap, i 

through his own free-will and with the assent of the 
baronage of England, freely yields up his kingdom 
to Innocent and his Catholic successors, receiving it 
back as a fief and paying 1000 marks per annum as 
a token of perpetual obligation and concession. Peter's 
pence was to be paid as before, and liege homage to be 
performed 1 if John and the pope met. Had John lived 
long enough to be victor in the contest for absolute 
power, he would probably have proved as faithless to 
this oath as to all others, and it would have passed 
harmlessly away: as it was, he lived just long enough 
to welcome papal legates and to give the pope every 
opportunity to turn the parchment pledge into actual 
practice, and then died, — leaving a minor heir to take 
the same oath, to be burdened with the same tribute, 
to pass his life under the same ecclesiastical tutelage 
which formed his early character, and to allow the See 
of Rome through its legates to attain a height of power 
in England never equalled before or since. In the 
light of papal exactions throughout Henry's reign, and 
especially in connection with the Sicilian crown, the last 
words 2 of John's oath read like a mocking prophecy. 
Eighteen months after John's surrender of England 
to the pope, the king was in worse plight than ever. 
Bouvines in France had been fought and lost, and in 



1 Actually performed to Nicholas of Tusculum, Ann. Wav., pp. 
277, 278. 

2 Patrimonium b. Petri .... adjutor ero ad tenendum et defen- 
dendum contra omnes homines pro posse meo. Rymer, I. , p. 112. Sel. 
Chart., p. 286. 



parti INTRODUCTION: PRIMARY FORCES 15 

England the barons, assembled at St. Edmund's, had 
openly threatened war. 1 Probably in order to break 
the force of the coalition against him, John issued, Nov. 
21, 1214, his "Carta 2 ut liberae sint electiones totius 
Anglise." Since the days of Henry I. elections 3 had 
been canonical in form and free in theory ; John's 
Charter converted theoretical freedom into actual. 
Whenever a vacancy occurred in bishopric or monas- 
tery, the chapter could now meet as soon as it wished 
and fill the vacancy by a free election. A royal 
license had first to be obtained, but this was not to be 
denied or deferred. If it should be — " quod absit" — 
the election was nevertheless to be held and the choice 
to be valid and binding. However desirable this 
ecclesiastical freedom might seem to the church, John's 
Charter not only failed to detach it from his enemies, 
but also daring the reign of Henry III. established " a 
freedom of litigation and little more." 4 It opened the 
door for the pope a little wider, but to this Henry him- 
self was apparently not disinclined. 5 

In spite of John's exertions, the day of Magna 
Charta arrived : Innocent had not been able to save 
him. The sole resource was a Bull of Dispensation 6 

1 Mat. Par., II., p. 583. 

2 Sel. Chart., p. 288. Statutes of Realm, I., p. 5. Cf. Rymer, I., 
p. 126. 

3 For election of Roger of Salisbury, vide Sel. Chart., p. 288. 

4 Stubbs' Const. Hist., III., p. 315 and note. 

5 Cf. Mat. Far., III., pp. 169, 187. 

6 Rymer, I., pp. 135, 136. Cf. Fauli, Geschichte von England, III., 
p. 436. 



16 THE BARONS' WAR chap, i 

and such further assistance in the way of diplomacy 
and excommunications as Rome's greatest pontiff could 
afford in such a crisis. The English church was para- 
lyzed by the suspension of the great archbishop, 1 and 
for many a long year it remained under the domina- 
tion of papal emissaries. The result of the struggle 
between John and Innocent, the powers of despotism 
on the one side, and the representatives of English 
freedom on the other, need not detain us. Ultimately 
young Henry Avas crowned, the Charters reconfirmed 
by the king and Gualo, Louis of France expelled, and 
under the healing policy of the great Earl Marshall 
and Gualo, wisest of papal legates, the realm was 
reduced to peace. But given the character of the 
young king, the character of his reign was already 
largely determined. Aliens were already in the land; 
John's Charter to the church was in full force ; his 
oath of fealty to Rome had been renewed by Henry ; 
the king was already a special object of papal regard 
and under papal influence ; the Great Charter existed 
as the basic means for the preservation of national 
liberty ; and the national church, baronage, and people, 
acting in unison, had achieved a triumph which — as an 
historical fact — doubled in a certain sense the value 
of the statute. Whatever the inadequacy of the Great 
Charter, as a rigid constitution for a growing nation, 
may have been, it certainly limited royal prerogative, 
guaranteed national rights, and furnished stand ing- 

i Rymer, I., p. 139. Nov. 4, 1215. 



parti INTRODUCTION: PRIMARY FORCES 17 

ground for constitutional resistance to tyranny. As 
the winning of Magna Charta had been the first-fruits 
of English nationality, so in the evil days which fol- 
lowed the death of Stephen Langton the maintenance 
of its inviolability seemed to be the only pledge of 
continued national existence. As the administration 
of church and state fell more and more into the hands 
of aliens ; as the folly and faithlessness of the king 
himself became more and more apparent ; and as the 
peculiar character of governmental ills required the 
application of peculiar remedies, the "Struggle for 
the Charters ' developed into a struggle for the prin- 
ciples which they implicitly contained, and for the logi- 
cal extension of those principles as the sole guarantee 
for freedom and national existence. And so, in the 
course of time, the patriots of England raised the 
cry for the Provisions of Oxford as their fathers had 
done for the Great Charter, and their fathers' fathers 
for the laws of good king Edward. Although the 
chief importance of the Barons' War must always 
rest in its wonderful constitutional developments, yet 
to the men of the day the contest was not primarily 
a struggle for an ingenious political device, but to 
secure the right of native Englishmen to the enjoy- 
ment and fostering of their native heritage. The 
constitution was but a means to this end ; the de- 
velopment of the constitution was necessarily based 
on Anglo-Saxon forces, and it naturally grew into 
the representative system. Through Magna Charta 
the barons had promised to the people their rights ; 



18 THE BARONS' WAR chap, i 

the Provisions of Oxford had given the barons power 
to fulfil their promise ; but it was reserved for the 
genius of Simon de Montfort to accomplish its reali- 
zation by placing the means for vindicating English 
liberty and nationality in the only hands qualified in 
the long run to achieve the task — those of the people 
themselves. A thorough investigation of the causes 
of the Barons' War — which are essentially the same 
as those of the Provisions of Oxford — can alone de- 
termine its true character in the widest scope with 
reference to the crown, the papacy, the English church 
and nation, and the constitution. 



part ii THE INFLUENCE OF THE FBIARS 19 



PART II 

The Influence of the Friars 

Prominent among the causes which awoke national 
instincts and won the Great Charter had been the loss 
of Normandy and the consequent exclusion of foreign 
interests. That English nationality deepened and 
broadened was largely due to an element of a very 
different kind, though itself of foreign origin. On 
the 11th of September, 1 1221, a small body of men of 
unusual garb and appearance 2 landed at Dover. They 
were members of the order recently founded by 
Francis of Assisi and had been conveyed across the 
Channel by the charity of the monks of Fecamp. 3 
Three of the nine, however, were of English birth. 
Following the track of the Dominicans who had pre- 
ceded them three years before, they passed from Dover 
to Canterbury, thence to London and Oxford, 4 — part 
of their number remaining at each stopping-place. 
From such a humble beginning was destined to spring 
a movement which as " an instance of religious organi- 
zation and propagandism is unexampled in the annals 

1 Thomas de Eccleston, De Adventu Frat. Min., p. 5. 

2 Chron. de Lanercost, p. 30. They were locked up as spies and 
thieves. 

3 Eccles., p. 7. 

4 Ibid., pp. 7, 9. Trivet's Annales sex regum Anglise, p. 209, 



20 THE BARONS' WAR chap, i 

of the world." 1 Within a little more than thirty. years 
their numbers had increased one hundred and forty 
fold, and they counted forty-nine convents. 2 Among 
the membership many men of good birth and great 
influence came speedily to be included, 3 for the require- 
ments for admission to the order were framed to that 
intent, rather than to attract the lower classes. The 
applicant must " beleve of the Catholyk feith ; be 
suspecte of no erroure ; be not bound to matrimony ; 
be not unlawfully begotten ; be hoole of body ; be 
promote of mynde ; be not in det ; be not a bonde man 
borne ; be of good name and fame ; be competently 
lernyd, or ellis that he be of such conditioun that he 
maye profete the bretherne by laboure and his recep- 
tion maye be grete edification to the peple." 4 Yet 
these requirements by no means explain the firm hold 
which the order obtained upon England ; this came 
from its adaptability to the needs of the time. 

In view of the share which the national church had 
borne in winning the Charter, its political popularity 
had perhaps never been greater than in the early part 
of Henry's reign ; its spiritual influence, however, was 
sadly to seek. It has been already mentioned that 
during the first century after the Conquest the church 



i Brewer's Preface to Mon. Fran., p. xli. 

2 Eccles., p. 10. Dignum memoria quod secundo anno administra- 
tionis Fratris Petri, quinti ministri Anglise, anno scilicet ab adventu 
fratrum in Angliam XXXIP, numerati sunt viventes fratres, in pro- 
vincia Anglise, in XLIX. locis, MCCXLII. 

3 Eccles., pp. 15-17. Multi probi baccalaurei et multi nobiles. 

4 Mon. Fran., App. VII., p. 574. 



part ii THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRIARS 21 

had become more and more Romanized, more and more 
hierarchical. As Rome herself through the acquire- 
ment of worldly power had lost, pari passu, her spirit- 
ual force, so also corruption and spiritual weakness had 
been engendered in England through contact with 
Rome and Roman methods. The biting sarcasm of 
Nigellus in his Speculum Stultorum shows how far 
degeneration from this source had gone by the time of 
Henry II. But farther than this, the Crusades had 
brought a Nemesis upon the church. The Saracens 
had not only not been Christianized but had actually 
paganized Christianity. Heretical ideas were imbibed 
from this source as well as from the study of Aristotle; 
strange thoughts, customs, even diseases, penetrated 
Europe from the East. 1 Naturally the towns, seats of 
commercial activity, were most affected by this move- 
ment. But precisely upon the towns, in England as 
elsewhere, the hold of the church was weakest. Not 
only had monks of early times chosen the country 
exclusively as their residence, but their claim to market 
rights and tolls had brought them into actual colli- 
sion with many market-towns and boroughs. 2 A large 
and politically most important field of work was 
therefore almost wholly withdrawn from the action of 
the regular clergy, and either abandoned entirely or 
2iven over to the tender mercies of what was rap- 
idly becoming a hereditary class of secular benefice- 

1 Mon. Fran., Pref., p. x. 

2 Pauli's Pictures of Old England. Otte's translation, Macmillan 
and Co., London, 1861, p. 44. 



22 THE BARONS' WAR chap, i 

holders. 1 To complete the spiritual weakness of the 
church in England, the great secularizing conflict be- 
tween pope and emperor was sustained, on the side of 
the former, largely by English resources. In regard 
to this struggle Matthew Paris writes 2 in 1239, 
"The reputation and authority of the pope have suf- 
fered disastrous loss ; scandal has arisen and wise and 
holy men have begun greatly to fear for the honour 
of church, pope, and the whole body of the clergy." 

Into this turmoil the Franciscans entered, throwing 
their whole heart and soul into their triple task of pro- 
viding for the religious, physical, and mental welfare 
of the perishing population of the towns. They brought 
to the work their poverty, which made them one with 
the people, and even dependent 3 upon popular sym- 
pathy for their daily bread ; their humility and devo- 
tion, which could hardly fail to win the hearts of those 
among whom they unweariedly laboured ; their shrewd 
common sense and practical wisdom, such as befitted 
men thrown wholly upon their own mental resources 
in the quick reading of character, and deprived of the 
factitious aid of books. 4 Whether as preachers or 



1 Roberti Grosseteste Epistolse, Ep. LII, pp. 159, 160. Mon. 
Fran., Pref., p. xiii. 

2 Mat. Par., III., 638. For the evil of the times, cf. Mon. Fran., 
Ep. Ad. xx., pp. 104, 105 ; Ep. xxxviii., p. 141. His diebus damnatissimis. 

3 Gifts to the friars in London varied from 6d. to 40s. Their small- 
ness indicates the class from which they were received. Mon. Fran. , 
pp. 493 et seq. ; also Pref., pp. xli., xlii. 

4 St. Francis had answered a request for the ownership of a breviary, 
Ego breviarium, ego breviarium. Mon. Fran., Pref., p. xxxi. Green, 
I., p. 258. 



part ii THE INFLUENCE OF THE FBIABS 23 

teachers, their circumstances impelled them to base 
their appeals or instruction upon experience rather 
than on theory ; the result could not be for a moment 
doubtful. What the monks and regular clergy had 
lost, these " missionaries to the towns ' now won. 
Their unuttered philosophy of life struck even deeper 
root than their formal teaching. As the doctrines of 
Wycliffe undoubtedly fostered at a later date the social- 
istic tendencies inherent in the masses, so at this early 
period the thoroughly Christian democracy of the 
Mendicant Friars fostered the growth of the city com- 
mune, 1 which — in London especially — played such an 
important part in the Barons' War. It can scarcely be 
considered an accident that exactly in those towns in 
which the Friars had their firmest seats, the popular 
sentiment was most directly opposed to papal and 
royal tyranny, and in favour of reform in church and 
state. These two towns were London and Oxford. 

In less than a month 2 after their landing, the Friars 
had reached the university-town and lost no time in 
letting their presence be felt. 3 Education played a no 
less important part in their general programme 4 than 

1 Ant. Leg., pp. 55, 61 ; Winton, p. 101 ; Wykes, p. 138. 

2 Landing Sept. 11, 1224, they left London for Oxford "ante 
festum Omnium Sanctorum, 1 ' Eccles., p. 9. 

3 Eccles., pp. 17, 38. Et ita inundavit in provincia Anglicana 
donum sapientiae ut ante absolutionem Fratris W. de Nothingham, 
essent in Anglia triginta lectores, qui solempniter disputabant, et tres 
vel quatuor, qui sine disputatione legebant. 

4 In 1225 their first warden at London established a night-school. 
Factus est gardianus laicus quidam Lombardus, qui tunc primo de 
nocte didicit literas in ecclesia b. Petri de Cornhulle. Eccles., p. 10. 



24 THE BARONS' WAB chap, i 

it did at a later day in Germany among the Brothers 
of the Common Life, and still later among the Jesuits, 
— and with an equally notable success. The remark- 
able poem 1 on the Battle of Lewes alone would prove 
how deeply the Friars pondered politics, if other signs 
were wanting. But they are not. It was in Oxford, 
in 1238, that the legate Otho, in full pontificals, fled 
into the church-tower for safety, while the students 
searched for him with angry shouts : 2 " Where is that 
usurer, simoniac, and plunderer of benefices, who thirsts 
after gold, perverts the king, subverts the realm, and 
enriches aliens from our spoils ? " Not to mention 
other stormy scenes, there arose a great strife 3 in the 
University at the end of 1258 between scholars of dif- 
ferent races, Scotch and Welsh, Northerners and South- 
erners, in which many beneath the rival banners were 
killed or wounded. A later historian sees in this the 
prelude to the later war and a justification of the an- 
cient rhyme 4 — 

Chronica si penses cum pugnant Oxonienses, 
Post pancos menses volat ira per Angiigenenses. 

A surer proof, however, of the political leanings and 

1 Wright's Political Songs. Cf. Pauli, Tubinger Programm, pp. 
28, 31. 

2 Mat. Par., Chron. Maj., III., p. 483. Ann. Mon. de Oseneia, pp. 
84, 85. 

3 Mat. Par., V., pp. 726, 727. 

4 Wood, Hist, et Antiq. Univ. Oxon., I., p. 109. Certe bellum illud 
academicum in sequentibus regni tumultibus prtelusisse, et antiquis 
bisce Rhythmis fidem fecisse videbatur, quoting MS. Aurum ex Ster- 
core by Robert Talbot. 



part ii THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRIARS 25 

services of the Friars is seen in the mutual relations of 
the three great men to whom, more than to any others, 
the formation of a national-ecclesiastical party was due, 
— Adam of Marsh, a Minorite and the soul of the Uni- 
versity of Oxford in his day ; Robert Grosseteste, the 
great bishop of Lincoln ; and Simon de Montfort. 

In this movement Adam's importance is twofold : 
he is the intermediary between the University of Ox- 
ford and Grosseteste upon the one hand, and between 
Grosseteste and Leicester on the other. Of his two 
hundred and forty-seven letters preserved in the Mon- 
umenta Franciscana, one-third are addressed to these 
two men, sixty -two to Grosseteste. Such is the charm 
of the tender friendship which they reveal and so 
weighty is their information upon points of the great- 
est historical importance, that one is almost tempted 
to wish that viva voce intercourse had been curtailed, 
if so be the correspondence, voluminous as it is, could 
thereby have been increased. 

The bishop of Lincoln was the Friars' staunchest 
friend. He desires to have them always with him, 1 
enhances their influence by all means in his power, 
and defends them against their enemies. To the 
bishop of Lichfield he writes, 2 "We have heard that 
at Chester, in the presence of the people and some 
magnates, you bitterly abused the Minorites because 
they wished to live with the Dominicans there. This, 
if true, must have proceeded not from deliberation, 

i Rob. Gross., Epist. XIV., XV., XX., XLI. Lanercost, p. 43. 
2 Rob. Gross., Epist. XXXIV., pp. 120-122. 



26 THE BARONS' WAR Chap, i 

but some sudden impulse. Your discretion knows 
how useful the presence and intercourse of the Friars 
Minors is to the people with whom they dwell, since 
both by the word of preaching and the example of a 
holy and heavenly conversation, and the devotion of 
continual prayer, they are indefatigable in promoting 
peace and in illuminating the country, and in this part 
supply in a great measure the defects of the prelates." 
Still more emphatically he adds, " Because, therefore, 
the conversation of the Minorites is the illumination of 
the people with whom they dwell to the understanding 
of the truth ; since it is in life a guide, stimulus, and 
attraction to peace, is no slight supplement to the de- 
fects of the prelates among whom they dwell, and is 
the occasion of abundance, not poverty, to others who 
are needy ; no true lover of good can deliberately repel 
such a good, but must rather attract it with his whole 
strength." In these words we have the clue to Grosse- 
teste's reasons for championing the Friars : through 
their religious zeal and usefulness he hoped to shame the 
secular clergy into purity and energy, to check the rising 
flood of infidelity, and to regenerate the land. In this 
programme the University of Oxford bore a leading part. 
Without the efficient aid of Grosseteste, the Friars 
could scarcely have obtained a lodgment there, and he 
may have even summoned them himself ; at any rate, 
he became, in 1224, their first lecturer. 1 His interest 

1 Lanercost, p. 45. Gross. Ep., Pref., p. xxii. Eccles., p. 37. 
Sub quo inestimabiliter infra breve tempus, tarn in concionibus quain 
prsedicatione congruis subtilibus moralitatibus, profecerunt. 



part ii THE INFLUENCE OF TIIE FRIARS 27 

in the University never flagged thereafter. He plays 
the mediator in troubles between the students and the 
town, is active in the affair, 1 already mentioned, with 
the legate Otho, is consulted 2 by Adam in regard to 
the internal workings of the institution, and influ- 
ences the character of the curriculum. Grosseteste 
had probably resided as chancellor 3 until 1235 ; mean- 
while the Friars had been gaining possession of the 
chairs of theology in the University, largely through 
the efforts 4 of Adam of Marsh. That the bishop's 
sympathies were wholly enlisted on the side of this 
further development of theological studies, is shown 
by his remarkable letter 5 to the Regents of Theology. 
" Ye are builders of the house of God ; the foundation- 
stones of his house are the Books of the Prophets — 
Moses among them ; likewise the Books of the Apos- 
tles and Evangelists. There is a 'tempus fundandi' no 
less than a 'tempus sedificandi,' and that is the early 
morning hour." He seeks to model Oxford after Paris 6 

1 For different versions, cf. Mat. Par., III., pp. 481-485. Dunst., 
p. 147. Burton, pp. 253, 254. Theok., p. 107. 

2 Ada? de Mar. Epist., Ep. XXII., p. 107. 

3 Wood, Hist, et Antiq. Univ. Oxon., II., p. 389. Pauli, Tiibinger 
Programm, 1864, p. 12. 

4 Cf. Pauli, Tiibinger Programm, pp. 20, 21. Bei solchen und 
ahnlichen Anlassen hauptsachlich scheint es gelungen zu sein den 
Minoriten ein in der That unvergleichliches Vorrecht zu erobern, das 
wesentlich zu ihrer Herrschaft an der Universitat beigetragen hat. 

6 Rob. Gross., Epist. CXXIIL, pp. 346, 347. Written circa 1240 or 
1246. 

6 Rob. Gross., Epist. CXXIIL, p. 347. Wood, Hist. L, p. 94. Inno- 
centius . . . Episcopo Lincoln. Nos tuis supplication ibus inclinati, 
prsesentium tibi auctoritate concedimus, ut nullum ibi docere in 



28 THE BARONS' WAR chap, i 

and with brilliant success. 1 The foundation of the 
University jurisdiction 2 was probably laid by his 
jealous care, and as a last mark of his affection he 
bequeathed 3 his books to the Convent of the Oxford 
Minorites. The permanence of his influence is at- 
tested no less by the Oxford students' firm support 4 
of de Montfort in the Barons' War, than by the 
formal statement 5 of the University in 1307 when it 
joined with Edward I. in the endeavour to enroll the 
great bishop's name in the calendar of saints. " Never 
was he known to abandon any good work pertaining to 
his office or his duty through fear of any man, but was 
ever ready for martyrdom if the sword of the smiter 
should smite him." When we consider that Oxford 
probably counted thirty thousand 6 students in these 
latter days, and weigh the political as well as the 
religious importance of the city in the troubles of the 
realm, we must assuredly rank Grosseteste's Oxford 
efforts high among the causes which made for the 
growth of English national sentiments and freedom. 
It must not be supposed that Grosseteste's connec- 

aliqua facilitate permittas, nisi qui secundum morem Parisiensem a 
te . . . examinatus f uerit. 

i Rob. Gross., Epist. CXIV., p. 335. Mat. Par., V., p. 353. For 
Oxford's European reputation, vide Mon. Fran., Pref., p. lxxxi. 

2 Wood, Hist., I., p. 93, citing brief of May 10, 28 Hen. III. 

3 Trivet, Annates, p. 243. 

4 E.g., Chronicon Willielmi de Rishanger, p. 22. Walter de 
Hemingburgh, p. 311. 

5 Wood, Hist, et Antiq., I., p. 105. Rob. Gross. Epist., Pref., 
p. lxxxiv. 

6 Pauli, Tiibinger Programm, p. 21, citing Huber, Eng. Univ. I. , p. 117. 



part ii THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRIARS 29 

tion with Oxford and the Friars was formed with any 
avowed politieal purpose. Yet the religious and edu- 
cational influence of the Friars and their whole system 
of independent thought could scarcely fail, when 
coupled with the political occurrences of the time, to 
bear political fruit. In their intimacy with Simon de 
Montfort, however, Grosseteste and Adam of Marsh 
were touching, more or less consciously, the very 
centre of political life and almost the sole hope of 
political freedom. It is certainly significant to find 
in the correspondence of Adam of Marsh an allusion to 
a treatise on tyranny * written by the head of the na- 
tional-ecclesiastical party, sent to the Chancellor of the 
University of Oxford, and sealed with the seal of Simon 
de Montfort. The significance is doubled when in the 
same letter the statement occurs that Earl Simon is 
deeply 2 interested in Grosseteste's religious plans, and 
proposes, if possible, to organize a party for their 
realization. In addition, the zeal of the two friends 
for his general welfare, their sympathy for him in his 
troubles, exhortations to patience and long-suffering, 
advice as to his situation at court and how to improve 
it, together with actual help of the most important 
political kind, 3 attest their realization of his great 
value to the commonwealth. In a certain very true 
sense, de Montfort is their spiritual pupil, 4 and it can 

1 Ad. de Mar., Ep. XXV., pp. 110-112: "de principatu regni et 
tyrannidis." 2 " Supra quam a multis credi posset." 

3 Ad. de Mar., Ep. CXLI., p. 270. 

4 Cf. Eish. Chronica, p. 36, cited infra, p. 30, n. 1. Mat. Par., V., 



30 THE BARONS' WAR chap.*i 

scarcely be doubted that the popular enthusiasm for 
the earl as the great champion of religious freedom 
was largely founded on his intimacy with Grosseteste. 
It is a touching, but unconscious, tribute, which one 
chronicler pays to both by closing the roll of the dead 
leader's virtues with the fact of this friendship. 1 There 
is a legend which testifies still more strikingly to their 
juxtaposition in the popular mind. 2 Just before the 
battle of Evesham a youth was brought to be healed 
at Grosseteste' s tomb. He fell asleep, and on waking 
said that the holy bishop had gone to Evesham to the 
assistance of de Montfort, who was about to die there. 
It was even said 3 that Grosseteste had foretold earl 
Simon's death : " Laying his hand on the head of the 
earl's eldest son, he said to him, O fill carissime ! et tu 
et pater tuus ambo moriemini uno die, unoque die et 
morbo, pro justitia." As de Montfort's success was 
dependent on his popularity and moral worth, this 
reputation was invaluable to him ; while, conversely, 
his association with Grosseteste and the Friars enabled 
him to understand the working of the popular mind, 

pp. 415, 416. Lincolniensis, cui comes tanquam patri confessori 
extitit familiarissimus. 

1 Rish. Chronica, p. 36. Beato Roberto . . . adh?erere (comes 
Legrecestrise) satagebat, eique suos parvulos tradidit nutriendos. 
Ipsius concilio tractabat ardua, tentabat dubia, finivit inchoata, ea 
maxime per quse meritum sibi succrescere ffistimabat. Cf. Rish. 
Chronicon, p. 7. Ad. de Mar., Ep. XXV., p. 110, etc. 

2 Rish. Chronicon, p. 71, among the Miracula Simonis. Cited 
by Luard in this connection, Rob. Gross. Epist., Pref. , p. lxxxvi, n. 3. 

3 Rish. Chronicon, p. 7. Eor variation in wording, vide Rish. 
Chronica, p. 36. 



part ii THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRIARS 31 

to sympathize with popular objects, and ultimately to 
incorporate the people in his general plan of govern- 
ment. There exists apparently no other reason for 
Simon's superiority to the rest of the English baronage 
in the breadth and democratic character of his views, 
than his deeper piety and constant intimacy with the 
Minorites and their supporters. 

The history of the many abortive attempts during 
Grosseteste's life to control royal misgovernment had 
shown clearly — and events after the meeting of the 
parliament of Oxford were to show still more conclu- 
sively — that the baronage as a secular power, influ- 
enced by selfish aims and torn by discord, was unable, 
single-handed, to solve the problem. It was the mis- 
fortune of the church to lie at the mercy of king and 
pope, who usually combined their powers for extortion. 
Even when the royal caprice resisted papal exactions, 
the clergy dared not lean for support on such a shaking 
reed. 1 The church, moreover, had been fatally weak- 
ened by the intrusion of foreigners into its highest 
offices and by excessive taxation ; and the baronage 
had viewed its struggles with indifference until it was 
discovered that, in proportion as the clergy were im- 
poverished, the national burdens pressed with addi- 
tional force upon the laity. 2 In these circumstances 
Grosseteste did all that man could do. He resisted 



\ Mat. Par., IV., p. 559. Multi itaque praelatorum, timentes regis in 
hoc suo concepto proposito instabilitatem et consilii regii pusillanimi- 
tatem, partem papalem confovebant (1246). 

2 Liugard, Hist, of England, III., p. 115. 



32 THE BARONS' WAR chap, i 

papal tyranny, rebuked royal extortion and the mis- 
government of both church and realm, and in so far as 
was possible, encouraged an alliance between church 
and baronage. At the great reform parliament of 
1244, the final word had lain with him. The king 
had produced a papal letter, and both by messengers 
and in person, had tried to induce the clergy to break 
their union with the baronage and grant him a separate 
aid. Grosseteste brought the discussion to a close by 
referring to the agreement with the barons, and utter- 
ing the prophetic words : 1 " We may not be divided 
from the common council, because it is written, ' If we 
are divided, we shall forthwith all die.' His indirect 
influence through the Friars and the University of 
Oxford, as well as upon Leicester, has been already 
noticed. The result was, that although the time was 
not yet ripe for action, since oppression had not yet 
fused the elements of resistance into one, he had laid 
the foundations of a party which was to combine zeal 
for religious freedom with aspirations for national and 
political independence. His letter 2 to the Lords and 
Commons of the Realm and the Citizens of London is 
a trumpet-call to battle. It is an " appeal to the faith- 
ful children of the venerated English church in behalf 
of their fostering mother to restore her to her former 
state of peace, usefulness, and plenty." "The church is 
being worn out by constant oppressions ; the pious 

i Mat. Par., IV., pp. 362-366. 

2 Rob. Gross., Epist. CXXXL, pp. 442-444. Dated in 1252, 
according to Luard. 



part ii THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRIARS 33 

purposes of its early benefactors are being brought 
to nought by the confiscation of its ample patrimony 
to the uses of aliens, while the native English suffer. 
These aliens are not merely foreigners ; they are the 
worst enemies 1 of England. They strive to tear the 
fleece and do not even know the faces of the sheep ; 
they do not understand the Euglish tongue, neglect 
the cure of souls, and impoverish the kingdom. Unless 
the speediest remedy is found, the church of England, 
anciently free, will be laden with a perpetual tribute 
through appeals to Rome and through the impositions, 
reservations, and provisions of the Apostolic See, whose 
claims, on account of the too great patience of English- 
men — nay, rather their folly — increase in extent from 
day to day. Therefore, let the noble Knighthood of 
England and the illustrious Commonalty of London 
and the Realm manfully rise to defend their fostering 
mother. Let them see to it, and know if it be fitting 
and expedient that the English be as sheep which bear 
fleeces, and oxen which carry yokes, not for themselves, 
but for others. That the realm of England may re- 
cover the pristine glory of its now tarnished name, that 
it may laudably perform its divine functions, and be 
strong to resist the spiritual enemies who cast their 
lustful eyes upon it, let the secular power be effec- 
tively armed to resist encroachments, and let the treas- 
ury be preserved for the sons of the soil. This will 
verily redound not merely to the unspeakable aclvan- 



1 Capitales inimici. 



34 THE BARONS' WAR chap, i 

tage of the land itself and the perpetuation of its 
people's fame, but also to the glory of God." The 
year after this appeal was published, a noble victory 
seemed to have been won. With unusual solemnity 
the Great Charter was confirmed ; fourteen bishops 
with bell, book, and candle excommunicated all in- 
fractors, and at the awful moment when the candles 
were extinguished and the words of the curse, " So 
may all who incur this judgment be extinguished and 
stink in hell r fell upon the startled air, the king 
exclaimed : " May God so help me as I shall faith- 
fully maintain these things inviolate, as I am man, as 
I am Christian, as knight, and king crowned and 
anointed." 1 Grosseteste was one of the officiating 
bishops, but future woes seemed to oppress his pre- 
scient spirit, and one of his last public acts was to 
cause the Great Charter to be proclaimed throughout 
the length and breadth of his great diocese of Lincoln. 2 
Upon his death-bed — if we may trust the great national 
chronicler 3 — his last words were a prophecy: "Nor 
will the church be freed from the bondage of Egypt, 
except at the point of the bloody sword ; but these 
things now are light, yet in short space of time — 
within three years — heavier burdens are to come." 

i Mat. Par., V., pp. 375-377. Kymer, I., pp. 289, 290. Burt, pp. 
305, 306. Wav., p. 345. Liber de Ant. Leg., p. 18. 

2 Mat. Par., V., p. 378. Robertus prseconizans in corde suo, et 
timens ne rex a pactis resiliret, fecit . . . excommunicare solempniter, 
in qualibet ecclesia parochia per diocesim suam, quae prse numerosi- 
tate sua vix possunt sestimare . . . infractores. 

3 Mat. Par., V., p. 407. 



part ii THE INFLUENCE OF THE FBIARS 35 

He had already * said that the Roman court, to work 
its wicked will, had made the king partaker in its 
crimes. The second statement explains the first, for 
the iniquities of pope and king had become so inextri- 
cably linked together, that both or neither must be 
assailed. Only with reference to this coming dual 
struggle can Grosseteste's prophecy and his life-work 
be correctly understood. Simon de Mont fort, as at 
once the heir of Grosseteste's religious views and 
political sympathies, 2 and as the practical head of the 
English baronage, combined in his own person all the 
highest aspirations of the period, and inevitably be- 
came in the fulness of time the head of the national 
movement. 



!Mat. Par., V.,p. 407. 

2 Cf. Rish. Chronicon, p. 7. It was the preaching of the Friars 
after Evesham, and their use of Simon's life and deeds as a subject, 
which first revivified the national party. Vide infra, p. 198, 199, 
and n. 1. 



36 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 



CHAPTER II 

THE FORCES WHICH ROUSED ENGLAND TO 
ARMED RESISTANCE 

PART I 

The Poetical Literature 

Admirers of national songs and ballads have fre- 
quently ascribed to them marvellous power in shaping 
the destinies of nations, placing them in this respect 
above the laws. This on the broad scale may be true 
or false ; to discover the exact influence of the songs 
of a particular period is the more important task, and 
it frequently baffles the historian. Thirteenth-century 
England is no exception to this rule: songs which mir- 
rored the times existed in greater or less profusion, 
but the bare fact of existence is not infrequently the 
sole witness to their power. It is certain that they 
were composed by men whose interest in current events 
was deep, and that they afforded expression to popular 
opinion. Their subject-matter and the language in 
which they are written point unmistakably in most 
cases to the clergy as their authors, but there our 
knowledge ends. 



part i THE POETICAL LITERATURE 37 

In other instances, however, — and as good luck will 
have it, the most important ones, — the very fact of 
authorship determines the limit of their influence. 
Such capable critics 1 as Pauli and Green join in attrib- 
uting the origin of the " remarkable Latin poems which 
treat of the leading ideas of the great popular move- 
ment and the sudden readiness of the third estate for 
a genuine constitutional form of government " to mem- 
bers of the order of St. Francis. The stimulative 
influence of the songs cannot in this case fall far short 
of the stimulative influence of their authors. The 
peculiar portability of the rhymed verses, and the close 
intimacy which existed between all members of the 
order, would ensure the wide transmission of the songs 
in their original form ; the Friars' genius for preach- 
ing would transmute the ardent Latin into the more 
homely, but scarcely less glowing, native speech, while 
the general popularity of the Friars would guarantee 
them a vast audience. The more sublimated ideas 
might be lost in the process, but the substratum of 
hard sense would remain and be strengthened by prac- 
tical applications such as the Friars best knew how to 
make. And upon the few choice spirits who could 
appreciate the depth and breadth and force of the 
original, the refined ideas would work with tenfold 
power. It is not too much to say that the strongest 
proof of the demand for the rise of the unrepresented 



1 Pauli, Bilder aus Alt-England, pp. 44, 45, from which the quo- 
tation infra is taken. Green, History of the English People, I., 
p. 265. 



38 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

knighthood and commonalty to a share in the govern- 
ment of the realm — the writ to the parliament of 
Jan. 20, 1265, excepted — is the remarkable poem 
On the Battle of Lewes. 1 It is the only document 
which bases, or attempts to base, upon an adequate 
theory of government the great movement from which 
the reign of Henry III. derives its chief importance. 

The songs of the reign of Henry III. are an especially 
valuable indication of the temper of the times. In the 
reign of John the eulogies and elegies which seem to 
have formed the bulk of the poetical literature in the 
early Anglo-Norman period had begun already to give 
way to the political satire. 2 Under Henry III. the 
movement goes rapidly on. The language changes 
from Latin to Anglo-Norman or a mixture of both, 3 
until finally, when excitement has reached its height 
and the popular imagination mocks the conquered foe 
at Lewes, the first extant political poem in the English 
tongue appears. 

The Kyng of Alemaigne wende do f ul wel, 
He saisede the mulne for a castel, 

1 A summary of this poem is given below, pp. 221-230. 

2 Wright's Pol. Songs, Pref., p. viii. Cf. p. 6. 

Savarics, reis cui cors sofraing 
Greu fara bon envasimen 
E pois a flac cor recrezen 
Jamais nuls hom en el non poing. 

This song, though written by the younger Bertrand de Born, and 
therefore not English, is a fair sample of the early style, and applies 
to Henry even better than to John. 

3 Pol. Songs, pp. 51-56. 



part i THE POETICAL LITERATURE 39 

With hare sharpe swerdes he grounde the stel, 
He wende that the sayles were mangonel 
To helpe Wyndesore. 
Richard, thah thou be ever trichard, 
Trichen shalt thou never more. 1 

The substance of the poems passes through three 
stages, 2 corresponding to certain great movements of 
the reign. The first stage turns from lament to com- 
plaint, from complaint to invective ; the second de- 
mands reform and appeals to individual leaders ; the 
third returns solemn thanks for victory and in impas- 
sioned language, but calmly perfect logic, seeks to 
justify the new basis of the state. But only too soon 
victory is changed to defeat, and the bursts of joy 
which hailed de Montfort conqueror and saviour die 
away into the accents of despair 3 or with deep relig- 
ious feeling celebrate his martyrdom and enroll his 
name in the calendar of saints. 

Salve, Symon Montis-Fortis, 
Totius flos militia?, 
Duras poenas passus mortis, 
Protector gentis Anglise. 4 

Without exception the songs of the whole period are 
on the popular side, a noble illustration of the position 

1 The whole poem is in Wright's Pol. Songs, pp. 69, 70. Wende = 
thought ; trichard = deceiver. 

2 1216-1258 ; 1258-1263 ; 1263-1272. 

3 Wright's Pol. Songs, pp. 125-127. Lament for Simon de Mont- 
fort, — ' ' MCs par sa mort, le cuens Mountf ort conquist la victorie, 
Come ly martyr de Caunterbyr, finist sa vie." 

4 Pol. Songs, p. 124. Cf. for slightly different reading, Rish. 
Chronicon, pp. 109, 110, with addition of " Ora pro nobis, beati 
Symon ! ut digni efficiamur promissionibus Christi." 



40 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

of the church and the national hero-worship of de 
Montfort. They touch upon purely secular abuses, 
but religious questions are their chief concern. They 
lament the lawlessness of the times and the growing 
infidelity ; * they censure the avarice of Rome, where 

Muims et petitio currunt passu pari, 
Nummus eloquentia gaudet singulari. 2 

The debasement of the clergy as a spiritual body, the 
vitiation of the teachings of the church through the 
introduction of doctrines of expediency, and the con- 
sequent scorn of the clergy as entertained by the 
people are shown to be among the far-reaching results 
of universal venality. 3 The church falls, therefore, a 
helpless prey to the rapacity of pope and king, who 
unite their efforts to impoverish it. 4 "The king does 
not act wisely ; living upon the robbery of Holy 

1 Pol. Songs, p. 47. Mundi status hodie multum variatur, Semper 
in deterius misere mutatur. . . . Rex et regni proceres satis sunt 
amari ; Omnes fere divites nimis sunt avari ; Pauper pauca possedens 
debet depilari, Et ut ditet divitem rebus spoliari. P. 48. Regnat nunc 
impietas, pietas fugatur ; Nobilisque largitas procul relegatur . . . 
Fidei perfidia jam parificatur. 

2 Cf. Pol. Songs, pp. 30, 31. Coram cardinalibus, coram patriarcha, 
Libra libros, reos res, Marcum vincit marca. To multiply examples 
is endless. P. 30. Roma, turpitudinis jacens in profundis, Virtutes 
prseposterat opibus inmundis . . . mutat quadrata rotimdis. 

3 Pol. Songs, p. 31. Roma cunctos erudit ut ad opus transvolent. 
P. 33. Non tarn verbis inhiant quam famse docentis. 

4 Pol. Songs, p. 43. Li rois ne l'apostoile ne pensent altrement, 
Mes coment au clers tolent lur or e lur argent. Co est tute la summe, 
Ke la pape de Rume Al rey trop consent, Pur aider sa curune La dime 
de clers li dune — De co en f et sun talent. 



part i THE POETICAL LITERATURE 41 

Church he knows he cannot thrive." 1 About seven 
years after these last lines were written, their corol- 
lary appeared ; — Simon de Montfort is a tower of 

strength — 

Ce voir, et je m'acort 

II eime dreit, et het le tort, 

Si avera la mestrie. 2 

The prophecy was speedily fulfilled at Lewes. 

1 Pol. Songs, p. 44. 

2 Ibid., p. 61. Date is probably 1263. The preceding was evi- 
dently written during the Sicilian exactions. 



42 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 



PART II 

The Alienation of London from the Crown 

Even in the days of William the Conqueror the city 
of London was of sufficient importance for him to think 
it wise to confirm its privileges by royal charter, 1 and 
since that time it had been steadily growing in political 
power and influence. One privilege after another had 
been accorded to it, until its position among the English 
cities had become unique. Even John, during the early 
years of his reign, had wooed it zealously and sought to 
beautify it. 2 The immediate result of his unwise change 
of policy had been the adhesion of the city to the barons, 
which in turn was followed by a great defection from 
the royal party ; three weeks later John found himself 
compelled to sign the Magna Charta. 3 In this document 
London received additional proofs of its great impor- 
tance : its mayor became one of the Charter's chosen 
guardians ; it obtained the same privileges as the barons 
in the imposition of aids ; and in common with other 
cities and towns it received the confirmation of its an- 
cient liberties and customs. 4 

1 Sel. Chart., pp. 82, 83. 

2 Pauli, Gesch. von Eng., III., p. 484. 

3 Stubbs' Const. Hist., I , p. 569. Cf. Pauli, Gesch. von Eng., III., 
p. 432. 

4 Sel. Chart., arts. 12, 13, pp. 298, 306. Stat, of Realm, I., p. 10. 
Rymer, I., p. 131. 



PART II 



THE ALIENATION OF LONDON 43 



With that shortsightedness, however, which was one 
of his characteristics, Henry III., disdaining the object- 
lesson which his father had received, not only refrained 
from conciliating the city but entered upon a course of 
action which bore him evil fruit in the days of the Barons' 
War. To rehearse the many indignities and injuries 
which he heaped upon the luckless city would be tedious. 
The pages of Matthew Paris and of the Book of the 
Ancient Laws 2 abound in instances. Nor is it necessary 
to trace the source of his behaviour ; on one side, it was 
his chronic poverty, and on the other, his besetting vice 
of favouritism. 

The latter led him to champion the cause of the Abbey 
of Westminster against the privileges of the city and 
incidentally to interfere seriously with the course of 
trade. Personal wrongs, such as Mayor Gerard Bat 2 had 
suffered, might be forgiven or passed over from fear, but 
by a certain transaction in the year 1248 Henry roused 
the lasting resentment of every tradesman in the city. 
It was his custom to celebrate the yearly feast of Edward 
the Confessor at Westminster ; to make the occasion as 
magnificent as possible, and at the same time to favour his 
pet abbey, he established there a two weeks' fair. To 
ensure variety of merchandise and a large attendance, he 

i Ant. Leg., pp. 8, 10, 14-16, 19-23, 25, 30-37, etc. 

2 Elected mayor in 1240. Henry refused to confirm him unless he 
would renounce the usual salary of £10. His pitiful reply to this 
demand — "Alas, my lord ! out of this sum my daughter could have 
had a marriage portion" — so roused Henry's wrath that Bat was 
forced to resign altogether. Ant. Leg., p. 8. Mat. Far., IV., pp. 
94, 95. 



44 THE B AEONS' WAR chap, ii 

next decreed that at this time no other fairs should be 
held in England, and that on pain of forfeiture, no goods 
should be sold in London, whether under roof or in the 
open air. The throngs which came to Westminster 
answered the royal expectation, but the accommodations 
offered to the merchants were insufficient. The ground 
was muddy, and the wares, inadequately protected by 
mere canvas booths, were seriously injured. 1 Four years 
later a repetition of this process, under still more dis- 
advantageous circumstances and with still more injurious 
results, roused the stings of memory and reawakened 
the ire of all. 2 

Midway between these two events, in the year 1250, 
there had occurred another breach between West- 
minster and London. Henry had endeavoured to force 
a deputation of the citizens to make important conces- 
sions to the abbot in exchange for certain privileges 
already theirs by right. They pleaded their inability 
to comply without the consent of the commune, where- 
upon the angry king suspended the action of the charter 
and took the administration of the city into his own 
hand. 

The citizens then had recourse to Richard of Corn- 
wall, Simon de Montfort, and other magnates of the 
council, with the result that these, fearing for their 

1 Mat. Par., V., pp. 28, 29. Ant. Leg., p. 14. This same affair 
damaged the fair of Ely. Mat. Par., V., pp. 29, 433. 

2 Mat. Par., V., pp. 333, 334. Nee pepercit eisdem propter hiemalis 
intemperiei inclementiam, lutum, pluviam, et loci ineptitudinem, quin 
tentoriis stare cogerentur. Exponere igitur jussit ipsis invitis merces 
suas, . . . non veritus omnium imprecationes, etc. 



part ii THE ALIENATION OF LONDON 45 

own immunities and vested rights, caused the decree 
to be annulled. 1 Here, apparently, begins Simon's 
friendly connection with this important factor in the 
later troubles of the reign ; it was years afterward, 
when London and the barons were formally leagued 
for resistance, that this old suit between the city and 
Westminster was finally decided in favour of the 
former. 2 The happy coincidence could scarcely fail to 
strengthen Leicester's influence and power. 

Although many examples of ill-treatment occur in 
the earlier part of his independent reign, yet Henry 
first seems to have adopted spoliation as a definite 
policy in the year 1248. Pecuniary aid having been 
positively refused by the July parliament' of that year 
— on the ground of the impoverishment of the realm 
for aliens and the refusal of the king to appoint the 
three great officers of state 3 — Henry turned in despair 
to his foreign councillors, accused them of having 
brought him to this pass, and demanded their advice. 
It was resolved that he should sell his plate, " For," 
said the crafty aliens, " as all rivers flow back into the 
sea, so all those things which now are sold, will return 
to you as gifts." After the sale was over and the king 
had learned that London was the purchaser, he petu- 
lantly exclaimed : "Of a yerity, if the treasure of 



1 Ant. Leg., pp. 15, 16. Mat. Par., V., pp. 127, 128. Regali autem 
voluntati, immo potius impetui et deliramento, restitit in quantum 
potuit major civitatis cum tota communa unanimiter. 

2 Ant. Leg., pp. 57, 58. In 1263. 

3 Mat. Par., V., pp. 20, 21. 



46 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

Octavian l were up for sale, the city of London would 
absorb it all ; these loutish Londoners are rich and call 
themselves ' barons ' to the point of nausea ; that city 
is an exhausted well of wealth." He forthwith con- 
ceived the plan of seizing frivolous pretexts for despoil- 
ing the citizens of their goods. 2 From this time on, 
the city was tallage d without mercy, 3 gifts were wrung 
from individual citizens, and the court, through the 
exaction of enormous prises, lived upon the plunder 
of the town. 4 The tide of misgovernment, which showed 
itself in the realm at large in the non-obstante clauses 
of papal bulls and continual violations of the Charters 
of Liberty, displayed itself in London by the viola- 
tion of the city-charter and its frequent suspension for 
repurchase. 5 On at least one occasion, the dictates of 
a false policy led the monarch to construe as the pay- 
ment of a customary debt 6 the gifts which the love of 
the citizens had been wont to give him on his return 
from a protracted absence ; and his necessities drove 

1 Vide Mat. Par., IV., p. 624. 

2 Mat. Par., V., pp. 21, 22. The words " puteus inexhaustus " forcibly 
remind one of Innocent's speech at Lyons. Mat. Par., IV., pp. 546, 
547. The policies in fact were identical, and led to similar results. 
For frivolous pretexts, vide (ex grege) Ant. Leg., p. 22. Mat. Par., 
V., p. 486. 

3 Ex grege, Mat. Par., V. , pp. 101, 333, 568, 663. Rymer, I., p. 316. 
* Ant. Leg., pp. 8, 16. Mat. Par., V., pp. 199, 485. 

5 Ant. Leg., pp. 19-22, 30-37, et passim. 

6 Mat. Par., V., pp. 485, 486. Et eidem adventanti centum libras, 
quod propter frequentise continuationem jam in debitam vertebat dom. 
rex consuetudinem, optulerunt, etc. . . . et sic xenium accepit, nee 
sereno, ut decuit, vultu acceptavit. Cf. V., p. 199. Non tanquam 
gratuita, sed jam quasi debita postulare. 



part ii THE ALIENATION OF LONDON 47 

him to exorbitant demands for presents which his insa- 
tiable greed prevented him from receiving with even 
a decent grace. Then, too, the pettiness of his nature 
caused him to inflict injuries which had not even the 
poor excuse of rilling a temporary gap in the treasury, 
but which continued to sting and rankle long after they 
had passed out of the memory of their author. When, 
for instance, the king assumed the cross in solemn state 
at Westminster, in the year 1252, and but few of the 
citizens followed his example (for from long experience 
they scented this new device for getting money), he 
fell into a rage and called them baseborn money-grub- 
bers. 1 An expression more offensive to high-spirited 
burghers would be hard to find. In the very year of 
the Mad Parliament, at a time when men were wont to 
gather in little knots at the street-corners, and when 
the most fantastic rumour became the basis for demands 
of vengeance, royal injustice brought Ralph Hardel, the 
mayor of the city, down with sorrow to the grave. 2 In 
the same year, while famine prevailed throughout all 
England and France; 3 while London was overcrowded 
with starving men and women fleeing from death in the 

1 Mat. Par., V., p. 282. Et objurgans vocavit Londonienses igno- 
biles mercenaries. 

2 Mat. Par., V., p. 675. Cives Londonienses, qui graviter de 
quibusdam enorinitatibus coram rege accusabantur, redempti et mul- 
tiformiter puniti, vex reconciliantur. Maximus autem eorum, sc. 
Radulplms Hardel, pr?e dolore obiit, qui major extitit. For the events 
which led to this, in which the king seems to have been guilty of the 
grossest chicanery, vide Ant. Leg., pp. 30-37. 

3 Fabyan's Chronicles, p. 343. Nangis, Chronique Latine, I., 
p. 219. 



48 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

■ 

country-districts ; while thousands were perishing in the 
city, and the rich were proclaiming by herald where 
bread might be obtained as a gift ; when without the 
timely arrival of corn-ships sent from Germany by 
Richard, the king of the Romans, the people of the 
city must have perished from hunger ; — at this time 
Henry attempted to seize the golden grain for his own 
use, and was forced by the law to surrender his 
plunder. 1 

During the anxious years between the parliament of 
Oxford and the end of the sharp campaign of 1263, when 
the citizens were being courted by the baronial party 
and the Commons were awaking to a sense of political 
power never enjoyed before, the citizens were dwelling 
beneath the shadow of a Tower which they rightly con- 
sidered the stronghold of oppression, 2 and which, they 
knew, was fortified against them by means of their own 
wealth. At the very crisis of the struggle Prince 
Edward had craftily entered the New Temple, with iron 
hammers broken open the treasure-chests kept there, and 
carried off £1000 with which to pay his mercenary 
troops at Windsor. 3 Slight ground for wonder, then, 



iMat. Par., V., pp. 673, 674, 693, 694, 702, 710, 711, 728. Ant. 
Leg., p. 37. Fabyan, p. 341. Cf. Pauli, Gesch. von Eng., III., 714 
and n. 4. 

2 Cf. Mat. Par., IV., pp. 93, 94. Erant (mcenia Turris) autem eis 
quasi spina in oculo. Audierant itaque minas objurgantium quod 
constructa erant memorata moenia in eorum contumeliam, ut si quis 
eorum pro libertate civitatis certare prsesumeret, ipsis recluderetur, 
vinculis mancipandus. (1241.) 

3 Dunst., p. 222. 



part ii THE ALIENATION OF LONDON 49 

that the Commons hailed the entrance of the barons with 
relief and joy, and that when the time for action came, 
fifteen thousand of the citizens sallied forth to battle for 
the right at Lewes. 1 

1 Risk. Chronicon, p. 27. 



50 THE B AEONS' WAR chap, ii 



PART III 

The Alienation of Simon de Montfort from 

the Crown 

Although as early as the 8th of April, 1230, Simon 
cle Montfort had received a pension 1 of 400 marks per 
year until he should formally obtain the earldom of 
Leicester, he was undoubtedly classed by the men of the 
time with that swarm of aliens which descended upon 
England six years later on the occasion of the royal 
marriage. He was himself of foreign birth; at the 
queen's coronation he had carried the basin as High Stew- 
ard of the realm ; in 1238, with Henry's connivance, he 
had secretly married Eleanor, the king's sister, although 
she had previously taken a vow of chastity 2 and their 
children would be the heirs presumptive to the throne ; 
and on departing for Rome to obtain Gregory's confirm- 
ation of his marriage, he had carried with him royal letters 
and a large sum of money extorted from the citizens of 
Leicester. 3 Among the English aristocracy he was fated 
never to outgrow completely what their jealousy con- 

1 Shirley, I., p. 362. For Simon's claim to the earldom, vide Pauli, 
Simon v. Montfort, pp. 20-30. Blaauw, The Barons' War, pp. 39, 
40. Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., p. 55. 

2 Mat. Par., V., p. 235. Lanercost, p. 39. Trivet, p. 226. 

3 Mat. Par., III., pp. 338, 471, 479. The royal letters are translated 
by Blaauw, p. 43. 



PART III 



ALIENATION OF SIMON DE MONTFORT 51 



sidered the stigma of his foreign birth, 1 but his abilities 
and the vast services which he rendered his adopted 
country, together with his popular sympathies and love 
of justice, all conspired to place him in a commanding 
situation with the middle classes. It was reserved for 
Henry's folly to turn the man who might have been the 
brightest ornament of his court and the strongest sup- 
porter of his throne into an open enemy and the ulti- 
mate destroyer of the royal power. 

De Montfort's early career in England is marked 
by strange alternations of favour and disfavour. On his 
return, in October, 1238, from his successful Roman 
journey, the king received him with a kiss, 2 and on 
the second of the following February gave him full 
investiture of the honour of Leicester. 3 Six months 
later Simon had been driven out of England by the 
monarch's insults. The occasion was as follows. Prince 
Edward had been born on the 16th of June, and the 
churching of the queen occurred in August. 4 When 
Simon and his wife presented themselves for partici- 
pation in the ceremony, the king met them at the 
church-door with violent abuse. He shamelessly accused 
Simon of seduction before marriage, of obtaining the 
papal confirmation by corruption and then failing to 
pay the bribe, and of committing the unpardonable sin 
of presuming without authority to make the king his 

1 In 1265, Gloucester and others murmured, dicentes de Comite 
quod ridiculosuin erat quod hie alienigena prsesumabat, etc. Rish. 
Chronica, p. 32. 2 Mat. Par., III., p. 498. 

3 Ibid., p. 524. Theok., p. 111. Wav., p. 321. 

* Mat. Par., III., pp. 539, 566. Quinto Idus Augusti. 



52 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

surety. Having threatened him with excommunication, 
the king roughly forbade him to enter. In consterna- 
tion and deepest grief, the earl returned to the palace 
of the bishop of Winchester, which the king had pre- 
viously assigned to him as his residence, but a royal 
order speedily arrived for his expulsion. 1 Tears and 
prayers proving ineffectual, the earl, with his wife and 
following, fled across the channel. 2 The first breach 3 
had now been made; never again could Simon regard 
his brother-in-law with feelings of affection or even 
personal respect, and he henceforth pursued an inde- 
pendent line of action. 

His history for the next few years need not detain us. 
In April of 1240, 4 he came back to England and was 
received with honour by the fickle king. After his return 
from the crusade, he fought with bravery at Saintes, 
being "one of eight to win immortal glory" there, and 
in the following year he was one of the faithful few 
who remained with Henry at Bordeaux. 5 In the great 
movements of the next two years 6 he displayed his 
active sympathy with the reform-party, yet his favour 
with the king mounted steadily higher. The castle 



1 Mat. Par., III., pp. 566, 567. 

2 Ibid., p. 567. Dunst., p. 151. Prse timore a facie regis fugientes. 

3 Pauli, Sim. v. Mont., pp. 36, 37, assigns the intrigues of the 
papal party as the cause of Henry's behaviour. 

4 Mat. Par., IV., p. 7. 

5 Ibid., pp. 213, 231. 

6 In 1244, Simon was one of the twelve finance commissioners 
(Mat. Par., IV., p. 362), and in 1246 he was one of the signers of the 
baronial remonstrance to the pope. Burt., p. 283. Rymer, L, p. 265. 



part in ALIENATION OF SIMON DE MONTFORT 53 

of Kenil worth was placed in his keeping 1 and in the 
competition for the rich wardship of Gilbert de Umfran- 
ville he defeated Richard of Cornwall and gained an 
enemy for life. 2 It was not till 1248, that the king 
took the decisive, but unconscious, 3 step which led to 
the parting of the ways. 

Gascony was the only land which England still re- 
tained upon the continent, and her retention of this 
country was due rather to her weakness than her 
strength. To the turbulent robber-barons of the south, 
the stern French rule was far from welcome ; England's 
remoteness gave them a free hand. In Henry's need 
after the Poitevin war, they had simply sought to turn 
his weakness to their own advantage 4 and had been in 
a state of chronic rebellion ever since. Henry gladly 
availed himself of Simon's military genius and love of 
independence, made him viceroy of Gascony for six 
years, and instructed him to use harsh measures. 5 

Simon's success more than justified his appointment. 
In two campaigns he settled all questions with Navarre, 
captured the chief strongholds of the Gascon rebels, 
and sent Gaston de Beam and other ringleaders to the 
king at Clarendon to throw themselves upon the royal 
mercy rather than upon his justice. 6 On the 30th of 

i Rot. Pat., p. 28, Hen. III., Mem. 8. 2 Mat. Par., IV., p. 415. 

3 Cf. Pauli, Gesch. von Eng., III., p. 681. 

4 Mat. Par., V., pp. 104, 208. 

5 Ibid., p. 293. Cal. Rot. Pat., p. 22, Mem. 2. Ann. Hen. III., 
p. 32. For details of Gascony's condition, vide Pauli, Sim. v. Mont., 
pp. 51, 52. 

e Rymer, I., p. 269. Mat. Par., V., pp. 103, 104. 



54 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

November, 1249, Simon obtained Henry's acknowledg- 
ment: "We return hearty thanks to you for the 
care and enormous labour which you have expended so 
watchfully and manfully upon our affairs in Gascony, 
recognizing that your faithfulness and diligence yield 
no mediocre advantage to ourselves and our land of 
Gascony, and that they will also prove useful to our 
posterity forever and increase their honour." * 

This fair sky was soon to cloud. The preceding letter 
had been penned by Henry before the prisoners reached 
Clarendon. On their arrival they were at once set at 
liberty, and Simon was informed 2 that they had sworn to 
keep the peace and were not to be molested. The work 
which he had accomplished under circumstances of ex- 
ceptional difficulty 3 was in this way undone. But worse 
was to follow. In a letter written probably in April, 
1249, Simon had told the king — "I have heard that 
they (the rebels) have given you to understand many 
sinister things of me ; they will tell you soon that I was 
the cause of their rebellion." 4 In fact, from this time 
on, his Gascon enemies never ceased to intrigue against 
him, — with the result that the king became gradually 
alienated, failed to send supplies, and finally sought to 
disgrace him. 

During a visit which Simon paid to England in Janu- 



1 Rymer, I., p. 271. Dated Clarendon. Pauli, Sim. v. Mont., p. 52, 
refers to this passage as if it had been written in the year 1248. 

2 Shirley, Royal Letters, II., pp. 56, 57. Dec. 28, 1249. 

3 For Simon's own account, vide Shirley, II., pp. 52, 53. 

4 Ibid., p. 53 , 



part in ALIENATION OF SIMON DE MONTFORT 55 

ary, 1251, he received new light upon his situation. He 
came to ask the king for money and soldiers. The 
revenues of his own earldom of Leicester had already 
been exhausted, and the war could no longer be main- 
tained without royal support. To spur Henry to action, 
Simon recapitulated the wrongs which the king himself 
had suffered in Gascony after the war of 1242, when the 
Gascons not only refrained from helping him but prac- 
tised extortion, 1 and permitted him to lose both land 
and honour. " By the head of God, sir earl, you speak 
the truth, and since you fight for me so well, I will not 
refuse to give you aid enough. But there is an outcry 
against you, and grave charges are made. It is said that 
you imprison and plunder men who come to you in 
peace and also men whom you apparently summon in 
good faith." So spoke the king. The earl denied the 
truth of these accusations, adding that the king's own 
experience of Gascon treachery would adjudge them un- 
worthy of credence. From his earldom and the ward- 
ship of Gilbert de Umfranville Simon raised a large sum 
of money ; the duke of Brabant sent him troops ; and 
so, with fresh hopes and a grant of 3000 marks 
from the treasury, he returned to his task, 2 now 
more arduous than ever. But even before his return to 
England in the autumn, he had again fallen from favour. 
In company with Guy of Lusignan he landed at Dover; 
the king came to meet them, greeted his half-brother 



i Cf. Mat. Par., V., pp. 104, 105. 

2 Ibid., pp. 208-210. Cf. Mon. Fran., Ep. Ad. de Mar., 146, p. 281. 



56 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

cordially, and ordered London to be decorated in his 
honour. Leicester was ignored. 1 

Difficulties came to a head in 1252, when the secret 
insinuations of Simon's treason, avarice, extortion, 
cruelty, and general dishonesty had given place to open 
charges. 2 The king had already so far lent himself to 
these intrigues as to humiliate Simon publicly and to 
appoint a commission to investigate his conduct. 3 The 
rebels therefore felt sure of their ground. On the 6th 
of January Henry ordered the authorities at Bordeaux 
to send six representatives to lay complaints before him, 
and on the 1st of April, in accordance with a precon- 
certed plan, he sent letters-patent to the prelates, barons, 
and inhabitants of Gascony, summoning them to appear 
before him face to face with Simon. 4 Special safe- 
conducts 5 were also issued to Leicester's special enemies. 
On the 6th of March, 6 apparently after anxious consul- 
tations with the Gascons, the commission had made a 
report. Meanwhile the earl's English friends were 
active, and it was possibly through their influence that 
a second commission was appointed to traverse the 
judgment of the first. 7 Their report seems on the 
whole to have been favourable to Simon : " although he 
had treated some persons very harshly, they had received 

1 Mat. Par., V., p. 263. Ratione comitis fratris, non comitis Legre- 
cestriae, venit (rex) eis obviam lsetabundus. 

2 Mat. Par., V., pp. 276, 287. Wykes, pp. 104, 105. 

3 Shirley, II., pp. 60, 76. Mat. Par., V., p. 277. 

4 Shirley, II., pp. 70, 71, 81, 83. 

5 Ibid., p. 82. 6 Ibid., pp. 76-81. 
7 Mat. Par., V., pp. 288, 280. 



part in ALIENATION OF SIMON BE MONTFORT 57 

no more than their deserts." Owing to Leicester's 
absence no full report was given at this time, although 
the archbishop of Bordeaux, the chief of the hostile 
deputation, loudly clamoured for it and for immediate 
judgment. 1 At length, in the earl's presence, the 
haughty prelate delivered his ultimatum : " The Gascons 
would never receive Simon as their ruler, nor obey 
him." 2 This reiterated assertion seems to have consti- 
tuted the strength 3 of their argument, although from 
the 9th of May to nearly the middle of June they con- 
tinued by night and by day, in secret and in public, to 
besiege the king's too willing ear with their menda- 
cious complaints. 4 In the open sessions the nobility of 
the court rallied to Simon's support : Richard of 
Cornwall, because "the tribulation of the Gascons was 
well-pleasing in his sight ; " 5 the earl of Gloucester and 
many other magnates, because they dreaded the national 
disgrace, if Henry — always favourable to foreigners — 
should impulsively order the earl to be seized and im- 
prisoned; a few others, — among them the bishop of 
Worcester, Peter of Savoy, and Peter de Montfort, — 
apparently from love or principle. 6 It was only from 
this last class, according to the devoted Adam of Marsh, 
that the earl received efficient aid ; yet the moral sup- 

1 Mat. Par., V., p. 289. 

2 Dunst., p. 184. Mat. Par., V., p. 289. 

3 Cf. Ep. Ad. de Mar., XXX., p. 126. 

4 Ibid., p. 123. Quibus favor et audientia solempniter et private, 
non sine suggestionibus iniquitatis, jugiter sunt concessi. 

5 Mat. Par., V., p. 289. For reason vide V., pp. 291, 292, 294. 

6 Mat. Par., V., p. 289. Mon. Fran., Ep. Ad., XXX., p. 123. 



58 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

port which was afforded by even the lip-service of the 
rest was of no slight assistance in curbing Henry's wil- 
fulness. 1 During several days Simon bore unexampled 
abuse with unexampled patience ; finally he obtained an 
opportunity to defend himself. He was prepared to 
employ either English or Gascon law, 2 and by his lucid 
reasoning, supplemented on every point by unimpeach- 
able testimony, he utterly confuted his accusers. The 
commune 3 of Bordeaux sent under seal most striking 
witness in his favour; and much documentary evidence, 
still more weighty than personal testimony, was intro- 
duced, showing conclusively that the worst elements of 
the land were in conspiracy against Simon for checking 
their lawlessness. 4 On weighing the merits of the case 
the king himself was compelled to acknowledge de 
Montfort's innocence, 5 but although after this nothing 
remained to be done except to reward truth and punish 
falsehood, the stormy sessions still continued. The day 
following the king's acknowledgment, he broke out into 
renewed insults and rage, 6 as if determined on de Mont- 
fort's ruin by fair means or foul. It may have been the 

1 Mat. Par., V., p. 290. 2 Dunst., p. 184. 

3 (Comrnunitas) in qua quasi totum robur Vasconise ad distringen- 
dum hostiles et fideles protegendum, consistere dignoscitur. Ep. Ad., 
XXX., p. 124. 

4 Ibid., p. 125. 

5 Ibid., p. 127. Asserens illis condignam, istis vero nullum adhi- 
bendam esse credulitatem ; hoc ipsum comite Richardo et caeteris tarn 
prselatis ecclesiae quam proceribus regni, quam et consiliariis claman- 
tibus. In view of the discrepancies between Mat. Par. and Adam, the 
most probable version is obtained by combining both accounts. 

6 Ibid., p. 127. 



part in ALIENATION OF SIMON BE MONTFOBT 59 

question of financial compensation which roused his 
anger; it may have been renewed intrigues. The earl 
recounted his services at Saintes; said that the king 
himself had persuaded him to go to Gascony and subdue 
the traitors there, that he had given him by charter the 
government for six years, but that he had not fulfilled 
his promise to give efficient aid. 1 Then he added : 2 
" Lord king, you should firmly and truly keep your 
word. Either keep your bargain according to your 
charter, or pay back my expenses, for everybody knows 
that I have irreparably impoverished my earldom for 
your honour." Very unwisely the king rejoined, "I 
keep no contract with a traitor ; a covenant-maker need 
keep no faith with a covenant-breaker, but should rather 
destroy him." The impetuous earl could restrain his 
wrath no longer. He accused the king of telling a 
palpable lie and said it would go hard with him, were 
he not protected by the regal dignity and an empty 
title. 3 Had the magnates allowed it, Leicester would 
have been arrested on the spot. Their sympathy was 
on his side, however, and the earl continued : " Who 
could believe you were a Christian? Have you ever 
confessed? But what, after all, is confession without 
penitence and satisfaction? You may have confessed, 
but never yet were contrite or made reparation." After 
the king had furiously retorted, "Never have I so sin- 
cerely repented any deed as I now repent that I ever 

1 Mat. Par., V., pp. 290, 293. 10,000 marks. 

2 Mat. Par., V., p. 290. Cf. pp. 209, 210, 294. 

3 Mat. Par., V., p. 290. Nomine quoque umbratili. 



60 THE BARONS* WAR chap, ii 

allowed you to enter England or to have honours there," 
they were parted by their friends. 1 

For several days the long agony continued ; Leices- 
ter sought to effect such a reconciliation as to ensure 
success in his government, but failing this, declared his 
intention to return at any rate and war the rebels down. 
"With all the fondness of David for Uriah, Henry bade 
him by all means return " that he who loved war might 
have his fill and reap the reward of his father." 2 Four 
or five davs later Simon landed at Bordeaux. 

To a man of de Montfort's temperament and char- 
acter the king's actions must have been peculiarly exas- 
perating. He was himself the soul of honour, a lover 
of justice beyond all else, and especially tenacious in 
his purposes. Henry was his exact counterpart. A 
nagging persistency in wrong-doing seems to have been 
the most positive trait in his character, if we except the 
narrow piety, divorced from conduct, which made him 
fall an easy prey to Rome, and which lent de Mont- 
fort's words a keener sting. Never was Henry's wilful- 
ness less serviceable to him than now. The effect of 
his conduct thus far had been to give Simon every 
reason for personal enmity and distrust, to enroll him 
among the creditors of the crown, to bring him into 
closer touch and sympathy with the hitherto-jealous 
baronage, and to remove him more and more in public 

1 Mat. Par., V., pp. 290, 291. 

2 Ep. Ad., XXX., pp. 127, 129. Mat. Par., V., p. 313. Cf. Dunst., p. 
184. Simon's father was killed at Toulouse by a stone from a mango- 
nel. Mat. Par., III., p. 57. Nangis, I., p. 191. 



part in ALIENATION OF SIMON DE MONTFOBT 61 

estimation from the ranks of the aliens. 1 The king had 
been in the wrong throughout. 2 To cap the climax, he 
now issued a series of edicts "so foolish," says Adam 
of Marsh, 3 " that unless divine power speedily interfere, 
they will redound to his own disherison, the weakening 
of the realm, disturbance of the people, and ruin of the 
earl." Doubtless it was for this last purpose that they 
were issued : they put de Montfort in the position of 
a criminal awaiting trial, forbade him to administer 
justice, finally deposed him from his office, and in gen- 
eral, inflicted worse insults upon him than have cost 
many a monarch his crown at the hands of an outraged 
subject. 4 After a hard campaign in which he fully 
maintained his military reputation, thinking that he 
was now justified in entrusting the land to the tender 
mercies of Henry and his youthful son, de Montfort 
bound the king to the payment of his debt, went to 
France, and there was offered the remarkable honour of 
the regency. 5 The prophet was evidently not without 

1 Cf. Mat. Par., V., pp. 338, 289. Comes Glovernise in hoc casu 
com. Simoni favorabilis. . . „ Timebatur eniin quamplurimum, ne 
rex per impetum festinum quia tarn alienigenis propitius esse probatur, 
comitem virum nobilem et naturalem juberet capi. 

2 Mat. Par., V., pp. 291-294. 

3 Ep. Ad., XXX., p. 128. 

4 For the contents of these documents, vide Shirley, II., pp. 86- 
88, 90, 91. Rymer, I., pp. 282, 283. Wykes, p. 105. Mat. Par., V., p. 
379. The attempt to ruin Simon appears most clearly in the command 
to audit his accounts and to report concerning Blanchefort Castle. 
Shirley, II., pp. 91, 92. 

5 Mat. Par., V., pp. 365, 371, 379. Shirley, II., pp. 68, 69, 384-386. 
Cf. Wykes, pp. 105, 106. Comes quidem L. animo saucius, odium 
quod ex amotione sua conceperat pro tempore dissimulando, in regno 



62 THE B AEONS' WAR chap, ii 

honour in his native land at any rate, but to avoid the 
appearance of evil he declined the offer. 

Gascony at once fell into the wildest confusion. 
Alfonso X. of Castile was induced to advance claims 
to the province ; Gaston de Beam and other restless 
spirits accepted him as their lord, and Bordeaux hastily 
summoned Henry to its aid lest all be lost. 1 The king's 
shame was the earl's honour and best justification. The 
danger from Castile was averted by Edward's marriage- 
treaty, 2 but Henry's incompetency furnished weapons 
to the Gascons, 3 and it was only after Simon's reap- 
pearance that the rebels were forced to submit. Impe- 
rious as his temper was, de Montfort was far from 
vindictive. Throughout the whole of his recent troubles 
Grosseteste and Adam of Marsh had been his faithful 
friends, comforters, and guides, and now he had gra- 
ciously yielded to the solicitations of the former, for- 
given Henry's hard words and crooked dealings, and 
appeared in the field at the head of a choice body of 
troops maintained at his own expense. The Gascons 
" feared him as they feared lightning," and the rising 
was soon quelled. 4 

From this time on, till 1258, Simon stood somewhat 
aloof from politics. His most decided action was the 

Francise morabatur, expectans temporis opportunitatem, quo prse- 
meditate calliditate, depositoribus suis solveret talionem. 
i Mat. Par., V., pp. 365, 366, 370. Dunst., p. 188. 

2 Rymer, I., pp. 290, 296, 298, 300. 

3 Mat. Par., V., p. 410. Burt., p. 317. 

4 Mat. Par., V., pp. 415, 416. Mon. Fran., Ep. Ad., XXV., CXLIIL, 
CXLVL, CI., etal. 



part in ALIENATION OF SIMON DE MONTFOET 63 

speech in the Easter parliament of 1254 in which he 
unveiled the duplicity of the king's demand for money, 1 
but during the following years he resided in France 
and devoted himself to his private affairs. 2 His litiga- 
tion 3 with Henry for Eleanor's jointure does not seem 
to have interrupted their mutual toleration, for later 
de Montfort became a member of the French peace- 
commission, 4 and in 1257 he was one of four to be en- 
trusted with the entire management of the Sicilian 
affair — with power to wind it up, if deemed advisable. 5 
After what had passed, however, the relations be- 
tween Henry and Simon must have been simply those 
of toleration. The king feared Simon ; Simon despised 
the king. The forces which had repelled him from the 
crown had attracted him to the side of the people. 
His relations with the barons had become more cordial, 
and his identification with Grosseteste's party more 
complete. Thanks to his own efforts and the wise 
counsels of his Franciscan friends, 6 the persecution 
which he had undergone had greatly strengthened his 
power to endure. In his Gascon government he had 
developed his military skill, and had already tasted the 
sweets, as well as the bitter, of assisting the poor against 



!Mat. Par., V., p. 440. 

2 Shirley, II., pp. 107, 108. 

3 Ibid. , pp. 382, 393, 168-175, etc. Rymer, I. , pp. 407, 446, etc. The 
dates range, including complications, from 1250 to September, 1264. 

4 Shirley, II., pp. 107, 108. 

5 Rymer, I., p. 359. June 28. Also erroneously under June, 1264. 

6 Vide Ep. Ad. de Mar., especially Nos. 22, 30, 34, 135, 137, 138, 
141, 143, 146. 



64 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

the rich, the small against the great ; 1 and so, when 
misgovernment had reached its height in England, he 
was both willing and prepared to step out into a 
broader arena and to conduct a nobler fight for freedom. 

1 Shirley, II., p. 53. Simon to Henry. (Unsigned.) Et por ce que je 
sui si mauvoleu de les graunz genz de la terre, por ce que je sostien voz 
dreitures et de la poure genz contre aus, peril et lionte me serait. . . . 



part iv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 65 



PART IV 

The Denationalization of England: the State 

It is a strange phenomenon in English history that 
the weakest of her kings should stand between the most 
obdurate and the ablest. Among all the fluctuations 
of Henry's time no element is by nature more change- 
able than he. Visionary, without the ability necessary 
to realize his dreams ; narrowly pious, without the self- 
control essential to stability of character; extreme in 
his views of royal power, yet incapable alike of inspir- 
ing respect in his friends or fear in his foes — he must 
have drifted if left to himself. But he was not so left : 
from the very commencement of his reign he fell under 
influences which seized the salient points of his char- 
acter and never relaxed their hold. Papal agents used 
his piety for their own ends, and the supple natives of 
Poitou and Provence employed his sestheticism and 
ideas of arbitrary power as a stepping-stone to great- 
ness. Henry's policy, therefore, — in so far as he had 
a policy — is scarcely his own; it is rather the result- 
ant of his personal character as acted upon by tem- 
porary advisers and chance circumstances than a 
well-considered plan of action. It was England's mis- 
fortune that Henry, from purely personal inclination, 
selected his counsellors from among the class most 



66 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

dangerous to the welfare of the state. They encour- 
aged his dreams of foreign greatness, fostered his 
ideas of arbitrary power, disparaged the wisdom of 
the native English, sought to drive them from the 
council-board, and in general committed Henry to a 
course of action diametrically opposite to the natural 
tendencies of the growing nation. He dropped the 
wise plan 1 of attaching the greatest English nobles 
to the crown, and at the same time withdrawing them 
from interests in foreign states, by marriage alliances 
with the royal house, and was drawn by the marriage 
of Isabella with Frederic II. into the hot-bed of con- 
tinental politics. From the very first he cherished the 
idea of winning back from France the dominions 2 
whose loss had been foremost among the causes which 
had made England, England, and it was not until the 
barons ruled the state that peace was finally ensured. 
His wars with France were three in number; in all 
alike he was the real aggressor, all were alike unpopu- 
lar in England, all were mismanaged and failed dis- 
gracefully. In 1237 the magnates spoke of him as a 
king too " lightly led astray, who had never checked 
by arms or frightened off a single enemy of the realm, 
even the meanest ; who had never increased the bounds 
of the kingdom, but rather straitened it and subjugated 
it for aliens." 3 Five years later the barons warned him 

i Shirley, I., pp. 244-246. 

2 In 1223, at the death of Philip Augustus, he demanded Normandy. 
Mat. Par., III., p. 77. Dunst., p. 81. Rymer, I., p. 170. 

3 Mat. Par., III., p. 381. 



part iv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 67 

against the war in which he lost Poitou : " Rich and 
illustrious kings, his predecessors, had possessed in 
France impregnable castles, ample lands, and mighty 
armies, yet they had neither been able to subdue the 
French nor even to keep what they already had; let 
him profit by their example." 1 To the voice of reason 
he was dumb. The cap-sheaf of his folly was the ac- 
ceptance of the Sicilian crown. In a word, Henry's 
foreign policy was vicious because it was expensive, 
badly planned and worse executed, thoroughly unna- 
tional and reactionary, and through the introduction 
of aliens entailed lasting evils on the state. 

The dislike of the English people for a standing 
army, manifested in modern times by the yearly pas- 
sage of the Mutiny Act, and by that clause 2 of the 
Bill of Rights which states, " That the raising or keep- 
ing a standing army within the kingdom in time of 
peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is 
against law," is of very ancient date. In one sense 
it finds expression in the clause 3 of Magna Charta 
which removed certain aliens from their bailiwicks, 
for in those far distant days every alien was, or might 
become, a mercenary. At any rate it was dangerous 
to allow the castles of the land to remain in their 
power. The first problem of the reign of Henry III., 
after his position on the throne was once established, 

iMat. Par., IV., p. 184. 

2 Sel. Chart., p. 524, art. 6. 

3 Sel. Chart., p. 302, clause 50. Stat, of Realm, I., p. 12. Ryraer, 

I., p. 132. 



68 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

was the expulsion of these aliens ; it was solved by the 
overthrow 1 of Faukes de Breaute*, in 1224, by Hubert 
de Burgh. 

It seems strange that Henry in the face of the ex- 
pressed wishes of the people, and despite the light of 
history, should persist in the reintrocluction of a foreign 
element. Apart from papal influence and John's mer- 
cenary troops, he owed his crown, mainly, to the out- 
burst of national feeling 2 which had deprived Louis of 
France of his supporters. A sound, though apparently 
ungrateful, policy had demanded the removal of John's 
mercenaries : it was also pledged by the Charter. The 
national life of England was growing stronger day by 
day when Henry, in default of recovering his foreign 
lands, began " to conquer England for them." 

It was with much truth that de Burgh had said of 
Peter des Roches, that of all the evils which had hap- 
pened in the days of John and Henry III., he had been 
the cause. 3 His appointment to the bishopric of Win- 
chester by Innocent was an early example of the intrusion 
of a foreigner, and had enabled the pope to increase his 
power permanently. 4 He had been made justiciar by 

1 Mat. Par., Ill, pp. 87-89. Theok., p. 67. 

2 Mat. Par., II., p. 668. Cf. Mat. Par., III., p. 6. Dunst., p. 47. 
Quia vero Franci incipientes superbire, et nobiles Anglise a suis con- 
siliis elongare, cceperunt eos vocare proditores, et castra quae ceperant 
sibi retinuerunt, et Anglis sua jura non restituerunt ; ideo recesserunt 
ab eis comes Salesbyry?e, et W. junior Marescallus, et multi alii 
nobiles et potentes ; et exinde de die in diem, pars Francorum ccepit 
deficere. 

3 Dunst., p. 84. In 1223. 

4 Vide supra, p. 8. 



PART IV 



DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 69 



John for the express purposes of royal tyranny; his 
conduct had changed the wrath of the barons to fury, 
and was a signal warning against the introduction of 
aliens into the high offices of state. 1 His career under 
Henry III. is in all respects typical of the class which 
that king delighted to honour. He had all their disre- 
gard for the English constitution and ignorance of it. 
" There are no peers in England as in France ; the king 
by his judges may proscribe and condemn any man in his 
realm," was the substance of his answer 2 when the king 
was accused of banishing men without the judgment 
of their peers. He exercised a baleful influence over 
Henry's mind, alienating him from English counsellors 
and encouraging his ideas of arbitrary power. By his 
intrigues the most faithful servant of the crown was 
removed from office and publicly disgraced, and his 
almost unparalleled services in the cause of English 
nationality were of no avail. 3 The same des Roches 
compassed the death of the Earl Marshall, 4 and thereby 
depriving the baronial party of their acknowledged head, 
threw England for a quarter of a century into a wild 
vortex of misgovernment. It was again des Roches 
who taught the king misgovernment as a science. Ap- 
parently at his suggestion Henry dismissed his native 
counsellors and instituted foreigners, complaisant and 



i Waverley, p. 281. In 1214. 

2 Mat. Par., III., pp. 251, 252. Cf. Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., p. 49. 

3 Mat. Par. III., p. 220 et seq. 

4 Ibid., pp. 265, 266, 273-279, 288. Theok., pp. 92, 93. Dunst., 
pp. 136, 137. 



70 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

of low degree. 1 The last and easy step to arbitrary rule 
was the dismissal of justiciar, chancellor, and treasurer, 
and the appointment in their stead of weak commissions, 
which would work the royal will. In this way Peter cles 
Roches indirectly established the policy which gave the 
constitutional struggles of the reign their peculiar char- 
acter. The readiest mode of curbing the king was the 
reappointment of the three great officers of state. Fi- 
nally, from the same evil genius Henry learned the 
way to avoid performance of his public vows. There 
can scarcely be any doubt that it was the bishop of 
Winchester who privately procured that papal bull 2 
which annulled the Charter and released the king 
from all his obligations, on the plea that ruled by evil 
counsels and misled by his youth, he had violated his 
coronation-oath by alienating rights which pertained to 
the crown. John set the precedent, Peter confirmed it, 
and Henry used it as a legitimate organ of government. 
It was during the rule of Peter, in the year 1232, 
that the first of three swarms of aliens settled upon 
England. Poitevins and Bretons to the number of two 
thousand, eager for English gold, came at the call of 
their kin and were given congenial employment as 
guardians of castles and counties. Fat wardships and 
marriage-rights were entrusted to them, and posts in the 

1 Mat. Par., III., p. 240. Ut dicitur, de consilio Petri . . . omnes 
naturales curise suae ministros suos a suis removit officiis, et Picta- 
venses extraneos . . . subrogavit. Et sic contigit ut illorum consilio 
. . . universa regni negotia ordinaret. 

2 Kymer, I., p. 229. June, 1236. Cf. Pauli, Gesch. von Eng., 
III., p. 594. 



part iv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 71 

treasury. Abuses at once arose : bishop Peter thwarted 
the due course of law ; and in the words of the chroni- 
cler, 1 "Judgment was entrusted to the oppressor, law to 
outlaws, peace to the quarrelsome, justice to the unjust." 
Time did its perfect work, and the magnitude of the 
abuses wrought their cure ; for after the nobles had 
once risen in arms and Edmund of Canterbury had 
threatened the king with excommunication, the craven 
yielded and England was once more purged of the 
aliens. 2 

Although the clause, 3 " We will not make justices, 
constables, sheriffs, or bailiffs except from such as know 
the law of the land and mean to observe it," had been 
omitted from all of Henry's Charters, yet the people 
were insisting on its spirit and the consequent exclu- 
sion of foreigners from office. That hatred of aliens, 
which throughout Henry's reign steadily grew in in- 
tensity until it became a consuming fire, originated not 
in the bare fact of their foreign birth, but in their 
unconstitutional doctrines and utter lawlessness. 4 The 
two fundamental and essential questions of the reign — 
the maintenance of the Charters and of the exclusive 
right of the native English to rule in their own land — 

1 Mat. Par., III., pp. 240, 241. 

2 Ibid., p. 245 et seq., p. 272. Dunst, p. 136. Wykes, pp. 80, 81. 

3 Sel. Chart., p. 302, art. 45. Stat, of Realm, I., p. 11. Rymer, I., 
p. 132. 

4 In 1258, only those aliens were driven from England who refused 
to subscribe to the Provisions of Oxford, and who disobeyed them. 
Cf. Rish. Chronica, p. 3. Dunst., p. 222. 



72 THE BARONS' WAB chap, ii 

are strictly complementary and develop pari passu. 
Without the vantage-ground of Magna Charta, the 
aliens could not have been successfully resisted : if 
the resistance against the aliens had been unsuccessful, 
Magna Charta could not have survived. Freedom from 
continental interference had been the basis of all the 
distinctive points in the English constitution, and in 
the time of what may be termed the great Anglo-Saxon 
revival, when the government of the state was being 
organized and completed through the interlinking of 
central and local organs of administration, the inter- 
ference of the most selfish continental elements could 
by no means be tolerated. As the struggle progressed, 
this truth became more and more apparent, until finally, 
just before the outbreak of the Barons' War, the exclu- 
sion of aliens from office became the central point of 
baronial policy, superseding even the Provisions of 
Oxford in importance, and giving tremendous weight 
to the national character of the movement. 1 

The present victory of the national party was of no 
long duration. Henry's marriage in 1237 gave the 
signal to a second swarm of aliens, the relatives of 
his wife ; and ten years later, the death of his mother, 
who had married the traitorous Count de la Marche, 
served to introduce a third. Filial affection and con- 
jugal love are excellent traits, but in Henry the defects 
of his qualities overshadowed the qualities themselves, 
and were displayed in nepotism and uxoriousness. For 

1 Vide infra, pp. 215-217. 



part iv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 73 

twenty long years Henry, in sharp contrast to the king 
of France and Frederic II., allowed himself to be ruled 
by his wife's relatives and his own. All kinds of aliens, 
Poitevins and ProveiiQals, Germans, and Italians, joined 
in the mad race for wealth and honours, and helped to 
swell the tide of general misgovernment. The national 
feeling which in Henry's reign had twice driven for- 
eigners from England was by no means dead ; but now 
no Hubert de Burgh was at the helm of state, and there 
was no great Earl Marshall to head an undivided 
baronage. Richard of Cornwall for a time maintained 
baronial rights, censured the king's misrule, even took 
up arms against him; 1 but he stood too near the crown, 
and the same }^ear which saw the death of his wife, 
Isabella of Gloucester, witnessed his departure from the 
land on a crusade. His parting speech 2 to the prelates 
at Reading reveals his temper and the desire of his 
heart, but his policy was at variance with both : " Had 
I not assumed the cross, yet should I go, that I might 
not see the misfortune of my people and the devastation 
of a kingdom which I am believed to be able to protect, 
but cannot." 

Isabella's death had snapped the last link which 
bound him to the English barons ; his marriage in 
1243 to Sancha of Provence, the sister of the queen, 
committed him irretrievably to the foreign party. 3 
Henceforth his fall was rapid. His absence from the 

!Mat. Par., III., pp. 411, 412, 475-479. Theok., p. 106. Shirley, 
II., p. 15. 

2 Mat. Par., IV., pp. 2, 11. s Mat. Par., IV., pp. 2, 263. 



74 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

parliament of 1249 — " quasi ex industria " — ruined 
bright hopes of obtaining the three great officers of 
state ; l two years later he is classed among the aliens ; 2 
his election as king of the Romans placed his chief 
interests upon the continent; in 1258, the barons were 
glad to take advantage of his absence in order to carry 
out their plans of reform, and they dreaded his return 
as that of a disturbing element. 3 But in no case could 
Richard have played the part of a Simon de Montfort. 
It has already been shown 4 how the latter drew much 
of his strength from his connection with the deeply 
religious party founded by Grosseteste. With this 
element Richard had nothing in common except oppo- 
sition to papal encroachments. In a letter 5 of May 18, 
1257, on the occasion of a victory of his partisan, the 
archbishop of Mainz, over the archbishop of Treves, 
Richard writes exultingly to Edward : " Behold, what 
spirited and warlike prelates we have in Germany ! It 
would be by no means disadvantageous to you, if such 
should be created in England, that by their aid you 
might be defended against the unseasonable attacks of 
your rebels." He evidently preferred a knightly Peter 
des Roches or a military boxer Boniface to the learned 

*Mat. Par., V., p. 73. 

2 Ibid., p. 229. Rex . . . spretis ac spoliatis Anglicis alienos 
introduxit ; hinc com. Ricardum, hinc archiepiscopum, illinc Win- 
toniensem. . . . 

3 Wykes, pp. 118, 119, 121, 122. Rymer, L, p. 380. Burt., p. 
461. Mat. Par., V., pp. 732-736. Shirley, II., pp. 132, 133. For 
Richard's policy, vide Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., pp. 61, 62. 

4 Vide supra, pp. 27-29. 

5 Rymer, I., p. 356. Burton, p. 394. 



part iv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 75 

bishop of Lincoln or the saintly Oxonian Edmund. 
His denationalization was complete. 

By the royal marriage England had been conquered 
for the natives of Provence and Savoy. The queen's 
uncles, William, the bishop-elect of Valence, Thomas 
of Flanders, Bernard, Boniface, and Peter of Savoy, 
had all entered England between 1236 and 1241 and 
had been given influential appointments in the state be- 
sides honours and gifts without number. 1 Nothing was 
for them too great or too small, from the archbishopric 
of Canterbury and the honour of Richmond to the cus- 
tody of a castle or a yearly pension. Avarice and in- 
difference to England's welfare were their distinguishing 
traits ; the money which they received from the king 
or queen they were wont to use in the furtherance of 
their continental interests and then return for more. 
They were, however, by no means neglectful of their 
countrymen. Peter of Savoy, in particular, was em- 
powered by letters-patent 2 to enlist in Henry's service 
as many foreigners as he saw fit, and their payment was 
practically left in his hands. A more potent engine for 
the denationalization of the realm would have been hard 
to find. The English, however, believed that it had 
been discovered when, in 1247, — the year when the 
Poitevins arrived — Thomas of Flanders imported 3 a 
bevy of foreign girls to be married to young English 

1 For details, vide Pauli, Gescli. von Eng., III., 620, 627. Blaauw, 
Barons' War, pp. 13-16, 18. 

2 Kymer, I., p. 242. June 23, 1241. 

3 Mat. Par., IV., pp. 598, 628. Cf. Rymer, I., p. 264. 



76 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

nobles then in ward, and when Edmund of Lincoln and 
Richard de Burgh fell a prey to them. Men later came 
to think that a system of intermarriages formed the 
keystone of Henry's policy of arbitrary rule ; by it he 
would debase the good old English blood and craftily 
entangle the leading members of the baronage in court- 
alliances of such a nature, that if the commonalty 
should dare to rise against the king and the aliens in 
defence of its rights, it would find itself impotent and 
destitute of leaders. 1 In particular, the marriage of the 
young and promising Gilbert of Gloucester to Alice of 
Angouleme had been felt as a heavy blow. 2 Henry had 
touched the nation in its tenclerest point, the pride of 
blood, and it is in a tone of veiled rebellion that the 
great historian, in whose pages the England of the time 
is mirrored, sums up the strength of the two parties and 
foretells the coming of the storm. 3 

But bad as was the influence of the natives of Pro- 
vence and hated as they were, yet bitterer by far was the 
advent of the Poitevins in 1247. No special harm had 
ever come to England from Provence, while the rela- 
tions between England and Poitou had for the last 
thirty years consisted of tissue after tissue of treachery 



1 Mat. Par., V., p. 514. In 1255. 

2 Theok., p. 151. Mat. Par., V., p. 363. Anno quoque sub eoclem 
(1253) indigenarura Anglise argumentosus supplantator, volens omnes 
regni sui nobiles degenerare, ad sic totam Anglorum in eorum excidium 
propaginem annullare genealem atque eorundem sanguinem genero- 
sum melancolicis fsecibus alienorum perturbare, doluit quod saltern 
Ricardus comes Glovernife et ejus progenies ex fonte sulphureo non 
coinquinaretur. 3 Mat. Par., V., pp. 514, 515. 



part iv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 77 

and falsehood. In the very centre of the web of in- 
trigue had sat the Count de la Marche, the one to 
whom above all others the ultimate loss of Poitou had 
been due. 1 It was his children by Isabella, Henry's 
mother, who now came to claim the royal bounty. 
Henceforth the pages of the English chroniclers teem 
with the misdeeds of Guy and Geoffrey of Lusignan, 
iEthelmar, and William de Valence. They not only 
represented a third wave of invasion from the conti- 
nent, and bore the burden of long-accumulating ills, 
but in themselves deserved their reputation. Their 
birth was much against them ; their avarice surpassed 
that even of the Provencals. With the latter they 
speedily entered into such competition that the court 
was filled with the rivalries of " reginales " and " re- 
gales." 2 Their pride and their excesses were so great 
that inferiors could not live beneath them, nor their 
equals with them ; they so trampled the people under 
foot that the " bitterest bitterness lay in the necessity 
for peace." 3 Their bailiffs played the part of thieves 
and plundered the people on all sides. The favourite 
answer of William de Bussey to complainants against 
him is said to have been, " If I do you wrong who shall 
do you right? The king wills whatever my lord, 
William de Valence, wills, but not e converso." ' 4 All 



1 Mat. Par., IV., p. 216. Theok., p. 124. Dunst, p. 158. Shir- 
ley, II., p. 28. 

2 Mat. Par., V., pp. 349-352. 

3 Rish., Chronicon, p. 5. Rymer, I., p. 373. 

4 Mat. Par., V., p. 738. Cf . Rish., Chronicon, pp. 4, 5. Chronica, p. 2. 



78 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

the worst political abuses of the time centre round the 
names of these four brothers. Their influence over 
Henry was unbounded : 1 no one dared to complain 
against them to the king lest he should be not judge 
but adversary. 2 The days of the Heptarchy seemed to 
have returned, when England was ruled by a multitude 
of kings and anarchy prevailed. 3 To complete the gen- 
eral confusion, many even of the more illustrious Eng- 
lish nobles seemed inclined to follow their example. 4 

Despite the popular ill-will, the king overwhelmed 
his brothers with favours. Guy and Geoffrey vibrated 
between England and the continent, departing loaded 
with gifts and returning empty for more. 5 William de 
Valence was knighted, admitted as a matter of course 
to the council-board, through the king's gift received 
Joanna, the heiress of Munchensey, as his wife, later 
obtained the wardship of the rich estates, and finally 
was graced with the lordship of Pembroke. 6 ^Ethelmar 
was given benefices extorted by the king from individ- 

i Cf. Rymer, I., p. 373. Mat. Par., VI. , pp. 403, 407. 

2 Rymer, I., p. 373. Cf. Mat. Par., V., p. 594. Vide infra, 
p. 153, n. 3. 

3 Mat. Par., V., pp. 229, 241, 316, 370, 494, 595. Taxster (apud 
Barthol. Cotton), p. 137. Theok., p. 175. Robert of Gloucester, p. 533. 
And the king horn let hor wille, that ech was as king, And nome 
pouere menne god, and ne paiede nothing. To eni of this bretheren 
zuf there pleinede eni wizt, Hii sede, zuf we doth ou wrong, wo ssal 
ou do rizt? 

4 Robert of Glouc, p. 533. Mat. Par., V., p. 316. Et sic facti 
sunt aliis deteriores. 

5 Mat. Par., IV., p. 650 ; V., pp. 205, 263. 

6 Ibid, IV., pp. 627-629, 644, 650; V, p. 504. Ant. Leg., p. 12. 
Dunst., pp. 171, 172. 



part iv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 79 

ual prelates, until he seemed richer than a bishop ; and 
finally this stripling who, it was said, " had never sub- 
mitted his hand to the ferule in the schools, who was 
ignorant of the rudiments of art and grammar, and did 
not understand the English speech or writing," was per- 
mitted to administer the rich bishopric of Winchester 
and draw its revenues. It was on this occasion that the 
grand cathedral witnessed the edifying spectacle of a 
king who, in the very act and article of violating ca- 
nonical and chartered rights, preached to the monks upon 
the text, " Justice and Peace have kissed each other." : 
To name at length the rank and file of these great 
armies of invasion, and to enumerate the infinite multi- 
plicity of the gifts which they received would be alike 
tedious and fruitless. Henry was naturally fond of 
display and was lavish beyond the point of prodigality. 
Magnificent ceremonies, costly wars, demands from 
Rome, and gifts to aliens kept him chronically poor. 
As early as the year 1237, soon after the Provencals 
arrived, Richard of Cornwall had sharply rebuked the 
king for despoiling his nobles, impoverishing the king- 
dom, and imprudently enriching the insidious enemies 
of the realm. He added that Henry during his reign 
had collected enormous sums of money, had had the 
custody of every archbishopric and bishopric in Eng- 
land except three, had also had the incomes of abbacies, 
the wardship of baronies, and frequent escheats — and 
yet the treasury was empty. 2 

1 Mat. Par., IV., 650; V., pp. 91, 179-184, 224, 227, 468. 

2 Ibid., III., pp. 411, 477. Cf. IV., p. 186. 



80 THE BARONS' WAR, chap, ii 

The amount of money spent was indeed enormous ; 
but bitter as were the feelings of the plundered English 
solely on this account, they became tenfold bitterer 
when they saw the hated aliens rolling in wealth. As 
more foreigners arrived, the outgoes increased in pro- 
portion, and soon the national chronicler could write in 
anguish of soul, " Daily, no longer gradually, the king 
is losing the affection of his native people." 1 

The inevitable result of Henry's conduct was financial 
misgovernment and widespread discontent. The bar- 
ons would not vote supplies to aliens or for unnational 
purposes : Henry dared not levy an aid without their 
consent. He was therefore driven to confirm the 
Charter in exchange for grants of money ; but his faith- 
lessness, and as some said, the counsel of the aliens, 2 
led him to misapply the proceeds and, in full reliance 
upon papal aid, to disregard his oath. 3 

In default of grants, every expedient in taxation 
which extortionate selfishness could suggest and careless 
cruelty apply, was practised. London was systemati- 
cally plundered ; the Jews were so oppressed that in 
despair they asked to leave the realm ; 4 the custody 
of vacant churches was a frequent source of lawless 
gain ; 5 the crusades were used as a pretext ; and the 

1 Mat. Par., V., p. 229. In 1251. 2 Mat. Par., V., pp. 378, 449. 

3 Taswell-Langmead, Eng. Const. Hist., p. 145, n. 2, mentions the 
number of confirmations of the charters in each reign through that of 
Henry VI. 

4 Mat. Par., V., pp. 441, 487. For extortions, vide Mat. Par., III., 
p. 543 ; IV., pp. 88, 260 ; V., pp. 114, 136, 274, etc. 

6 Ann. Burt., p. 420. 



part iv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 81 

itinerant justices, seeming to recall the palmy days 
when Ralph Flambard drove his gemots to and fro 
throughout the kingdom, 1 proved ready instruments 
of extortion. 2 Prises and exactions through sheriffs 
and other royal bailiffs reached an unheard-of amount; 3 
the king lived at free-quarters on abbots, priors, clerks, 
and men of even humbler station, and no entertainer 
was considered hospitable unless he gave splendid pres- 
ents to the king, queen, Edward, and the royal train. 4 
Money was made by selling rights of warren 5 in viola- 
tion of the royal charters, and inquisitions into the state 
of the forests 6 produced on more than one occasion 
many thousand marks. Men were required to take up 
their knighthood, if possessed of fifteen librates of land. 7 
The most casual means of obtaining revenue were used. 
In 1256 the king exacted heavy fines from all sheriffs 
who did not punctually pay their obligations to the 
treasury; and on the same occasion, every single sheriff 
in England was compelled to pay five marks for neglect 
of duty in not forcing all men of a certain degree of 
wealth to take up their knighthood. 8 Again, when the 

1 Cf. Stubbs' Const. Hist., I., p. 327. 

2 Mat. Par., IV., p. 34. The best proof of the exactions of jus- 
tices, sheriffs, and bailiffs is found in the Petition of the Barons at 
Oxford (Sel. Chart., pp. 382-387. Burt., pp. 439-443), and kindred 
documents. 

3 Mat. Par., V., pp. 370, 371, et passim. 

4 Ibid., p. 199. 

5 Ibid., p. 356. 

6 Ibid., IV., pp. 400, 401 ; V., pp. 136, 137. 

7 Ibid., V., p. 560. Cf. p. 589. Ten. 

8 Ibid., V., pp. 588, 589. 

G 



82 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

clipped coinage was called in and the new issue was 
made, — itself a process entailing heavy loss upon the 
people, — the king, by levying a heavy seigniorage and 
high exchange, used the opportunity to pay off his debt 
to Richard of Cornwall. 1 On days of festival or great 
occasions, money was sometimes given by individuals ; 
if the present was small, the king showed no scruple in 
asking for more. At Edward's birth, particularly, mes- 
sengers were sent throughout the land to announce the 
joyful news and to return with gifts : whence it became 
a current phrase in court-circles, " God gave this child 
to us, but the lord king has sold him." 2 

Rightly or wrongly, the chief share in these manifold 
wrong-doings was laid at the door of the aliens ; at any 
rate, they ruled the treasury and seemed to feast when 
other men were fasting. That they favoured arbitrary 
government and were themselves lawless ; that they 
were ignorant of the constitution, systematically dis- 
regarded 3 it, and incited the king to do the same, there 
could be no doubt. They supplemented in the state 
the great contemporary movement which was dena- 
tionalizing the church, and lent the latter movement 
their support. Their avarice was so great that the 
woe prophesied by Joel as about to come upon Israel 
seemed to have fallen upon England : " That which 



i Mat. Par., V., pp. 15, 18, 19, 629. Dunst., p. 175. Burton, p. 285. 
Osney, p. 97. Wykes, pp. 96, 97. 

2 Mat. Par., III., pp. 539, 540. 

3 Cf. Mat. Par., V., p. 316. Nihil curamus de lege regni. Quid ad 
nos de assisis, vel regni hujus consuetudinibus ? 



part iv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 83 

the palmer-worm hath left hath the locust eaten ; and 
that which the locust hath left hath the canker-worm 
eaten ; and that which the canker-worm hath left, hath 
the caterpillar eaten." 1 Their pride and contempt for 
the English was insupportable and ultimately received 
its due reward; for when the Poitevins opposed the 
national demand for constitutional reform, the universal 
discontent, long smothered, received adequate expression 
by their expulsion from the land. 

1 Joel i. 4. Cf. Ann. Burt., 464. The nuncio to the pope. 



84 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 



PART V 

The Denationalization of England: the Church 

and the Pope 

The removal of aliens from the realm of England 
had been guaranteed by Magna Charta, but by a charter 
of a very different kind the power of one foreign poten- 
tate had been placed upon a basis in England more 
solid than before. The baleful influence of Peter des 
Roches had ultimately rendered the first provision 
nugatory ; piety and policy, together with the king's 
well-grounded affection for Honorius III., conspired to 
make the second unassailable. And so it came to pass 
that while the state of England was being administered 
by aliens and in alien interests, a parallel denationaliza- 
tion was occurring in the church. One movement was 
the complement of the other, and each strengthened the 
other, 1 for their natures were essentially the same. 
The policy and conduct of the aliens from Poitou was 
the more frankly unnational and arbitrary at the start, 
and roused more speedily the jealousy and vengeance 
of the barons, while the material character of the aliens' 
power rendered them more open to attack ; the hostility 
of Rome to England, more subtle in its character, more 
deadly in its effects, and less assailable on account of 

* Cf. ex grege, Mat. Par., III., pp. 187, 241. 



part v DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 85 

its spiritual nature and the indefiniteness of its power, 
was slower to develop, and roused the clergy to a com- 
paratively hopeless resistance long before the baronage 
perceived their identity of interests and came to their 
help. The Poitevins favoured absolutism from habit and 
self-interest ; the pope, from immemorial tradition and 
the very nature of his own power as the Vicar of Christ. 
It could scarcely be expected that the head of a strictly 
hierarchical church, which was seeking universal tem- 
poral sovereignty no less than spiritual, would favour 
aspirations for free institutions and for national sepa- 
rate existence — especially in the case of England, 
which by virtue of John's oath of fealty and its confir- 
mation by Henry was considered a mere appanage of 
the Holy See. 1 Circumstances, however, delayed for a 
season the outward expression of this fundamental dis- 
cord ; the recall of Pandulf at Langton's instance, and 
the accompanying promise that no other legate should 
be appointed during the archbishop's life, averted a 
possible conflict between the overlordship of the pope 
and the national desire for self-government. 2 It was, 
therefore, not until the death-grapple between papacy 
and empire had fairly begun, that the ungloved hand 
of Rome was laid on England, and that the full effect 
of the inauspicious alliance between needy pope and 
arbitrary king was felt. 

Meanwhile the kindly interest and wise counsels of 
Honorius were winning Henry's affection. "We re- 

1 Cf. Gardiner and Mullinger's Eng. Hist, for Students, pp. 70, 71. 

2 Dunst., p. 74. Green, Hist, of the Eng. People, I., pp. 267, 268. 



86 THE BARONS' WAR chap. 11 

joice," wrote 1 the pope, "to hear that your conduct is 
laudable in all respects, so that the flower of your youth 
seems to promise grateful and acceptable fruits ; in this 
our joy is all the greater in proportion to our excep- 
tional love and esteem for your person and realm. Since 
you are lord of a kingdom embracing many men and 
many minds, it is expedient that you be studiously kind 
and o-racious to each and all, and that if controversies 
should unhappily arise, you should not become a par- 
tisan, but should correct, rule, and govern all sides with 
equal affection, equal diligence, and equal zeal : so that 
each party, recognizing your justice, may not fear to 
place their cause within your hands, but may trust you 
as a faithful vassal trusts his gracious lord, or a dutiful 
son his loving father." As the years rolled on, self-inter- 
est supplemented predilection, the papal influence deep- 
ened, and Henry's love for the person was transferred 
to the office as well. Even during the temporary 
breach of 1*245, Henry signified his lasting attachment: 
" We intend to keep unimpaired, as we ought, all rights 
pertaining to our crown and kingly office, and desire 
the pope and the church to lend us their aid. You may 
be sure that we shall always exhibit and cherish utter 
obedience, faith, and devotion to the pope as to our 
spiritual father, and to the holy church of Rome as to 
our mother : in their adversity as in their prosperity we 
will adhere to them firmly, constantly, and loyally. . . . 
For bevond the creneral reasons which bind all Christian 



Ryuier, L, p. 177. March 14, 1225. 



iartv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 87 

princes to the church, we are bound to her more closely 
than the rest for special reasons ; when we were de- 
prived of our father, while we were still in our nonage 
— rer'no nostio non solum a nobis averso sed et nobis 
adversante — mother Roman church herself, through 
the lord cardinal Gualo. then legate in England, re- 
called the realm to our peace and sway, consecrated 
and crowned us king, and seated us aloft upon the 
throne." 1 

Honorius doubtless meant to act for the best: his 
conduct, however, in the case of Faukes de Breaute, 
that "more than king in England," 2 shows but the 
more conclusively how grievously even the best-inten- 
tioned pope could err through ignorance of the actual 
conditions in the distant island. 3 Then. too. his indul- 
gence and Henry's partiality to Rome were the chief 
causes of the heaviest grievances of the English church 
throughout the latter's reign. 4 As early as 122o the 
expenses in connection with the papal court probably 
outweighed all other English outgoes: 5 in the follow- 
ing year, goaded by his need for money, the merciful 
Honorius himself made the first grand attack on pat- 
ronage. Otho was sent as legate to demand for the 
pope's use two prebends in each cathedral and con- 

i Ep. Rob. Gross., CXVIL, pp. 338, 339. Grosseteste to Innocent 
IV., relating a conversation between himself and Henry. 
2Theok., p. 64. 

3 Mat. Par., III., p. 105. Shirley. I., pp. 543-545. 547. 

4 Cf. Ep. Rob. Gross., Pref., p. xvi. Pauli, Gesch. von Eng., III., 
p. 566. 

5 Pauli, III., p. 566. 



88 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

ventual church : his specious, but disgraceful, plea was 
the reduction of the expenses of litigation in the Roman 
curia and the abatement of notorious scandals which 
had arisen through Roman lust for gold. 1 This demand 
was refused, but Gregory IX. in his pontificate renewed 2 
the attack frequently, and Innocent IV., by the use of 
non-o bstante clauses, reduced the custom to a science. 

The results of the intrusion of foreigners into English 
benefices are not far to seek. The realm at large was 
sadly impoverished by the constant drain of money ; the 
lower clergy in particular were deprived of a career; the 
spirituality of the church was weakened and its unity 
of action paralyzed; through the infringement of the 
rights of noble patrons a reaction against the papal 
power was at this time occasioned, which tended to 
develop into a clamour for the secularization of the 
church estates ; 3 the pope and king became so closely 



iDunst., p. 99. Mat. Par., III., pp. 98, 102, 103, 105 et seq. 
Osney, p. 67. Wykes, pp. 66, 67. Stubbs' Eng. Const. Hist., II., 
pp. 38, 39; III., pp. 320, 321. 

2 In 1231. Mat. Par., III., p. 208. In 1239 lie endeavoured to 
extend the practice to livings in private patronage, but was defeated. 
Mat. Par., III., p. 610 et seq. In 1240 he ordered Canterbury, Salis- 
bury, and Lincoln to provide for three hundred Romans. Mat. Par., 
IV., pp. 31, 32. For general summary, vide Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., 
pp. 38, 70; III., 320, 321. 

3 Cf. Rymer, I., p. 393. Burton, pp. 487-491. Alexander ad 
Magnates Anglise, p. 490. Absit ergo, filii, ut propter appropriationes 
et provisiones hujusmodi ad revocationem et repetitionem juris patro- 
natus quod vos dictosque pnedecessores vestros prsefatis religiosis 
asseritis concessisse, quomodolibet procedatis : cum non liceat vobis, 
quibus disponendi de rebus ecclesiasticis nulla prorsus est attributa 
facultas, extendere ad talia manus vestras, etc. (1259 or 1260.) 



partv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 89 

identified that one conld scarcely be attacked apart 
from the other ; l and finally an impetus was given 
to the great national movement of the reign — for 
not only were the barons roused to action, but the 
patriotic prelates and the lower clergy gave efficient 
aid. The cause of the national church and that of the 
reforming party in the state found here one connecting 
link. 

The method by which intrusions were accomplished 
was no less exasperating than the practice itself. At 
York, for example, three strangers secretly entered the 
cathedral and asked a worshipper to point out the dean's 
stall. Then two of them said to the third as they placed 
him in the chair, " Brother, we install thee by the author- 
ity of the pope." Archbishop Sewall, a man renowned 
for holiness of life, tried later to invalidate this appoint- 
ment and was suspended from his office for his pains. 2 
The usurpation in this case was particularly glaring, but 
in very many instances an insult was added to an injury. 

Honorius III. had instituted this pernicious custom ; 
Gregory IX. extended and combined it with another 
politically worse. In 1229 came Stephen, demanding 
in the pope's name a tenth for the war against the 
emperor. 3 The clergy at first refused to make the 
grant, but a few days later yielded for fear of excom- 



1 Cf. Mat. Par., IV., pp. 10, 559, 561, 577, 655, et passim; V., p. 514. 

2 Ibid., V., pp. 586, 624. 

3 Ibid., III., pp. 186, 189, says that the tenth was demanded from 
clerks and laymen, and that the earl of Chester resisted. All other 
authorities refer it to the church alone. 



90 THE BARONS' WAR, chap, ii 

munication, and the tenth was rigorously collected. 
Throughout the discussions the king sat silent, and by 
his silence seemed to give consent. 1 He had recently 
bound himself by his proctors at Rome to assent to 
this exaction in return for the cassation of Walter of 
Eynsham's election to the archbishopric of Canterbury 
and for the substitution of Richard, chancellor of 
Lincoln. 2 Here was the beginning of that shameful 
alliance which resulted in the degradation of the Eng- 
lish church, and in such utter humiliation of the realm 
that a foreign potentate not only levied direct taxes in 
the land but was later allowed to collect them by his 
private agents. The king's explicit statement eleven 
years afterward, that he neither wished nor dared to 
thwart the pope in any matter, 3 scarcely required proof. 
In the year 1281, Gregory ordered no presentments 
to be made to English livings till provision had been 
made for five Romans, names not stated. 4 In conjunc- 
tion with Stephen's levying of tithes — so rigorous that 
it did not spare crops growing in the field 5 — this piece 
of papal insolence fanned all the fires of national enthu- 
siasm. A secret society was formed whose members 
styled themselves the " universitas eorum qui magis 
volunt mori quam a Romanis confundi." They wrote 
threatening letters to the farmers of churches whose 



1 Mat. Par., III., pp. 186, 187. Burt., p. 245. Theok., p. 73. 
Dunst., p. 114. Wav., p. 305. Winton., p. 85. Wykes, p. 70. 
Osney, p. 70. 

2 Mat. Par., III., pp. 169, 170, 187. 4 Ibid, III., p. 208. 

3 Ibid., IV., p. 10. s Ihid ^ pp. 18 g 5 189- 



partv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 91 

revenues were due to Romans, forbidding them, on 
pain of personal injury and destruction of their prop- 
erty by fire, to send the revenues abroad ; and they 
ordered all bishops, under like penalties, not to inter- 
fere with the chastisers of the Romans. 1 From threats 
they passed to deeds, seizing the persons of the foreign 
clerks, burning and pillaging. 2 This was by no means 
the work of a rabble, for Sir Robert Twenge, their 
leader, was the scion of a noble house of northern Eng- 
land, and when the royal bailiffs tried to seize some 
pillagers, the latter produced what purported to be 
letters-patent of the justiciar himself. 3 In all respects 
this movement, so early in the reign, is strongly analo- 
gous to the rising in 1263 which ushered in the Barons' 
War ; and the politic measure by which the barons, in 
1258, sought to attract the lower clergy to their stand- 
ard may well have been suggested by the letters of 
those who preferred to die rather than be confounded 
by the Romans. 4 

In spite of opposition, the pope continued his exac- 
tions, the alien counsellors of the king gave him their 
support, and Henry was the ready instrument of both. 

1 Mat, Par., III., pp. 208-210. 

2 Ibid., pp. 210, 211, 217. Dunst., pp. 128, 129. 

3 Mat. Par., III., pp. 217, 218. Dunst., p. 129. 

4 Cf. the passages in Mat. Par. and Pish. Chronicon. Par. III., 
p. 209. Pro certo scituri, quod si hujus mandati, quod absit extiteritis 
transgressores, qure vestra sunt incendio subjacebunt, et poenam, quam 
Romani incurrent in personis, vos . . . incurretis. Chron., p. 10. 
Adjungentes quod, si aliter facerent, sua incendio subjacerent, et 
nicbilominus periculum quod Romanis imminebat in suis personis 
immineret. Rishanger had access to Matthew's writings. 



92 THE BABONS* WAB chap, ii 

" The fire of faith begins to cool," wrote Matthew Paris 1 
in the year 1237; "charity has breathed its last, the 
liberty of the church is but a name, and religion is 
basely trodden under foot." But worse days were to 
come. 

On the arrival of William de Valence in 1236, he had 
been made the king's principal councillor, to the great 
disgust of all the English magnates. 2 The January 
parliament of the following year had proved a stormy 
one. The king had received his coveted grant of a 
thirtieth, but only on condition 3 of the confirmation of the 
Charter, the removal of aliens from his council, and the 
appointment of four baronial nominees to administer 
the proceeds of the tax. In these circumstances Henry 
had recourse to papal aid, and at his request Otho was 
sent as legate to conciliate. 4 His moderation 5 won 
golden opinions for him for a time, but events were 
speedily to show that he brought not peace but a sword. 
During the three years 6 of his legation, by means of 
procurations, licenses for neglecting vows of crusade, 
usurpation of patronage, direct taxes, and by other 
agencies, he extorted a sum equal to full half the money 
in England, besides obtaining more than three hundred 
of the best prebends in the land for his own use or for 

1 Mat. Par., III., p. 389. 

2 Ibid., p. 362. Dunst., pp. 145, 146. Theok., p. 102. 

3 Mat. Par., III., pp. 380-383; IV., p. 186. Rymer, I., p. 232. 
Theok., p. 105. 

4 Mat. Par., III., pp. 395, 403, 567. 

5 Ibid., p. 403. 

6 June 29, 1237-Jauuary, 1241. Mat. Par., III., p. 395 ; IV., p. 84. 



part v DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 93 

the pope's. 1 Except the king and Otho's beneficiaries, 
none grieved when he departed ; his extravagant de- 
mands had cost the saintly Edmund of Canterbury his 
happiness and life, and had damaged the English church 
almost beyond repair. 2 Otho's coming coincided with 
that of the second swarm of aliens ; it denationalized 
the church as these denationalized the state ; it roused 
everywhere a storm of national indignation; 3 and from 
this time dates the movement in the church which, 
supplementing the baronial agitations in the state, pre- 
pared the way for later armed resistance. 4 

With the accession of Innocent IV., Roman extortion 
began to reach the climax. With characteristic short- 
sightedness Henry had misused the lull before the 
storm — the vacancy in the papacy between Celestine 
IV. and Innocent — for a fruitless expedition to Gas- 
cony. Throughout the year 1243 royal exactions had 
consequently reached an almost unprecedented amount, 
and when Innocent's demand for aid against the em- 
peror reached England in 1244, it found both baron- 
age and clergy in a state of rage and desperation. 5 
The latter promptly sent a letter 6 of remonstrance and 
refusal: "As the Roman church has its own patri- 
mony, whose administration pertains to the pope, so 

1 Mat. Par., III., pp. 567, 616 ; IV., pp. 6, 7, 9, 10, 15, 84. Burt., 
p. 257. Dunst., p. 154. 

2 Mat. Par., IV., p. 32. Winton., p. 88. 

3 Vide especially Mat. Par., III., pp. 481-485; IV., pp. 83, 84. 

4 Cf. Stubbs' Eng. Const. Hist., II., pp. 57, 58. 

5 Burt., p. 265. Cf. Mat. Par., IV., p. 39 et seq. 

6 Burt., p. 265. Mat. Par., IV., p. 39. 



94 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

other churches have theirs, arising from bountiful 
grants of kings and princes. These are in no respect 
tributary to the pope or taxable by him : from these 
their patrimonies prelates should not be compelled to 
contribute." The king had already written l to the 
pope a general remonstrance against his exactions, 
and in the parliament of 1244 bishops and barons had 
united in a manner which seemed to promise better 
days. 2 The embassy of Martin, an envoy, not a legate 
but clothed with more than legatine authority, and of 
more than Roman arrogance, 3 seemed to join all three 
elements in an opposition to Rome which bade fair to 
be lasting. He suspended prelates from the collation 
of benefices until the pope's need was satisfied, de- 
manded procurations from religious houses, collected 
all arrearages due since 1240, including the aid which 
Gregory IX. had claimed, and asked for a further 
grant of 10,000 marks. 4 In accordance with their own 
wishes and the order of the king, this was refused by 
the prelates, yet Martin succeeded in wringing large 
sums from individuals. 5 At length the barons took 
the matter up, and in the name of the " universitas 
regni " appointed Fulk Fitz Warin to send him out 
of England. Their emissary used but little ceremony: 



i Mat. Par., IV., pp. 314, 315. 

2 Ibid., pp. 362-366. Vide supra, p. 32. 

3 Mat. Par., IV., pp. 368, 379, 416, 443. Eymer, I., p. 262. 

4 Mat. Par., IV., pp. 284, 368, 369, 443. Rymer, I., p. 262. Dunst., 
pp. 166, 167. 

5 Mat. Par., IV., pp. 375, 379, 416, 443. 



partv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 95 

" If you will take advice, you will leave England before 
three days are up, that you and yours may not be 
hacked to pieces." l Martin appealed to the king for 
leave to remain, or at least for the grant of a safe-con- 
duct, but received a still rougher reply. 2 At length, 
July 15, 1245, England was relieved of his hated pres- 
ence. 3 The Council of Lyons had then been in session 
three weeks. 4 

Henry's own needs, the remonstrances of clergy and 
baronage, and the surpassing insolence of Martin's 
embassy and of papal demands, had emboldened the 
king to resist the papal tyranny. Envoys to the Coun- 
cil of Lyons had therefore been appointed. It was not 
their duty to join in the general glorification of the 
pope, but to present a declaration repudiating the fur- 
ther payment of John's tribute-money on the grounds 
that its exaction in time of war was injurious to Eng- 
land, and that " neither had their ancestors consented 
to its imposition nor would they themselves consent." 5 
During the presentation the pope sat motionless and 
uttered not a word. The envoys next proceeded to 
read a letter 6 from the commonwealth (universitas) of 
England. It was couched in most courteous terms, but 
censured general legatine exactions, violations of the 

1 Mat. Par., IV., p. 420. 

2 Dunst., p. 167. Mat. Par., IV., pp. 420, 421. Diabolus te ad 
inferos inducat et perducat. 

3 Mat. Par., IV., p. 421. Cf. Dunst., p. 167. 

4 Mat. Par., IV., p. 431. 

5 Ibid., pp., 419, 440, 479. Dunst., p. 168. Trivet, p. 234. 

6 Mat. Par., IV., pp. 441-444. Rymer, I., p. 262. 



96 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

rights of private patrons, and the intrusion of aliens 
into English benefices to the detriment of spiritual in- 
terests, the impoverishment of the land, and the loss 
of the native English clergy. Martin's embassy re- 
ceived especial mention. After some days' delay 1 — 
ostensibly for purposes of consideration, — the envoys 
received an unsatisfactory reply. They left, protest- 
ing that from henceforth the revenues of at least those 
churches whose patronage was in the hands of nobles 
should never be extorted. 2 Before the council broke 
up, the pope gave a still more unequivocal proof of 
his intentions toward the English church and people 
by forcing the bishops present at Lyons to sign the 
very charter which the envoys of the realm had just 
repudiated. 8 The only fruit of the embassy had been 
a few paper-privileges : certain suspensions made by 
Martin were invalidated; only twelve benefices were 
reserved for papal appointees ; bishops and other pa- 
trons were to be allowed the due exercise of their 
rights of presentation ; and one Italian should never 
be allowed to immediately succeed another. 4 But no 
papal promise could restrain the operation of a non- 
obstante clause. 

Never was a saying more indicative of settled policy 

1 Mat. Par., IV., pp. 444, 445. Trivet, p. 234. 

2 Mat. Par., IV., pp. 478, 479. 

3 Ibid, p. 479. 

4 Ibid, pp. 519, 520, 522. Rymer, I., pp. 262, 263. The immediate 
succession of Italians was a fruitful source of fraud. Before the 
English patron knew that the benefice was vacant through the death 
of the alien incumbent, another had been appointed. 



part v DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 97 

than the celebrated speech of Innocent at this great 
Council of Lyons : " Verily England is our garden of 
delights ; verily it is an unexhausted well ; and where 
many things abound, from the many can much be 
extorted." l In addition to the general tax of a twen- 
tieth for three years levied upon the church universal, 
England was favoured with a special demand 2 for a half, 
a twentieth, and a third from different classes of the 
clergy. The matter came up for discussion before a 
special parliament convened at London, March 18, 1246. 
Not only were these demands enormous, but in addition 
the pope had failed to keep his former promises, meagre 
as they were. 3 It was therefore decided that king, 4 
clergy, and baronage should each send a separate epistle 
to the pope. The barons had now entered the contest 
heart and soul ; their letter 5 is a trumpet-call to battle. 
The spiritual power of the pope is devoutly recognized, 
to be sure, and he is greeted as the " chariot of Israel 
and the horsemen thereof," but the threatening words 
follow, — " Unless the king and the realm be very 
speedily freed from their burdens, it will be incumbent 
on us to establish a wall for the house of the Lord 
and for the freedom of the kingdom." And again, — 
" Unless these evils are very quickly corrected by you, 



1 Mat. Par., IV., pp. 546, 547. 

2 Ibid., p. 458. Burt., pp. 269, 276, 277. 

3 Mat. Par., IV., p. 519. 

4 Ibid., pp. 534-536. Rymer, I., p. 265. Dunst., pp. 169, 170. 

5 Mat. Par., IV., pp., 533, 534. Burt., pp. 283-285. Rymer, L, 
265. 



98 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

there is great reason to fear that such peril will 
threaten both the church of Rome and the king, that a 
remedy cannot be easily applied." Such words might 
hail the advent of a WyclifTe. 

The six complaints which form the substance of the 
letter represent those peculiar evils of the church in 
England, which arose from Roman greed. Contrary 
to English law and custom, the pope was year by year 
extorting a heavier sum. Advowson-rights were vio- 
lated, and Italian clerks, ignorant of the English 
tongue, were intruded into benefices to the imperilling 
of souls and the devastation of the kingdom. Papal 
pensions and provisions were a burden, nor did the pope 
observe the limits which he had himself established. 
Italian continued to succeed Italian, and contrary to 
English custom and the written indulgence x of former 
popes, Englishmen were forced to plead outside the 
realm. Without the consent of the king general taxes 
were levied and collected by the pope, the common- 
wealth protesting. " The land is burdened by the fre- 
quent arrival of that infamous envoy, non-obstante, by 
means of which the sanctity of oaths, ancient customs, 
force of documents, validity of concessions, statutes, 
laws, and privileges are weakened and pass away, while 
great numbers of Englishmen are heavily oppressed." 2 
Finally, in the benefices of Italians, the ordinances of 
the bishops met with no observance ; the poor were not 
supported, nor hospitality practised; the gospel was 

i Rymer, I., p. 201. Theok., p. 75. 

2 Cf. Rob. Gross., Epist. CXXVIIL, p. 434, 



partv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 99 

not preached, nor did souls receive due care ; divine 
rites failed to be performed ; churches were not adorned, 
and walls and roofs were falling to decay or were com- 
pletely ruined. Such was the terrible indictment drawn 
by the barons of England against the secularized Roman 
church. 

Their letter presented the theoretical and political 
side of the question ; the clergy's was largely practical. 1 
" The sum demanded was so great that it could not 
possibly be paid ; England would be reduced to straits 
more dire than after the great tax which freed king 
Richard." They therefore appealed to a general coun- 
cil for relief. 

Prominent among the causes for the king's attitude 
in this matter had been the discovery by actual compu- 
tation in the year 1245, that the annual revenues drawn 
by Italian clerks from England amounted to upwards of 
60,000 marks — a sum much greater than the clear 
income of the crown itself. 2 The king's anger had been 
still more recently excited by the papal concession to 
Boniface of Canterbury of the first fruits of his see for 
seven years, or until the sum should reach 10,000 marks. 3 



1 Mat. Par., IV., pp. 531-533. Rymer, I., pp. 265, 266. Burt., 
pp. 278-282. 

2 Mat. Par., IV., p. 443. Rymer, I., p. 262. Cf. Mat. Par., V., 
p. 355 (1252). Episcopus R. Lincolniensis . . . fecit a suis clericis 
diligenter coinputari et considerari alienorum proventus in Anglia. . . . 
Reditusque clericorum per ipsum in Anglia alienorum, quos ecclesia 
Romana ditaverat, ad plus quam septuaginta milia marcarum ascen- 
dit. Redditus regis merus non ad ejus partem tertiam computatur. 
This may have been the same computation which Paris mentions. 

3 Mat. Par., IV., pp. 506-509. 



100 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

Henry was therefore eager to oppose this new demand 
for tallage. 

On the 1st of April, 1246, eight days before the 
envoys bearing the three letters of remonstrance left 
the island, the king issued a writ 1 forbidding the pre- 
lates to pay. At first sight, it seems strange that this 
command was disregarded, yet the very refusal of many 
of the clergy to obey the king throws a flood of light 
upon the circumstances of the time. In the greatest 
indignation Henry wrote 2 to the several bishops that 
he was in the highest degree surprised to find that they 
were acting contrary to the agreement in council to sat- 
isfy no papal demands until an answer had been received 
to the three remonstrances. Grosseteste responded: 3 
"Rightly would you be surprised and indignant if, 
when bidden by the pope, we did not do a greater thing 
than this. For we see our spiritual father and mother 
forced to exile, straitened on all sides by persecutions 
and tribulations, despoiled of their own patrimony ; and 
we are bound to honour, obey, revere, and help them in 
their necessities of every kind incomparably more than 
we are bound to do in the case of fleshly parents." In 
this reply, Grosseteste was traitor neither to his duty 
as foremost champion of the church against papal and 
royal abuses, nor to his settled principles. He simply 
fell a victim to the erroneous views of his day con- 
cerning the nature of the papal power. His view of 

i Mat. Par., IV., pp. 551, 554. 

2 Ibid., p. 558. 

3 Rob. Gross. Epist., CXIX., pp. 340-342. 



partv DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 101 

church and state was the strictly orthodox view of the 
mediaeval churchman. The object of each in its own 
sphere was to prepare the way to eternal blessedness, 
and their relations were complementary and mutually 
helpful. 1 The church, however, was the higher power, 
and therefore ought not to be entangled by the secular 
power in secular affairs. 2 In all things spiritual the 
pope must be obeyed so long as his commands were 
God's commands, otherwise they were to be resisted. 3 
It followed as a corollary that papal demands upon the 
English church for money must be paid, if levied for 
lawful objects and in lawful ways. In the case at issue, 
the pope's decree was binding until formally revoked. 4 
Grosseteste was the defender of the liberties of the 
English church against, first, papal violations of the 
canons and divine law, and second, royal violations of 
the rights of the church as both a chartered and privi- 
leged body. Because, however, the pope and king were 
as a rule so closely connected in their illegal exactions, 
and because the king could ultimately be constrained by 
force of arms only and by rebellion, Grosseteste fore- 
saw the evil days 5 so close at hand and trained Simon 

1 Epist. CXXIV, p. 348. Est igitur . . . utrumque utriusque 
juvativum : ex quo evidenter sequitur quod neutrum neutrius est 
impeditivum. 

2 Epist. CXXIV., p. 349. Cum hoc esset solare lumen in lunare 
convertere, solares radios a vegetatione terrse nascentium praecludere, 
etc. Cf. Ann. Burt., p. 422. 

3 Epist. C XXVIII., pp. 432 et seq. The Lavagna letter. 

4 Epist. CXXIX., p. 341. Ad id compellit summi Pontificis auctori- 
tas et prseceptum, cui non obedire quasi peccatum est ariolandi et 
quasi scelus idololatrise non adquiescere. I Sam. xv. 23. 

5 Cf. Mat. Par., V., p. 407. 



102 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

de Montfort to be the champion of the church in the 
coming battle. 

It is evident from the passage quoted above, 1 that the 
bishop of Lincoln's sympathies were enlisted on the 
side of the pope against the emperor, — partly as matter 
of duty, partly, perhaps, from horror at the latter's 
infidelity. 2 At any rate, scruples of this kind could 
not fail to weaken the position of the clergy in the year 
1246 ; evils were so inextricably mingled with what the 
prelates considered a good, that the first entered the 
door with the second. Then, too, grave perils threat- 
ened the church from either side — from king as well as 
from pope. In these circumstances Henry's personal 
character had great weight. Because they distrusted 
his fickleness and the pusillanimity of the royal council, 
many prelates favoured Rome. 3 

On the 7th of July the clergy and magnates of the 
realm assembled at Winchester to receive the pope's final 
answer. It compared the king with the emperor, and 
ordered the prelates to satisfy the nuncio by the middle 
of August. 4 After a burst of impotent rage the king 
gave way, and 6000 marks left England to swell the 
coffers of the landgrave of Thiiringia. 5 

Henry's spasmodic struggle had lasted two short years ; 

1 Rob. Gross. Epist., CXIX., p. 341. 

2 Rob. Gross. Epist., Pref., p. xxviii. 

3 Mat. Par., IV., p. 559. 

4 Ibid., pp. 561, 560. Rex Anglorum, qui jam recalcitrat et Fre- 
therizat, suum habet consilium ; ego vero meum habeo, quod et 
sequar. 

5 Mat. Par., IV., pp. 560, 561, 577. 



part v DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 103 

its issue was universal despair and more intolerable ser- 
vitude to Rome than formerly. In spite of paper-con- 
cessions 1 the rights of patrons continued to be violated ; 
ecclesiastical penalties were employed to enforce the 
unrighteous demands of the pope ; non-obstante clauses 
were introduced with even greater frequency; "avarice, 
simony, and usury flourished while true religion de- 
cayed." In truth, the case of England was peculiarly 
pitiable ; she had surpassed all other nations in the 
vigour of her faith and of her devotion to Rome, but 
only to be trampled under foot by papal oppression and 
robbed of the fruits of her toil. A prey to every plun- 
derer, she herself plundered none. 2 

Year by year, as royal misgovernment grew worse and 
worse, the alliance between the pope and king grew 
firmer. The latter needed help in enriching aliens from 
the revenues of the church, 3 and always looked upon a 
papal bull as the readiest means of relief from those 
troubles within the realm which were gradually assum- 
ing more threatening shape. The pope had even greater 
need of Henry and the wealth of England, for the 
struggle with the emperor was advancing apace and be- 
coming a matter of life and death. The tenth for the 
crusade which was conceded 4 to Henry in 1250 by the 

iMat. Par., IV., p. 598; VI., pp. 260-264. Burt., pp. 314-317. 
Rymer, I., p. 294. Nov. 3, 1253. 

2 Mat. Par., V., p. 185. In 1250. 

3 Vide Mat. Par., V., pp. 224, 227, for bargain between king and 
pope : JEthelmar was to receive first fruits before confirmation ; the 
son of the count of Burgundy, revenue of 500 marks. 

4 Rymer, I., p. 272. 



104 THE BABONS" WAB chap, ii 

pope offered a new opening for the extortions of both; 
while the king's acceptance of the Sicilian crown paved 
the way for exactions of hitherto unequalled ingenuity 
and magnitude. As the crown under Richard and John 
had overstrained its power through the over-elaboration 
of means of taxation and the extent of its use, so the pope 
now yielded to the same strong temptation, and ulti- 
mately paid a penalty still heavier. The struggles of 
the English people against the papal exactions which 
ensued upon the death of Stephen Langton, were the 
ground-swell which heralded the coming storm. 



part vi DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 105 



PART VI 

The Denationalization of England: the 
Church and the King 

The evils which Henry inflicted upon the English 
church flowed partly from his intimacy with Rome, 
partly from his fostering of aliens, partly from that 
chronic poverty which was caused by both these ele- 
ments in conjunction with his visionary projects. The 
first led him to summon legates unwisely, and to allow 
papal taxation for non-national objects ; the second 
caused improper presentations to bishoprics and bene- 
fices, and uncanonical interference with elections in 
violation of the Charters ; the third led to a great 
variety of infringements of the rights of the church as 
both a chartered and privileged body. It is only fair 
to say that many grievances of the clergy based upon 
this last score arose from the innate antagonism between 
church and state, and must have been inflicted by any 
monarch who refused to tolerate an imperium in im- 
perio. The extent of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over 
ecclesiastical persons, and the extent of the penalties 
which ecclesiastical courts could impose upon laymen 
guilty of spiritual offences, as well as the exact nature 
and limits of spiritual offences themselves, were ques- 
tions as yet scarcely capable of definite statement and 



106 THE BARONS' WAR chap, it 

answer. 1 It remains true, nevertheless, that whether 
Henry in this last respect was intentionally guilty or 
not, he yet touched the sensibilities of the clergy in a 
very tender spot, and awoke the anger of a great corpo- 
rate body which was especially jealous and tenacious of 
its peculiar privileges. Ecclesiastical immunities were 
in the eyes of churchmen a dogma of the highest rank, 
and around such citadels of faith conflicts are wont to 
rage with more than proverbial bitterness. 

It is scarcely necessary to treat at greater length of 
Henry's alliance with the pope. Its ultimate tenden- 
cies were clearly seen as early as 1255, when Matthew 
Paris 2 wrote: "The pope is prepared and ready in all 
things to second the king's attempt to destroy the com- 
monwealth of England, and will bind all royal oppo- 
nents with the chains of anathema." One curious side- 
effect of the connection may, however, detain us for a 
moment. 

On account of their ecclesiastical safeguards, the 
Great Charters were regarded as especially under the 
care of the clergy. The ecclesiastical documents corre- 
sponding to these Charters were the privileges guaran- 
teed by papal bulls. It is scarcely possible, therefore, 
that the frequent violation of the latter by means of 
non-obstante clauses should not have influenced Henry 
in the non-observance of the Charters. He could not 
be his own dispensation, it is true, but the pope and 

1 They are best studied from the long lists of gravamina so common 
at this time, but require very special treatment. 

2 Mat. Par., V., p. 514. 



part vi DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 107 

the venal college of cardinals formed an alter ego 
admirable as he could wish. Certain it is that Henry 
was urged by his alien counsellors — who were practi- 
cally identical with the Roman party at the court — to 
violate the Charters in reliance on the pope's assistance. 
A still more striking proof of the influence of the non- 
obstante in the same direction, was its introduction into 
civil courts in England to accomplish the cassation of 
royal letters-patent and of private charters. 1 

The introduction of aliens which denationalized the 
state by their charge of the royal counsels, the admin- 
istration of the treasury and chancery, and the custody 
of royal castles to the danger of the land, is exactly 
paralleled by the denationalization of the church which 
resulted from their introduction to the care of the royal 
conscience, the administration of the finances of the 
church, and the possession of bishoprics and inferior 
ecclesiastical offices to the danger of souls. Then, too, 
as the cumulative effect of successive waves of invasion 
was felt in political spheres, so, also, in the sacred circle 
of the church. 

The uncles of the queen had received a warm wel- 
come from Henry and been given lucrative appoint- 
ments in the state. To the great disturbance of the 
monks of Winchester he had caused their election of 
the noble Ralph Neville to be quashed by the pope, 
while in defiance of every canonical law and John's 
Charter he sought to intrude William of Valence. 2 

1 Mat. Par., V., p. 210. Bishop of Carlyle vs. a certain baron. 

2 Mat. Par., III., pp. 489, 491, 493-495. 



108 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

William's death prevented his success. 1 His former 
procurator, Peter of Aigueblanche, a Proven Qal, did 
not deserve, but met, a better fate. Through Henry's 
direct interference he was forced, despite his evil repu- 
tation and ignorance of English, into the bishopric of 
Hereford. 2 His whole influence was pernicious to the 
last degree, and with the possible exception of ^Ethel- 
mar of Winchester, no other churchman was so hated. 3 
It was the eminent misfortune of England at that day 
— whatever it may be in this — that every bishop was 
per se a force in politics. The efforts of this one were 
especially directed to furthering the interests of aliens, 
the king's arbitrary power, and abuses in the church. 
He was the agent for Richard's inauspicious marriage 
to Sancha, 4 he negotiated the Sicilian treaty, 5 and his 
extortions for the papal court were so shameless that 
through fear he rode out armed and guarded. 6 

It was reserved for Boniface of Savoy to win the 
richest prize of all. His election at the king's request 
as archbishop of Canterbury 7 was a national misfort- 
une of the first magnitude. In times which demanded 
a Langton, the church received a head whose primary 
interests lay confessedly outside of England. Matthew 
Paris, writing in 1252, states 8 that Boniface had already 

1 Mat. Par., III., p. 623. 

2 Ibid., IV., pp. 48, 74, 75 ; V., p. 422. 

3 Mat. Par., V., p. 510. Cujus memoria sulphureum fcetorem 
exhalat ac teterrimum. 

* Mat. Par., IV., p. 190. 

5 Rymer, I., pp. 312, 316-318. 7 Ibid., IV., p. 104. 

6 Mat. Par., V., p. 591 (1256). 8 Ibid., V., p. 348. 



part vi DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 109 

drained the church and realm of 17,000 marks, had 
destroyed the forests in his see, and bestowed the 
richest revenues within his gift on aliens. His income 
had been used to aid his niece, Beatrice of Savoy, and 
the pope. 1 His sins of omission may have been worse 
than his sins of commission ; but he who should have 
been a shield against hostile attacks was entangled in 
secular business, cared but little for his English flock, 
and passed his time abroad. 2 His active occupancy of 
the see of Canterbury, so far as it tended to good, was 
about equivalent to the occupancy of a Stephen Langton 
under a perpetual sentence of suspension. 

The third swarm of aliens in the state was repre- 
sented in the church by JEthelmar of Winchester. 
The mode of his election was utterly uncanonical, and 
his unfitness for the office was notorious. 3 Yet this 
youth acquired such influence over the mind of the 
king, that the barons, soon after his expulsion, wrote 
to the pope that iEthelmar's presence could overthrow 
in a moment all the reforms which they had instituted 
with untiring watchfulness and infinite toil. 4 The king, 
by great exertions, succeeded in obtaining for this 
brother permission to retain the first fruits of his see 
even before his consecration ; soon after, another royal 
favourite, Laurence of St. Martin, bishop-elect of Roch- 

1 Mat. Par., IV., pp. 404, 405, 507 ; V., pp. 36, 37, 195. 

2 Ibid., V., p. 515. Cf. Rymer, I., pp. 438, 444. 

3 Mat. Par., V., pp. 468, 224. Non-obstantibus juventute et litera- 
rum ignorantia et omnimoda ad tantam dignitatem et tot animarum 
regimen insufficientia. 

4 Mat. Par., VI., p. 403. Cf. p. 407. Rymer, I., p. 373 



110 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

ester, received the same grace from the pope : thus by 
royal connivance and papal sanction it was ordained 
that " a bishop need not be a bishop, but only a bishop- 
elect ; that the shepherd should not feed the sheep, but 
should himself be fed." 1 

The intrusion of foreigners into bishoprics, whether 
by canonical means or otherwise, was a blow of peculiar 
severity. Every bishop was a peer of the realm, and 
as such was entitled to a place in the council. His 
positive influence strengthened both papal and royal 
tyranny ; his negative, weakened the resistant power 
of the church. The cleft in the councils of the baron- 
age, which their own discords had occasioned, was 
caused in the case of the church by Henry's intrusion 
of aliens. 

That " potestas cum petit, premit," is an ancient say- 
ing. By his prayers, which had practically all the force 
of law, the king intruded his nominees into the humbler 
offices of the church as well as into bishoprics. 2 The 
spiritual effect could not be doubtful ; aliens unknown, 
who did not speak the English tongue, illiterate and 
thoroughly unworthy, careless of souls and greedy for 
money, outraged every sense of religious propriety. The 
king — it was well said — thought first of himself, of his 
nominee next, and of the people last of all. 3 No wonder 



1 Mat. Par., V., pp. 224, 241, 620, 621, 227. Ut scilicet pastor non 
pascat, sed pascatur. 

2 Mat. Par., V., p. 184. Patronatus oneri est jam, non honori ; 
dampno, non utilitati. 

3 Burt., p. 423. Mat. Par., V., pp. 184, 329 ; VI., p. 354. 



part vi DENATIONALIZATION OF ENGLAND 111 

that the Minorites found a ready welcome ; they were 
the heaven-sent antidote for the poison. The political 
effect was no less sure : a great body of eligible men 
of English birth, literate, discreet, and capable of doing 
good service, felt themselves defrauded of their rights, 
and helped to swell the ranks of those who sought to 
end the national disgrace. 

The same poverty which led so directly to illegal 
exactions from the more helpless portions of the lay 
community was the fruitful source of violations of 
ecclesiastical rights. Men thought that there was no 
church of note in England from which, at one time or 
another, Henry had not extorted revenues. 1 A king 
who would not respect John's Charter of Liberties 
could scarcely be expected to observe John's Charter 
to the church. Of all Henry's oppressions, the misuse 
of ecclesiastical vacancies was perhaps the worst. Ca- 
thedral and conventual churches were tallaged and 
their lands left untilled; woods, parks, and fish-ponds 
were destroyed ; buildings fell into decay ; the villeins 
were impoverished and badly treated, and the church- 
estates so plundered that for some time succeeding 
prelates were forced to play the mendicant. 2 A con- 
siderable period usually elapsed before the impover- 
ished church regained its former condition. 3 

1 Mat. Par., V., pp. 184, 185, 362, 2-41. Nulla enim creditur fuisse 
notabilis ecclesia, de cujus uberibus in Anglia lac non creditur exsux- 
isse. Cf. III., p. 411 ; IV., p. 186. 

2 Burt., p. 423. Mat. Par., VI., p. 353. 

3 Cf. Mat. Par., V., p. 362. Dissipatis igitur bonis ecclesite vix 
poterant monachi (S. August. Cantuar.) per quinquennium respirare. 



112 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

John's Charter had guaranteed a canonical election, 
and that with no delay. It was Henry's policy to 
interfere, and if his nominee were unsuccessful, he 
prolonged the vacancy and plundered the estates. 1 
Perhaps the worst outrage of this kind occurred in 
the years 1256-1257 in the bishopric of Ely. On the 
principle " Tgnotum tibi tu noli praeponere notis," the 
monks refused to elect Henry de Wengham, the royal 
candidate, and chose Hugh Balsham, their prior, instead. 
The result was a contested election and one more 
appeal to Rome ; the bishopric was frightfully devas- 
tated by the royal officials, while in the end the king 
was forced to submit and see the island pass under the 
control of an enemy of his own making. 2 It was not 
alwa}^s that such poetical justice was meted out to him, 
for his chief objection to the prior's election had been 
that " the island of Ely from ancient times was wont to 
be a stronghold and camp of refuge for many men hard 
pressed in time of war ; nor would it be safe to entrust 
the guardianship of such a place, strong as any castle, 
to any simple monk, unwarlike, feeble, and ignorant of 
the wisdom of the court." 

It was in this same year — the year before the Mad 
Parliament of Oxford — that the convocation of the 
clergy submitted to the king a formal list 3 of their 
grievances against him; the number of the items was 
no less than fifty. 

1 Mat. Par., IV., p. 3. 

2 Ibid., V., pp. 589, 619, 635, 652. Theok., p. 159. Dunst., p. 204. 

3 Mat. Par., V., p. 638 ; VI., pp. 353-365. 



part vii THE SICILIAN CBOWN 113 



PART VII 

The Sicilian Crown 

Barbarossa's acquisition of the kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies through the marriage of Henry, his son, 
and Constance, the heiress of the Norman kings, was 
destined to be fatal to his house. The conflict for the 
headship of the world — originating largely in theo- 
retical causes — had already been acquiring a character 
more and more territorial and local in proportion as the 
popes had advanced toward the realization of their 
dreams of temporal power. When Sicily and Lom- 
bardy had fairly become the two jaws of a vice whose 
function was to crush the papacy, this process was com- 
pleted : sentence of death was passed upon the line of 
the Hohenstaufen when Alexander IV. announced 1 the 
fixed and perpetual policy of the See of Rome, — 
"Never shall the kingdom of Sicily be united and 
joined to the Empire." 

At Frederic's deposition at the Council of Lyons, 

1 Rymer, L, p. 317 (1255). Cum nostra perpetua et firma voluntas 
existat ut numquam regnum Sicilies uniatur vel jungatur imperio ; 
videlicet, quod unus et idem et Romanorum Imperator et Sicilian Rex 
existat. Cf., however, the utterance of Innocent IV. in 1253. Item 
regnum Imperio nullo modo subdetur, seu sibi unquam tempore in 
eadem persona aliquatenus unietur. Raynaldus, 1253, III. Mansi, 
T. II. , XXI., p. 471. 

i 



114 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

Innocent had asserted his rights of suzerainty over the 
Sicilian kingdom as a fief which had been forfeited, 
and had announced his intention to dispose of it as he 
saw fit. 1 At the time of Frederic's death he continued 
the same policy, ordering the princes and imperial cities 
in Germany not to submit to Conrad's power, and writ- 
ing to the Sicilian magnates that no Hohenstaufen was 
to be recognized as lord, for the sole lordship was vested 
in himself. 2 He also annulled such of Frederic's laws 
as were opposed to the laws of the church, and de- 
manded full control of the administration of Italy, till 
he should appoint the emperor's successor. 3 

By Frederic's last will, Conrad had been made chief 
heir; in case of his death without male issue Henry, 
his brother, son of Isabella of England, was to succeed ; 
and failing heirs to him, Manfred. The latter was 
created prince of Tarentum, and entrusted with the 
government of Sicily and the administration of all 
Italy during Conrad's absence. 4 Of all Frederic's sons 
Manfred was the ablest, truest, most proficient in the 
arts of ruling, and most beloved by the people. A 
strong party, however, had been formed against him by 
the intrigues of the pope, now in Italy, and he there- 
fore lost no time in urging Conrad to appear in person. 
While awaiting his arrival, he entered perforce into 

1 Mat. Par., IV., pp. 454, 455. Cf. Wykes, p. 126. 

2 Raynaldus, 1251, III. Mansi, T. II., XXI., p. 436. 

3 Von Raumer, Gesch. der Hohenstaufen und ihrer Zeit, IV., 
pp. 175, 183. 

4 Mat. Par., V., p. 217. Burt., pp. 289, 290. Raynaldus, 1250, 
XXXIII. Mansi, T. II., XXI., p. 428. 



PART VII 



THE SICILIAN CROWN 115 



negotiations with the pope, but the latter's proposals 
were not only unseasonable, exorbitant, and dishonour- 
able, but were so long delayed that before they arrived 
hostilities had broken out. 1 

It was not until the 8th of January, 1252, that 
Conrad, after an unsuccessful campaign in Germany, 
entered his Apulian realm, 2 but once arrived, his pro- 
gress was rapid. Before the end of the year, Manfred 
and he in brotherly union had won all the Sicilian 
kingdom, with the single exception of Naples. 3 The 
pope steadily refused to negotiate, treated Conrad as 
if deposed with Frederic, conducted himself as lord of 
the land, and diligently sought foreign aid. 4 

It was natural that he should turn to England first 
of all, for the struggle against the empire had long 
been sustained with English gold. As early as 1229 
Gregory IX. had exacted 5 by direct taxation one-tenth 
of the property of the clergy, and in the year 1240 
Frederick II., at that time Henry's brother-in-law, had 
found it necessary to write the king a letter of remon- 
strance, and to demand that the legate Otho be dis- 
missed from England. The base answer was returned 
that Henry, of all princes in the world, was the most 
completely bound to obey the pope's commands, since 
he was the pope's sworn vassal and tributary. 6 From 

i Von Raumer, IV., pp. 184, 186. 

2 Ibid., pp. 178, 188. 

3 Naples fell Oct. 10, 1253. Von Raumer, IV, p. 190. 
* Ibid., IV., p. 188. 

5 Mat. Par., III., pp. 169, 186. Theok., p. 77. 
e Mat. Par., IV., pp. 4, 5, 16-19. 



116 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

a ruler so submissive, what might not Innocent ex- 
pect ? 

In continuation of the same policy which in Fred- 
eric's lifetime had sought to raise up rival emperors, 1 
— the landgrave of Thiiringia, William of Holland, 
and Hacon of Norway, 2 — so the crown of Sicily had 
been offered already to Richard of Cornwall. Accord- 
ing to Richard's own statement, this occurred at a 
dinner in Rome on the very day on which Louis IX. 
was captured at Damietta. 3 The offer was undoubtedly 
made on account of Richard's wealth, ambition, and 
relationship to Henry III. 4 The earl, however, was 
far too shrewd to accept an invitation which savoured 
so remarkably of that which once was made by another 
potentate on the top of an exceeding high mountain 
and in the words, "All these things will I give thee, 
if thou wilt fall down and worship me." 5 

Now, on the 3d of August, 1252, Innocent repeated 
the offer, on the specious plea that through Richard the 
world should have rest from its turmoil, and the church 
be tranquil and prosper. 6 

1 Cf. Mat. Par., V., p. 201. 

2 Hacon's answer is memorable ; it might have been made by 
Grosseteste : Se semper velle ecclesise inimicos, sed non omnes Papse 
inimicos, impugnare. Mat. Par., V., p. 201. 

3 Mat. Par., V., pp. Ill, 112, 347. April 5, 1250. Kaynaldus, 
1250, V. Mansi, T. II., XXL, p. 418. 

4 Mat. Par., V., p. 347. Noverat enim papa, quod comes hydro- 
pisi pecuniali insatiabiliter laborabat et dignitate temporali. V., p. 112. 
Sciens ilium avidum et ambitiosum et multis thesauris abundare. 
V., p. 201. Quia vafer et abundans numismate et quia f rater regis 
Anglise. 5 Sic, Mat. Par., V., p. 347. 

6 Kymer, I., p. 284. Innocent to Henry, urging him to use his 



part vii THE SICILIAN CEOWN 117 

Richard had plenty of reasons for refusing — the 
state of his health, the danger involved in the sub- 
jugation of a realm so inaccessible from England, the 
dishonesty of supplanting Henry, his own nephew, 
and, above all, the fear of Roman intrigues and Apu- 
lian treachery. 1 His shrewdness and unwillingness to 
offend the pope led him, however, to reply that he 
would accept the offer, provided that all crusaders 
should be assigned to duty in Sicily; that the pope 
would pay half the expenses; give him certain cities 
and castles, together with hostages, as evidence of good 
faith, and would also secure him by written guarantees. 
" Otherwise," said he to Albert, the papal nuncio, " the 
pope might just as reasonably say, I sell you the moon 
at a bargain ; just clamber up and take it." The answer 
of the pope was equally short and to the point: "With 
this man we care not to be leagued, or to have anything 
in common." 2 So ended the Cornwall episode. At 
a later day a sharp contrast did not fail to be drawn 
between Richard's wisdom and Henry's rash folly. 

The pope had been treating meanwhile with different 
sons of France, and on the 12th of June, 1253, he defi- 
nitely offered the crown to Charles of Anjou. It was 
refused on account of the harshness of the conditions, 
the absence of Louis from France, and general discon- 



influence with Richard. For Henry's answer, promising an aid from 
the clergy, vide Rymer, L, p. 288. Jan. 28, 1253. 

1 Mat. Par., V., pp. 346, 347, 680. To these the influence of Conrad 
is added by Mat. Par., V., p. 361. 

2 Mat. Par., V., pp. 361, 457, 681. 



118 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

tent with the project. 1 The pope's plan of marrying • 
his nieces to Frederic's sons had also failed, and Inno- 
cent was therefore fain to console himself with the 
reflection that Henry would in no case have exerted 
himself so much for a nephew as he would for a son. 2 
The crown of the Two Sicilies was accordingly offered 
to Henry for Edmund. To make the offer more tempt- 
ing, Innocent promised that all crusaders should be 
diverted from the Holy Land to Sicily, — a promise 
whose fulfilment cost him nothing, — and added an in- 
definite assurance of further support. 3 Henry had for 
some little time been nibbling at the bait and hesitating 
less on account of the enormous difficulty and expen- 
siveness of the undertaking than on account of scruples 
against supplanting Henry his nephew. On the latter's 
death, 4 he was finally induced to give consent. 5 The 
concession 6 was drawn up by Albert at Vendome, 
March 6, 1254, and ten weeks later received Innocent's 
formal confirmation 7 at Assisi. Comment is unneces- 
sary. No definite terms were stated in the document, 
and on the very day on which he signed it Innocent 

!Burt., p. 339. Raynaldus, 1253, II. Mansi, T. II., XXL, pp. 
470, 471. Von Raumer, IV., p. 189. 

2 Mat. Par., V, pp. 274, 275, 301. 

3 Ibid., pp. 457, 681. Cf. Rymer, I., p. 302. 

4 According to Von Raumer, IV., p. 193, Henry died December, 
1253. According to Pauli, III., p. 695, " zu Ende 1253." Stubbs' 
Const. Hist., II., p. 71, dates "early in 1254." Cf. Mat. Par., V., 
p. 448; VI., p. 302. Rymer, I., p. 302. 

5 Rymer, I., p. 302. Burt., p. 340. 
e Rymer, I., p. 297. 

< Ibid., p. 301, May 14, 1254. 



PART VII 



THE SICILIAN CROWN 119 



issued the first 1 of a long line of extortionate bulls. 
The archbishop of Canterbury and the bishop of Chi- 
chester were ordered to borrow in the name of the pope 
and the churches of England as large a sum as possible 
from any who would lend, to bind the church in Eng- 
land to repayment, and to coerce all refractory churches 
and ecclesiastics of every degree by the severest spirit- 
ual penalties. 

The league of Henry and Innocent was the league 
of inordinate vanity and visionary ambition with un- 
bounded avarice and calculating selfishness. At the 
very moment when Albert sealed the concession of the 
6th of March, negotiations were pending 2 between 
Innocent and Conrad ; the pope throughout played his 
double game coolly and with consummate skill. Henry, 
however, was so elated by the pope's shadowy promise 
that by voice, smile, and gesture he proclaimed his 
exultation, and saluted Edmund openly as king. The 
first flush of enthusiasm boded ill to England, for Henry 
sent at once to Rome all the money he had in the 
treasury, all he could borrow from Richard of Cornwall, 
wring from the Jews, extort from the land by the itin- 
erant-justices, and then promised to send more. 3 

The week following Innocent's formal ratification of 
the Sicilian compact, the Hohenstaufen cause received 
a heavy blow in Conrad's death. A fever, conceived 
in the autumn of the year before and heightened by 



1 Rymer, I., p. 301. 

2Raynaldus, 1254, XII. Mansi, T. II., XXI., p. 512. Von 
Rauruer, IV., pp. 194, 196. 3 Mat. Far., V., p. 458.. 



120 THE B AEONS' WAR chap, ii 

grief, carried him off on the 21st of May, 1 1254. Inno- 
cent's opponents in Italy were now limited to Conradin, 
Conrad's heir, a boy too young to inspire fear, and whose 
interests were managed by his friends ; to Manfred, now 
simple prince of Tarentum ; and to Berthold of Hohen- 
burg, the leader of the German mercenaries. Through 
Manfred's shrewd concession, the latter held the whole 
administration in his grasp. When, in accordance with 
the dead Conrad's wishes, Berthold presented Conradin's 
cause to the pope, Innocent replied that the kingdom 
of Sicily belonged to himself, but that he would admit 
Conradin to favour in so far as his tender years would 
allow. Berthold was shrewd enough to see that if a 
papal army once entered Apulia, both his own power and 
Conradin's cause would be lost ; he therefore leagued 
himself with Manfred. The latter governed in Con- 
radin's name and was recognized by the magnates of 
Sicily as Conradin's lawful successor. 2 As soon as this 
was known, Innocent appointed a short respite, and at 
its expiration banned Manfred, Berthold, and all of 
their adherents who had failed to make submission. 3 

While still negotiating with Manfred and the rest, 
Innocent was straining every nerve to make the most 
of the advantage which had accrued to him by the 
decentralization of his opponent's power. On the 22d 
of May he ordered Henry to refrain from all unneces- 

1 Mat. Par., V., p. 460, n. 2. Bohmer, Regesta, p. 28. Von 
Raumer, IV., p. 196. 

2 Mat. Par., V., pp. 460, 461. 

3 Von Raumer, IV., pp. 199-201. 



PART VII 



THE SICILIAN CROWN 121 



sary expenses, and caused Henry's counsellors to add 
their entreaties to his. 1 The next day he promised to 
pay £ 50,000 Tours immediately to Henry's agents at 
Lyons and to duplicate the sum later under certain 
conditions. 2 On the same day he extended the grant 
of the tenth for the crusade from three years to five, 3 
and ordered the papal agents in Scotland to proceed to 
the more hasty collection of the twentieth which had 
there been granted 4 to Henry by the pope for the same 
purpose. All signs show that Innocent believed that 
his game was won already : joyfully he wrote that with 
the death of Conrad the last obstacle had vanished; 
that if Edmund would come with a suitable army, he 
would meet with no resistance ; and he ordered Henry 
to prepare a great seal in readiness for the formal accept- 
ance of the kingdom on September 29th. 5 He even 
refused Henry's request that his vow of a crusade to 
Palestine be commuted for the Sicilian expedition — 
"for," said the pope, "Sicily would be a fine stepping- 
stone in carrying out the former project." 6 A little 
later he wrote from Anagnia, urging Henry not to be 
remiss; that the Lord was with him and was making 
his way unexpectedly easy. 7 In this foretaste of 



1 Bulls to Henry, the queen, Peter of Savoy, in Rymer, I., pp. 302, 
303. 

2 Rymer, I., p. 303. May 23, 1254. 

3 Rymer, I., p. 303. Original grant for three years, Rymer, I., 
p. 272. Ratification by English magnates in 1253, Mat, Par., V., 
pp. 374, 375. Ant. Leg., p. 18. Danst., p. 190. Burt., p. 305. 

4 Rymer, I., p. 303. 5 Ibid. Bulls of May, 1254. 
« Rymer, I., p. 304. 7 Ibid. June 9, 1254. 



122 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

triumph Henry undoubtedly shared, for on the 3d of 
October he confirmed Edmund's grant 1 of Capua 
to Thomas of Savoy, and eleven days later he ordered 
the magnates of Sicily to pay homage to his envoys 
in the name of Edmund. 2 

On the 5th of September, Innocent had placed Cardi- 
nal Fiesco in charge of all Apulian matters. 3 By means 
of Henry's former gifts, and of loans from Italian mer- 
chants to whom the king was bound in payment, Inno- 
cent had raised an army of unwarlike and treacherous 
Italians and sent them forth, ostensibly to battle for 
the church. 4 

Manfred, in truth, had been hard pressed, though 
not by papal armies. His money was exhausted, and 
the German mercenaries had therefore become as dan- 
gerous as open enemies. Peter Rufus, too, the adminis- 
trator of the island Sicily, had shown signs of yielding 
to the pope. Therefore, when Innocent's army was at 
hand, Manfred resolved to make a virtue of necessity, 
and himself led the pontiff to Naples. Peace was signed 
between them Sept. 27, 1254. 5 It mattered little to 
the pope that Edmund's seal for the acceptance of 
Sicily had been ordered for the 29th. 6 Obligations sat 

i Rymer, L, p. 308. 

2 Ibid., p. 310. Hereford and York. 

3 Von Raumer, IV., p. 201. 

4 Mat. Par., V., pp. 458, 459, 470. Ipse enim rex omnia ei abun- 
danter necessaria ex inexhausto Angliae puteo ministrabat. Vide also 
Rymer, I., p. 307. Bull of September 0th, concerning loan of Sienese 
merchants to the church of Cash el. 

5 Raynaldus, 1254, LVIII.-LX. Mansi, T. II., XXI., pp. 511, 512. 
Von Raumer, IV., p. 202. 6 Rymer, I., p. 303. 



part vii THE SICILIAN CROWN 123 

lightly on him, for his game seemed won. He was 
ruling at Naples, and all the Sicilian nobles were his 
very humble servants. 1 But this fair sky soon clouded. 
Manfred felt that Conradin and he were not treated 
as the sons of an emperor should be ; his former oppo- 
nents had more influence in every way than he himself ; 
and the pope's dealings with England also came to 
light. The Burillo 2 episode precipitated matters. On 
the 17th of November, Innocent sent Henry the follow- 
ing significant message : " God has granted us a good 
beginning and things prosper. Our mandates are re- 
ceived submissively. But because the church by reason 
of the gentleness and sweetness of its rule cannot long 
govern here with efficacy, you must make haste to 
support it and not delay. With but a slight exertion 
the prize is yours; delay may ruin all." Then Inno- 
cent for the first time adds a threat: "I will you to 
know that the church can suffer no long postponement 
or delay, without herself providing for the matter and 
ceding the kingdom to another." 3 That very month, 
through fear of intrigue, Manfred entered Luceria and 
found there men, money, and material for war. De- 
serters from the papal army kept flocking to his stand- 

1 Rymer, I., p. 312. Mandata nostra suscipiuntur humiliter et 
servantur. ' Cf . Nangis, I., p. 210. Berthold had yielded in Novem- 
ber and been made seneschal of Apulia ; other grants were also given 
to himself and brothers. Rymer, L, pp. 311, 312. Confirmation by 
Alexander IV., Rymer, I., p. 314. February, 1255. 

2 Von Raumer, IV., pp. 203-205. 

3 Rymer, I., p. 312. Sciturus pro certo, quod ecclesia multum 
differre vel expectare non posset, quin super re ilia, et de concedendo 
ipsam alteri aliter provideret. 



124 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

ard, and he grew stronger day by day. Instead of at 
once advancing against him and cutting off supplies, 
Fiesco preached crusades. The favourable moment 
passed, and on the 2d of December Manfred's victory 
at Foggia over Otto, Berthold's brother, gave the papal 
cause decisive check. As soon as the news arrived, 
Fiesco's army bolted in wildest confusion, Apulia was 
left unprotected, and when the new year dawned, the 
whole province, with the exception of Otranto, was 
in Manfred's hands. 1 Such was the campaign on which 
Henry had lavished English treasure. 

On the 13th of December, from chagrin or chronic 
disease, Innocent IV. had died — four years to a day 
from the ill-starred Frederic's death. 2 It was said that 
during his pontificate he had impoverished the church 
universal more than had all his predecessors together 
from the earliest times 3 — a melancholy epitaph for the 
failure of a life. 

From his temperate, kindly, and religious successor, 
England expected much. But in those days a pope 
could no more refrain from extortion than he could be a 
Ghibelline. On his death-bed Innocent had urged the 
cardinals to continue the war against Manfred, and papal 
policy made it appear that care for Henry's interests was 
a prominent factor in their subsequent deliberations. 4 
On this basis Alexander IV. became a very Rehoboam. 

i Von Raumer, IV., pp. 211-214, 216. 

2 Rymer, I., p. 312. Cf. von Raumer, IV, p. 215, n. 3. 

8 Mat. Par., V., p. 355, quoting Grosseteste. 

4 Cf. Mat. Par., V., pp. 472, 473. 



part vii THE SICILIAN CROWN 125 

The new pope had found diplomacy a very tangled 
web. At the end of February, or a little later, he was 
forced to seek negotiations with Manfred; he had 
already given a written promise to Conradin's grand- 
mother, mother, and uncles, that he should have his 
rights and more. 1 Yet in defiance of common honesty, 
he had at the same time been dealing with Henry's 
plenipotentiary, the bishop of Hereford, and on the 
9th of April a treaty 2 was formally concluded. It is 
needless to say that the terms were sufficiently in favour 
of the pope. 

First, the kingdom of the Two Sicilies was never 
to be divided, and Edmund and his successors were to 
do liege homage to the See of Rome. Second, 2000 
ounces of pure gold were to be paid yearly in token 
of subjection, and at the pope's requisition three hun- 
dred knights, equipped and maintained at the king's 
expense, were to be furnished for three months' service 
annually, anywhere in Italy. Third, churches, church- 
estates, and all ecclesiastics were to enjoy canonical 
rights, and the authority of the pope in respect to them 
was in all cases to be allowed free exercise. To the 
king was saved such customary rights of patronage as 
were not uncanonical. Fourth, full restitution was to 
be made by the king to all the clergy who had been dis- 
possessed. Fifth, on penalty of forfeiture and excom- 
munication no election to the headship of the empire 
was to be sought or accepted. Sixth, Beneventum was 

1 Von Raumer, IV., pp. 216, 217, 219. Jan. 23, 1255. 

2 Ryiner, I., pp. 310-318. Naples, April 9, 1255. 



126 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

to be reserved to the pope ; all claim on the <£100,- 
000 Tours promised by Innocent 1 was to be relin- 
quished ; and all honours and donations 2 to the Hohen- 
burgs and others were to be confirmed. Seventh, 
Henry should bind himself and his whole kingdom to 
repay the 135,541 marks already spent by the pope in the 
acquisition of Sicily, and also to repay all expenses still 
to be incurred. The first amount was to be discharged 
before Sept. 29, 1256. Eighth, after the full pay- 
ment of the foregoing, and not earlier, Henry was to 
send a captain and an army to Apulia — but in no case 
later than Sept. 29, 1256. Ninth, in case of fail- 
ure to fulfil these terms, the penalty was forfeiture 
of the kingdom, excommunication, and an interdict on 
England. Tenth, the pope reserved to himself the 
right to make such further grants as seemed essential. 
Any surplus of income from Sicily over the outgoes 
was to be restored to Edmund, but no account should 
be required. 

This final clause seems scarcely necessary, for Man- 
fred was then in full possession of Calabria and Alex- 
ander was about to bind himself to pay the Hohen- 
burgs 8000 ounces of gold in compensation for their 
losses. 3 

The immediate and most important effect of this 
treaty was the invasion of England by swarms of papal 

1 Rymer, I., p. 303. Vide supra, p. 121. 

2 They amounted to 7500 ounces of gold yearly. 

3 Rymer, I., p. 319. Bulls of May 19 and 21, 1255. Von Raumer, 
IV., p. 218. 



part vii THE SICILIAN CROWN 127 

emissaries. The bishop of Bologna arrived in early 
autumn, and on the 18th of October formally invested 
Edmund with the kingdom by a ring, and received his 
homage. On the same day Henry ordered John Mansel 
to seal the writ of acceptance. 1 The pope was now 
legally clothed with all the rights and powers of an 
acknowledged creditor — and that to an unlimited 
extent. 

The bishop of Hereford had also returned. During 
his stay in Rome he had introduced an exceedingly in- 
genious method of extortion by means of what seems to 
have been the use of unauthorized bills of exchange. 
The chronicles of the time are full of his infamy in 
binding 1 the church of England to Sienese and Floren- 
tine merchants by means of forged procurations. All 
burdens of days gone by seemed light in comparison 
with the present exaction. 2 With Hereford, Sept. 29, 
1255, came the Gascon Rustand, a learned man, 3 
most dangerous of legates. The number of the bulls 
he brought was legion. Luceria, the Saracen city 
founded by Frederic II., had long been a thorn in the 
pope's side ; it had been a place of refuge for Conrad 
in his day and now served Manfred's turn. Under the 
pretext of destroying this relic of paganism, doubly 



i Mat. Par., V., p. 515. Rymer, L, pp. 323, 324, 331, 332. The 
barons had neither part nor lot in this whole affair. Vide Rymer, I. , 
p. 373. 

2 Mat. Par., V., pp. 510, 512. Dunst., p. 199. Burt., pp. 348, 349, 
361. Osney, p. 109. Wykes, p. 126. 

3 Mat. Par., V., p. 519. Burt., p. 350. Dunst., p. 196. Oxenedes, 
p. 205. Homo litteratus et efficax ad uoeendum. 



128 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

dangerous because so near the holy city of the popes, 
Rustand was ordered to preach a general crusade 
against Manfred, and to promise to all participants the 
privileges and immunities granted in the general Coun- 
cil of Lyons to crusaders ; 1 to commute Henry's vow of 
a regular crusade to a vow in favour of the Sicilian 
enterprise ; 2 to collect and assign 3 to Henry's use all 
money raised, or to be raised, on the tenth for the cru- 
sade ; and to assume full charge in England, Scotland, 
and Ireland of all matters which were in any way con- 
nected with the cross. 4 His assistant in the latter func- 
tion was Bernard of Siena. 5 

Even before the bishop of Bologna had fulfilled his 
mission, matters in Italy had grown steadily worse for 
Henry and the pope. Cardinal Octavian, the leader of 
the Roman army, had been at first successful in his 
military operations — so wrote 6 the pope to Henry in 
the middle of September — but lately, on account of 
treachery 7 and guile, so many obstacles had been raised 
up against him, that he had been forced to retreat with 
all his army into Terra di Lavoro. There was need of 
urgent haste. The pope could no longer sustain so 
great a weight alone ; he had exhausted his treasury, 
contracted innumerable debts, and so overstrained his 

1 Mat. Par., V., p. 474. Burt., p. 350. Rymer, I. , p. 320. 

2 Rymer, I., p. 319. May 3, 1255. 

3 Burt., pp. 350,351. 

4 Ibid. , pp. 350, 353. 

5 Rymer, I., p. 330. Oct. 12, 1255. 

6 Rymer, I., p. 328. Anagnia, Sept. 18, 1255. 

7 Cf. Mat. Par., V., pp. 474, 498. 



part vii THE SICILIAN CROWN 129 

credit that no further loans could be obtained. He 
therefore exhorted Henry to send an army immediately, 
while Sicily and that part of the mainland which offered 
easiest access to the rest was still in his power. If 
Terra di Lavoro were once lost, the greatest efforts 
could scarcely win it back. Such was the bad news 
which Henry was destined to receive from the hands of 
John de Dya, papal emissary. 1 Neither a letter nor 
English gold availed to stem the tide: by the following 
February Terra di Lavoro had fallen, and Manfred was 
practically lord of the land. In 1257 the pope's power 
was scarcely mentioned there, and in the ensuing year 
Manfred was solemnly crowned king. 2 

Throughout the autumn Henry was still ignorant of 
his great misfortune, and Rustand's mission went mer- 
rily on. His crusade-preaching, however, was neither 
successful nor popular. In truth, in England the cru- 
sading-idea had long since worn itself out. Gains ob- 
tained from oppression and the impoverishment of the 
poor were displeasing in the sight of God, and their 
subsequent expenditure was not blessed with his favour, 
so people thought. 3 

For the same reasons, Rustand's exactions were 
doubly unwelcome. He demanded redemption-money 
from crusaders, and extended the tenth for the crusade 
through two years more. 4 The tenth was to be assessed 

1 Rymer, I., p. 328. 2 Von Raumer, IV., p. 225. 

3 Cf. Mat. Par., V., pp. 170, 171, 522. End of one of Rustand's 
sermons: "Estote filii obediential. Obligamini tali et tali mercatori, 
in tanta pecuniae quantitate." This is seldom a popular style. 

4 Bulls in Burt., pp. 350, 351. Rymer, I., p. 303. 

K 



130 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

according to a new and stringent valuation, 1 and was to 
embrace the income from manors and baronies — on the 
ground that " one-tenth of ecclesiastical income " in- 
cluded the income from baronies and manors under the 
control of churches or ecclesiastics. 2 If all demands 
were not paid in full by the 2d of February, 1256, 
delinquents were declared to be guilty of fraud and ipso 
facto excommunicated. The shortness of the time was 
in itself a heavy grievance, for churches were thereby 
compelled to borrow at ruinous rates of interest from 
the usurers whom Rustand's foresight had provided. 3 

His exactions came at the worst possible time for 
king and realm. Henry's Gascon expedition had en- 
tailed a debt of 350,000 marks. 4 His consequent extor- 
tions had driven all classes wild. 5 The demand for the 
three great officers of state, made for the first time in 
1244 and renewed in 1248 and 1249, had been repeated 
and refused in the Hokeday parliament 6 of 1255, and 
when the magnates reassembled, on the 13th of Octo- 
ber, their temper was obdurate. The king demanded 
an aid — first from Richard of Cornwall, who refused 
chiefly because the king had assumed the Sicilian busi- 
ness without his advice and the consent of the baronage, 

1 Burt., pp. 356-360. Item, nulla sit portio adeo modica, in qui- 
buscumque consistat in pondere, numero, et mensura, terris, pratis, 
pascuis, pannagiis, auro, argento, grano, liquore, operibus, servitiis 
liberis vel rusticis consuetudinibus, in panibus deferendis ad Natal e 
Domini, gallinis, ovis, et quibuscumque aliis ad ecclesias vel ecclesias- 
ticas personas spectantibus, quin taxetur et sestimetur, etc. 

2 Burt., p. 354. 3 Mat. Par., V., p. 536. 

4 Ibid., p. 521. 5 Cf. Mat. Par., V., pp. 104, 105. 

e April 6th. Mat. Par., V., p. 494. Burt., p. 336. 



part vii THE SICILIAN CROWN 131 

and next from the other magnates. They also refused, 
assigning the portentous reason that all had not been 
summoned according to the terms of the Great Charter. 1 
It was evident that a period of constitutional resistance 
was at hand. 

Rustand, meanwhile, had summoned a convocation of 
the clergy to assemble also on the 13th of October, and 
had laid his demands before them. He, too, met with 
resistance : Fulk of London, and Walter of Worcester, 
a prelate endowed with Grosseteste's spirit, and like 
him a warm friend of Simon de Montfort, 2 headed the 
opposition. Their task was difficult in the extreme. 
The archbishop of Canterbury was absent, York was 
dead, and Winchester distrusted, while Rustand and 
Henry were in formal alliance. The clergy, therefore, 
postponed their answer till Jan. 13, 1256, appealed 
by letter to the pope, and separated in distress, without 
having agreed upon any definite line of action. 3 

Their appeal was based upon the following griev- 
ances. 4 First, a tenth of their income had been granted 
arbitrarily to the king, although their own expressed 
consent was necessary. 5 Second, the tenth had been 
conceded for a definite use, time, and cause, all three 
of which had now been changed. The clergy were 

1 Mat. Par., V., pp. 520, 521. Burt., p. 360. 

2 Mon. Fran., Ep. Ad., CXLL, p. 270. Adam to Leicester. Con- 
cepi autem spem indubitatem in Domino quod illud bene prosperabitur 
per sollicitudinem dom. Lincolnias et dom. Wygornise, vobis inter 
mortales omnes speciali amicitia favorabiliores. 

3 Mat. Tar., V., pp. 524, 525 et seq. Burt., p. 360. 

* Burt., pp. 360-363. 5 Cf. Burt., p. 356. 



132 THE BARONS' WAB chap, ii 

therefore not bound to pay, especially since the present 
use was not even dreamed of at the time of the grant. 1 
Third, their manors and baronies were twice taxed, — 
once by the king for military service, and again by the 
pope for the disme. Fourth, in defiance of precedent 
and custom the clergy were compelled to pay strange 
taxes of all kinds, and that by a yearly assessment 
under oath. Fifth, Rustand, by giving his proxies to 
underlings, 2 by summoning individuals to crusade- 
courts held in remote places, and by encroachments on 
the jurisdiction of the ordinaries, misused his powers. 
Sixth, doubtful legacies, heretofore employed for relief 
of the poor, maintenance of hospitals, and other pur- 
poses, were now granted to the king, although lay 
abuses of the church exceeded even those practised 
before the Charters of Liberty had been confirmed. 
Seventh, the extent of the taxation was too great; 
even where benefices scarcely supported their incum- 
bents, the tithe was still taken. Eighth, Hereford's 
forged procurations were roundly denounced, and a 
vigorous protest against the whole Sicilian affair was 
made, — on the ground that it was undertaken by 
traitorous advice. A general declaration that the 
clergy were willing to support the See of Rome in all 
lawful enterprises may have slightly weakened the 
force of the appeal. 

During the interim which lay between the October 

i April, 1253. Mat. Par., V., pp. 374, 375. 

2 Cf. Mat. Par., V., p. 536. Datur potestas personis prorsus indig- 
nis super nobiles ecclesias et eorum prselatos excellentes. 



part vii THE SICILIAN CBOWN 133 

and January convocations, news had arrived of Octa- 
vian's defeat 1 and of Manfred's brilliant successes, yet 
the king persisted in his folly, and lavished gifts upon 
the foreigners in England. 2 At length the prelates met 
to give Rustand his final answer. A certain master 
Leonard was their spokesman. When Rustand arro- 
gantly said that all churches belonged to the pope, 
Leonard, possibly remembering the words of Grosse- 
teste, 3 made answer: "True — but for protection, not 
revenue or appropriation. Such was the intention of 
the founders." In anger Rustand then ordered each 
man to speak for himself, that the pope and king might 
know their individual opinions. He had already drafted 
a document which asserted that the prelates had re- 
ceived a "loan for the advantage of their churches;' 
since he would not alter it, the prelates again appealed, 
and sent a formal embassy to Rome. 4 The Magna 
Charta and John's Charter to the church were re- 
hearsed, and their observance ordered ; but although the 
king was ruthlessly sacking vacant churches, the pope 
returned the answer that in these days he would not 
offend princes. 5 

No definite answer had yet been given by the pre- 
lates. Rustand had weakened somewhat under the 
threat of appeal, and on the 29th of January had miti- 

1 Vide supra, pp. 123-124, 128-129. 

2 Mat. Par., V., pp. 521, 531, 536. 

3 Cf. Mat. Par., V., p. 536. Also Rob. Gross., Epist. CXXVIIL, 
p. 437. Haec enim est potestatis plenitudo, omnia posse in sedifica- 
tionem. 

4 Mat. Par., V., pp. 539, 540. 5 Ibid., pp. 540-544. 



134 THE B AEONS' WAR chap, ii 

gated the taxation by exempting houses for the poor 
and hospitals, and he forbade his proctors to trespass 
on the jurisdiction of the ordinaries. To all who paid 
the tenth he also granted the same privileges which 
were accorded to crusaders, 1 — a sure sign that the 
money was coming in but slowly. At the same time 
came the reply from the pope to the bishops' first 
appeal. They were ordered to pay the merchants to 
whom the church was bound, but were allowed to 
withhold a corresponding amount from the tithes, — 
an empty privilege. In this way the church was tal- 
laged. 2 

Two weeks after Easter, 1256, the bishops for the 
third time assembled at London to give Rustand his 
final answer. At first, in their great dejection, they 
were on the point of yielding, but encouragement came 
from the barons, and the clergy boldly replied that 
Henry should have nothing from their baronies. 3 This 
was a turning-point in the history of the reign. The 
barons, six months before, had adopted the line of strict 
constitutional resistance ; on similar grounds, driven by 
royal and papal aggressions, the patriotic wing of the 
clergy was now compelled to join them. To a pro- 
phetic eye the parliament of Oxford was looming in the 
distance. 

The king 1 was now forced to exactions of a meaner 
kind. All men who possessed twenty-five librates of 



i Mat. Par., V., p. 540. Burt., pp. 363, 364. 

2 Mat. Far., V., p. 558. Burt., p. 364. 

3 Mat. Tar., V., p. 553. 



part vii THE SICILIAN CROWN 135 

land were compelled to take up their knighthood or 
pay a money-fine. 1 From the Cistercians of Reading 
he demanded, through. Rustand, a sum equal to the 
whole value of their stock of wool, their sole means of 
maintenance. They courageously refused to pay, and 
for once the pope stood firm to a previous indulgence 
and confirmed their privilege. From individual abbots 
of the order, however, Rustand succeeded in extorting 
some money before the papal bull arrived. 2 Meanwhile 
Manfred was winning his kingdom, and the English 
people were learning to detest the very names of king 
and pope. 

Before the decisive Easter meeting of the prelates 
had occurred, Alexander had written 3 to Hereford that 
Henry's negligence was causing his Italian creditors to 
harass and annoy the pope, and that they would cer- 
tainly seize their surety, if not paid within the stipu- 
lated time. A whole province was now threatened by 
the enemy ; instant aid would save it at but slight 
expense ; if once lost, the greatest outlay of strength 
and money could scarcely win it back. An emphatic 
postscript stated that unless all debts were paid within 
the time appointed, the pope would forthwith nullify 
the compact and give the kingdom to another. 

If Alexander's lines had fallen in unpleasant places, 
Henry fared still worse. He had to bear debt, losses, 

!Mat. Par., V., p. 560. 

2 Ibid., pp. 553-555, 557. Rymer, I., p. 323. Waverley, p. 348. 

3 Rymer, I., p. 336, Feb. 5, 1256. The province was Terra di 
Lavoro, and the time was Sept. 29, 1256. 



136 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

and reproaches from the pope, to tread the way of the 
transgressor, which is proverbially hard, and to fear in 
addition the opposition of his magnates. On the 15th 
of February the warden of Dover was ordered to allow 
no clerk to cross the Channel unless he first swore that, 
if he went to Rome, he would attempt nothing to the 
injury of the king or to the detriment of the Sicilian 
enterprise. 1 As soon as Henry learned of the refusal 
of the prelates and magnates to come to his assistance, 
he wrote 2 to William Bonquer, his agent at Rome, 
stating that on account of Octavian's failure and the 
capture of the count of Savoy at Turin, he could not 
pay his debt nor send an army within the stipulated 
time. At the same time he wrote 3 to Alexander and 
the cardinals, that in view of the requirement of mili- 
tary aid and of the great sums which he already owed 
to Rome, his council refused to sanction the Sicilian 
enterprise, and the prelates refused to pay Rustand. 
All were afraid to undertake the business in this state, 
for failure seemed certain, and the stipulated time 
was short. He therefore sought a prolongation. This 
was afterwards granted, reluctantly, and with bitter 
reproaches. 4 

After the loss of Terra di Lavoro, the pope redoubled 

1 Rymer, I., p. 337. 

2 Ibid. Shirley, II., pp. 114-116. 

3 Rymer, I., pp. 337-339, March 27, 1256. Non enim credimus 
quod hodie princeps aliquis regnat in terris, qui ita subito tantam 
pecuniam possit habere ad manum. 

4 Rymer, I., p. 342. Other prolongations, Rymer, I., pp. 350, 366, 
360. 



part vii THE SICILIAN CROWN 137 

his almost hopeless efforts. Rustand was informed that 
the clergy must pay the tenth, even if double taxation 
were thereby entailed. 1 At Henry's request, Alexander 
also granted him through Rustand the revenue of all 
vacant benefices whose collation pertained to the pope, 
the incomes of all non-resident incumbents, 2 and the 
goods of intestates which fell to the church. 3 In spite 
of the prelates' petition, the true valuation obtained on 
oath — " taxatione antiqua nequaquam obstante " — was 
reaffirmed as the basis of taxation. 

To crown the evils of this most wretched year, the 
Welsh rebelled about the time of harvest, and defied 
the utmost efforts of Prince Edward to reduce them 
to a state of peace. 4 

The year 1257 was ushered in by a second attempt at 
extortion from the unfortunate Cistercians, and aofain 
they plead their privileges. Henry promptly com- 
manded that no favour should be shown to the order, 
— a virtual sentence of outlawry, — and the sheriffs 
and judges of the forest-courts were permitted to de- 
spoil them. 5 

About Lent, another envoy, John of Messina, arrived 
from Rome. 6 With him he brought a bull of prolonga- 
tion, accusation, and incitement to action. 7 As if the 

1 Rymer, I., p. 342. June 13, 1256. 

2 Rymer, I., pp. 344, 345. Aug. 21, 1256. 

3 Rymer, I. , p. 345. 

4 Mat. Par., V., p. 592. Vide infra, Part VIII. 

5 Mat. Par., V., p. 610. January 6th. 

6 Mat. Par., V., p. 614. 

7 Rymer, I., p. 351. Messina's commission. Nov. 9, 1256. 



138 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

pope had been granting Henry the greatest favour in 
the world, he wrote that he had assumed full charge of 
the Sicilian enterprise, raised armies, and sent legates 
to command them, yet Henry was relax. If the king 
failed, it would be not only disgraceful to Henry him- 
self, but disastrous to his reputation throughout Europe 
for military power. The king was therefore ordered to 
reconcile to himself all those prelates whose rights had 
been infringed, as well as all other persons whose aid 
might be of value. It could scarcely have been in 
furtherance of this latter task that Messina bore also 
papal letters of authorization for collecting and receiv- 
ing money, and for punishing delinquents. At once he 
issued imperious summons to the prelates. His mode 
of dealing with them may be gathered from his treat- 
ment of St. Albans. He had demanded procurations 
from the abbey, and since the monks who came in 
response to his summons failed to bring them, he de- 
tained the monks by force until they had signed bills 
on merchants to the amount of twenty-one marks. 1 
Rustand's powers had at this same time been greatly 
amplified, — a rare measure of conciliation, — and that 
no stimulus to Henry's activity might be wanting, the 
Roman court had sown broadcast the accusation that 
Manfred sought to murder both Henry and his sons. 2 
All the new schemes for extortion were brought to 
light at a mid-Lent parliament in London. Nearly all 
the nobility of England were present, and the city could 

!Mat. Par., V., pp. G14, 615. 
2 Cf. Burt., p. 395. 






part vii THE SICILIAN CROWN 139 

scarcely contain the vast throngs. 1 On the 2d of April, 
at Westminster, Rustand 'proclaimed to the archdeacons 
of all England the authority 2 with which he was now 
clothed : first, absolute power, without appeal, over all 
cases involving crusaders and legacies, clear or doubt- 
ful, for the Holy Land ; second, power of inquiry con- 
cerning all benefices so long vacant that their collation 
devolved on the pope ; third, visitatorial power over 
clerks who held a plurality of benefices, the final de- 
cision of such cases being reserved to the pope ; fourth, 
power to collect all the income of non-resident incum- 
bents ; fifth, to collect for five years the first-fruits of 
all vacant benefices — bishoprics and regular prelacies 
excepted ; sixth, power to compel the archdeacons to 
collect the tenth for the two additional years at the 
new valuation. Lastly, power was given to the bishop 
of Norwich, the elect of Salisbury, and Rustand him- 
self to make all arrangements concerning the disme. 
After some deliberation it was decided that a definite 
answer should be given within a month after Easter or 
Rustand should proceed. 3 

On the same day the archbishop of Messina had 
made an address to the magnates — prelates, clergy, 
and laymen — on the Sicilian affair, endeavouring to 
persuade them to assume the enterprise and help the 
king. 4 After a few days' deliberation — in the course 
of which the archbishop demanded procurations from 

1 Mat. Par., V., pp. 621, 622. 

2 Burt., pp. 388, 389. 

3 Ibid., p. 389. i Ibid, p. 386. 



140 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

the archdeacons 1 — the king and Messina received an 
answer. 2 It was written in French and Latin ; its title 
read, "Reasons of the Magnates against the King." 
Sicily's remoteness, the danger in traversing hostile 
countries to reach it, Manfred's occupation of Cala- 
bria and the keys of the kingdom, his popularity and 
wealth, were first mentioned. The enormous outlays 
which Henry had already made in vain, and the vast 
expenses which would be necessary in the future, were 
next instanced. The realm was in no condition to 
meet them, for king and people were alike impov- 
erished, royal officials were plundering the land, dis- 
turbances were brewing in Gascony, Ireland, and 
Scotland, while the Welsh were in open rebellion. 
That in case the expedition were undertaken England 
would lie naked to its enemies, especially to France, 
and that on account of the hard conditions imposed 
by the pontiff, the king might at any moment forfeit 
the crown, were the final and conclusive arguments. 

At the formal session of parliament the king intro- 
duced Edmund, dressed in Apulian costume, and im- 
plored the magnates for aid. He stated the amount of 
the sum for which he was bound, asked that the tenth 
be granted for the full five years at the new valuation, 
requested the concession for five years of the first-fruits 
of vacant benefices, also one-half the income of non- 
resident incumbents, all the revenue of privileged 
pluralists, except from one benefice which they should 

iBurt., pp. 389, 390. 

2 Ibid., pp. 386, 387. Cf. Dunst., p. 200. 



part vii THE SICILIAN CROWN 141 

reserve, and finally all doubtful legacies. 1 The clergy- 
gave excellent reasons 2 for refusing this extortion, 
but on the king's promise to confirm and keep the 
Charters, they finally granted him 52,000 marks. It 
was the richest gift the king had ever had, but he 
received it churlishly. 3 That he might know the bur- 
dens of the church and ensure the relief which he had 
promised, the prelates drew up their fifty articles of 
grievances. 4 

The archbishop of Messina left for Rome in May, 
having completed all arrangements for the sending of 
an army. 5 Meanwhile papal exactions continued. 
Henry's faith in his ultimate success, however, seemed 
now for the first time to waver. 6 He ordered Rustand 
to pay no more debts on the Sicilian account until he 
himself had better security; the pope was forced to 
allege his recent banning of Manfred as a proof of his 
good intentions. 7 Again, in a number of documents, 
Henry at this time sought a mitigation of the pope's 
conditions, and even authorized ambassadors to re- 
nounce the business altogether, if it seemed to them 
expedient. 8 Above all, he relinquished his darling plan 
of conquering France by way of Poitou, Sicily, and 

i Mat. Par., V., p. 623. Burt., p. 390. Osney, p. 114. Wykes, 
pp. 126, 127. 

2 Burt., pp. 390,391. 

3 Mat. Par., V., pp. 624, 637. 

4 Ibid., p. 638 ; VI., pp. 353-365. 

& Rymer, I., p. 355. Cf. Burt., p. 400. 
6 Cf. Mat. Par., V., p. 643. 
» Rymer, I., pp. 356, 357. June 3, 1257. 
8 Ibid., pp. 359, 360. June 26th and 28th. 



142 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

Germany, and sent envoys, at the pope's request, to 
negotiate a final peace. 1 

About this time another gleam of light for England 
appeared on the horizon. Rustand had made the most 
of his private opportunities, and become not the least 
wealthy man in the kingdom. The prelates complained 
to the pope, aroused his jealous indignation, and pro- 
cured the recall of the hated envoy. 2 

It is evident that Henry had not lost heart com- 
pletely, however, for on the 28th of June he sent a 
letter 3 of excuses to the pope: he had not paid his 
debts in full, because of the constant troubles which 
he had had, and was still having, with the recalcitrant 
prelates ; he could not send an army, because he had 
not paid the debts, and because the Welsh rebellion, in 
connection with his Gascon reverses, had paralyzed his 
strength. He asked for further time. Meanwhile his 
expenses still kept on and interest was rapidly accumu- 
lating. On the 5th of May his envoys at Rome had 
contracted a loan at no less a rate than five per cent per 
month. 4 Fugitives from Apulia also began to come in, 
recommended by the pope to Henry's fostering care on 
the ground that they had suffered in the latter's ser- 
vice. 5 Even at the beginning of 1258, Henry realized 
his position so little, that he wrote to Cardinal Octavian 

i Rymer, I., pp. 355, 358, 359. 

2 Mat. Par., V., p. 647. Dunst., p. 206. 

3 Rymer, I., pp. 359, 360. 

4 Ibid., p. 365. Per singulos duos menses, pro singulis decern 
marcis, unam marcam. 

6 Ibid., p. 366. 



part vii THE SICILIAN CROWN 143 

that notwithstanding the refusal of the barons to sanc- 
tion the Sicilian enterprise, he yet hoped to find means 
to bring it to a successful conclusion. 1 

The pope was still more completely in the dark. 
About the middle of Lent Rustand returned, with 
diminished powers it is true, but with him was an en- 
voy named Herlot, bringing confusion to the church of 
England. 2 The full effect of Herlot's mission was not 
felt even in England until the parliament of Hokeday 
met, and it was much longer before the pope could 
know it. As late as the 28th of December, 1258, Alex- 
ander wrote 3 to Henry in threatening language that, 
unless the terms were fulfilled, the concession of Sicily 
would be forthwith rescinded. Matters were then in 
stronger hands than his. The exactions of the pope 
and king had been rousing for long years the patriots 
of England — church, baronage, and people — to resist- 
ance; the royal system of administration, which had 
dispensed with the three great officers of state and gov- 
erned by commissions of pliable underlings, had caused 
the resistance to take a constitutional form with Magna 
Charta as its basis ; the royal policy which throughout 
the reign had favoured non-national objects abroad 
and at home, and which had found its most congenial 
expression in wars for conquest and in the introduction 
of aliens, had made the spirit of resistance no less 



1 Shirley, II., p. 126. January or February, 1258. 

2 Mat. Par., V., p. 672. Dunst., p. 208. Burt., p. 409. Theok., 
p. 163. 

3 Rymer, I., pp. 379, 380. 



144 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

national than constitutional ; the royal tyranny and 
caprice had alienated from the crown the one man, 
above all others, who was most competent to guide the 
national movement and the most likely to place it on a 
popular basis ; the Sicilian enterprise had revealed the 
depth of the king's incapacity and of his treason to his 
people, outraged public feeling beyond measure, and 
was in itself an ample reason for armed resistance. 
Therefore, as soon as the Welsh war had proved the 
king's military weakness and furnished the barons a 
pretext for appearing in arms, 1 the movement acquired 
irresistible force. Before Alexander had dictated his 
last demand for money in the year 1258, Manfred was 
reigning supreme in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, 
and a committee of the barons and prelates of England 
was holding daily sessions in the New Temple at Lon- 
don, ruling the land as the lawful representatives of 
the three estates of the realm. 

1 Mat. Par., V., p. 696. Rish., Chronicon, p. 8. Burt., p. 438. 



part viii THE WELSH WAR 145 



PART VIII 

The Welsh War, and the Famine of the Year 

1258 

Throughout the whole reign of Henry III. there 
had been more or less trouble with the Welsh, and 
the king's success in dealing with them had been slight. 
It is difficult to assess upon each party its due amount 
of blame for aggressions : the very existence of a March 
system, on the one hand, which at the time of its estab- 
lishment had assured to an encroaching baron the lands 
which he conquered, was a constant menace to a state 
of peace, while on the other hand the Welsh were but 
partly civilized, and their poverty must have constantly 
tempted them to raids for which their rocky fastnesses 
promised them impunity. In the great rebellion of the 
year 1256, however, the case is much clearer than usual. 
While in England the spirit of nationality had been 
steadily growing in intensity, a parallel movement had 
been occurring in Wales. The discord which existed 
between Henry and his barons and among the barons 
themselves, had given the Welsh a deep impression of 
England's military weakness. It was a direct encroach- 
ment on their national rights which fanned the spark 
of national enthusiasm into a consuming fire. 

Shortly after Edward's marriage to the princess of 



146 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

Castile, Henry had given him a magnificent appanage, 1 
in which was included the overlordship of the conquered 
parts of Wales. At the end of November, 1255, Ed- 
ward had returned to England, 2 and through his agent, 
Geoffrey of Langley, had begun at once to collect his 
revenues. Geoffrey had acquired already, in the service 
of the king, an exceedingly unenviable reputation for 
extortion, 3 but in Wales he fairly surpassed himself. 
Not content with the ordinary sources of revenue, he 
levied an unprecedented capitation-tax, and in addition 
sought to introduce English laws and territorial divi- 
sions. 4 About the 1st of November, 5 1256, the Welsh 
broke out in rebellion, and assigned to it the broad basis 
of national rights and existence. They refused to 
acknowledge Edward as their lord, demanded the pres- 
ervation of their ancient customs, and swore rather to 
die for the liberty of their country than to live in dis- 
honourable subjection. 6 They passed their boundaries 

i Dunst., p. 194. Rymer, I., pp. 296, 297. Feb. 14, 1254. 

2 Ant. Leg., p. 28. November 29th. 

3 Mat. Par., V., pp. 136, 137, 340. 
* Dunst., p. 200. Theok., p. 158. 

5 Mat. Par., V., p. 592. Cf. Pauli, Gesch. von Eng., III., p. 705. 
Pauli, on the strength of a letter written by Peter de Montfort, the 
custodian of certain castles on the Welsh border (Mem. 2. Ann. Hen. 
III., p. 41, September 25th), dates the beginning of the revolt at the 
end of September, 1256. This letter, however, is addressed to " Monsire 
Phelippe Basset, justice de Engleterre," and must therefore be referred 
to the year 1262. Cf. Rymer, I., p. 339. Shirley, II., pp. 219-221. 
Ant. Leg., p. 49. Wykes, p. 129. Mat. West., pp. 380, 381. Dunst., 
p. 217. Rish., Chronica, p. 10. The same letter misleads Pauli also 
as to the extent of the incursion. 

6 Mat Par., V., pp. 592, 596. Ant. Leg., p. 29. Theok., p. 158. 
Dunst., p. 201. 



part vin THE WELSH WAR 147 

at once, attacked Edward's lands and castles, and 
marched as far as Chester, pillaging and laying waste. 
So great was their success that they were believed to 
have received secret aid from certain of the Marchers 
who were not sorry in this way to check the king's 
attempts on English liberty. 1 Edward fled before the 
Welsh to Richard at Wallingford, and borrowed from 
him 4000 marks with which to carry on the war ; 
but the winter was wet and boisterous, the English 
forces failed to penetrate the pathless marshes and 
fastnesses of Wales, 2 and he lost his money and his 
pains. The manly conduct of the Welsh did not fail 
to elicit the admiration even of their foes, 3 — at that 
time doubtless in a frame of mind which could appre- 
ciate the nobility of a struggle for national rights 
against the encroachments of aliens. 

Every attempt on the part of Henry, Edward, and 
Richard to secure a truce, failed ; the Welsh were in 
league with the weather and helped by England's for- 
eign complications. Henry could give Edward no 
assistance, because his energies were paralyzed by his 
Sicilian troubles. He therefore roughly bade the prince 
" exert his untried strength, kindle his youthful ardour, 
and make his enemies afraid of him forevermore." 4 
Henry's version of " Let the boy win his spurs ' was 
singularly unheroic. Richard of Cornwall refused to 

1 Vide Mat. Par., V., pp. 592, 594, 597, 598. Wykes, p. 111. The 
report was probably false, as the next year showed. 

2 Mat. Par., V., pp. 593, 594. 

3 Ibid., pp. 596, 597, 639. 4 Ibid., pp. 597, 614. 



148 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

send good money after bad ; as the sole result of her 
war with Turin the queen's exchequer was empty ; and 
the Welsh therefore continued through the winter to 
plunder, burn, and kill, without let or hindrance. 1 

Early in May, 1257, Edward summoned forces from 
Ireland, but the Welsh prepared to resist them at sea. 
The barons of the March attempted an expedition, but 
it was caught between a wood and a marsh, and few 
returned to tell the tale. 2 The peril, in truth, was 
great; for the first time in the memory of man North 
and South Wales were united in resistance and attack. 
Henry was forced to summon 3 the general levy of the 
realm and to take the field in person. One division of « 
the English army was to march upon Chester and North 
Wales ; the other, from Bristol towards the south. 
The 1st of August was the time appointed, and the 
king accompanied the former body. As the army ap- 
proached Chester about harvest-time, it destroyed the 
standing crops lest they should fall into the enemies' 
hands. This, together with a refusal to treat for peace 
on the basis of the restoration to the Welsh of their 
ancient customs, was practically all that the campaign 
accomplished. 4 As Henry advanced, the Welsh re- 
treated with their wives and children to the inacces- 
sible wilds of Snowdon, breaking down the bridges and 

i Mat. Par., V., pp. 597, 633. 

2 Ibid., VI., pp. 372, 373. Theok., p. 158. Burt., p. 408. Osney, 
p. 116. Wykes, p. 117. 

3 Kymer, I., p. 361. July 18, 1257. 

4 Mat. Par., V., pp. 647, 648. Theok., p. 158. Osney, p. 117. 
Wykes, p. 117. 



part viii • THE WELSH WAR 149 

deepening the fords. 1 The king penetrated as far as 
Gannoc Castle, spent there a month of inglorious inac- 
tion, and then began a still more inglorious retreat. 
The Welsh hung about the rear of the army, mocking 
the troops and cutting off stragglers, while the king, 
clad in magnificent armour, rode in the midst of his 
troops, beneath the great banner of England, and 
shouted with eager voice, " Kill me these Welshmen, 
these off-scourings of men." 2 Such, at least, is the 
pen-picture of a hostile chronicler. 3 Henry was unable 
to defeat his enemies, but he had already established a 
precedent for consoling himself for his own losses. As 
previously he had practised extortion after his disastrous 
Gascon war, so he now burdened the land by collecting 
a heavy scutage. 4 

Although later in the year James of Aldithley led a 
more or less successful foray into Wales, it failed to 
re-establish the English power there, and the condi- 
tion of the Marches grew steadily worse. The loss of 
the usual Welsh supplies of horses and cattle was 
already felt severely in England, and by the end of the 
year the borders of Wales were a desert. 5 The Welsh 
still continued their forays, and when, in March, 1258, 
they formed a league 6 with the discontented elements in 

1 Mat. Par., V., p. 639. 

2 Ibid., pp. 649, 651. Dunst., p. 204. Theok., p. 158. Osney, 
p. 117. Wykes, p. 117. Burt., p. 408. 

3 Mat. Par. It is probably essentially correct. 

4 Theok., p. 158. 

5 Mat. Par., V., pp. 656, 657, 660. 

6 Rymer, I., p. 370. March 18th. 



150 THE BARONS' WAR chap, ii 

Scotland, the clanger became more pressing than ever, 
and the dissatisfaction of the English with their king 
grew more pronounced. 

That nothing might be wanting to excite them still 
further against the government, the very elements 
turned traitor to the king. Heavy rains in the autumn 
of 1257 had proved disastrous to the crops, and through- 
out the spring of the following year the north wind had 
blown continuously and blasted all the buds. 1 The 
scanty harvest of 1257 was soon exhausted, and a 
frightful famine broke out. The poor were reduced 
to eating horse-flesh, the bark of trees, or worse. 2 By 
the middle of May thousands had perished in London 
alone, although that city had been especially favoured. 3 
In March, Richard had sent to England fifty vessels 
laden with German corn, 4 and this had been sold in 
open market. It had by no means redounded to 
Henry's popularity that he had endeavoured to seize it 
for his own use, and that the matter had been carried 
to the courts. 5 For the scarcity of crops, the king could 
not be censured justly; but then, as now, there existed 
a strong tendency in human nature to lay the blame 
for all agricultural mishaps at the government's door. 



i Mat. Par., V., pp. 660, 661, 690. 

2 Taxster, apud Rish., Chronicon, Ed. Halliwell, p. 113; apud B. 
Cotton, p. 137. 

3 Mat. Par., V., pp. 693, 694. Quindecim milia. Fabyan, p. 343. 
Cf. Theok., p. 166. 

4 Mat. Par., V., pp. 673, 674. 

5 Ant. Leg., p. 37. Fabyan, p. 341. Vide, also, Pauli, Gesch. von 
Eng., III., p. 714 and n. 4. 



part vin THE WELSH WAB 151 

And, undoubtedly, Henry was to blame for those exac- 
tions of his own and of the pope which had so drained 
the land of ready money that prices rose to an enor- 
mously exaggerated height. The poor were compelled 
thereby to eat the bread of charity or starve. 1 The crop 
of vengeance was the only harvest fully ripe. 

1 Mat. Par., V., pp. 673, 674, 728, 701-702. Nummorum autem 
tanta fuit carentia et raritas, quod si etiam surama frumenti levi pre- 
tio venundaretur, emptorem vix inveniret sufficientem. For the actual 
prices, cf. Dunst., p. 208. Taxster, apud B. Cotton, p. 137. Fabyan, 
p. 343. Rish., Chronicon, notes, pp. 112-114. Also Mat. Par. , as cited 
supra. 



152 THE B AEONS' WAR chap, hi 



CHAPTER III 

THE OUTBREAK: AND THE CULMINATION OF 
THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT 



3XXOO- 



PART I 

The Reform Parliaments of the Year 1258 

In the year 1257 it was calculated by an actual 
computation that the king had spent 950,000 marks 
since his days of' spoliation and wastefulness began 
— an immense sum, whose method of expenditure had 
rather injured, than profited, the kingdom. 1 Henry's 
shameful alliance with the papacy had resulted in 
draining England of its wealth, in turning Henry 
himself from the pursuit of national objects for the 
sake of a fictitious greatness on the continent, and, 
through the intrusion of foreigners into bishoprics 
and benefices, in debasing and partially denationalizing 
the English church. As an indirect result of the 
impoverishment of the kingdom, and as the direct 
result of Henry's denationalizing policy, which had 
consistently favoured aliens in church and state at 

1 Mat. Par., V., p. 027. 



part i THE REFORM PARLIAMENTS 153 

the expense of his English subjects, the military 
vigour of the nation had been sapped — as the Welsh 
war had demonstrated. Seemingly, never since the 
days in which the barons had invoked Louis' aid 
against John had the liberties of the English nation 
been at a lower ebb. A contemporary chronicler 1 
draws a pitiful picture of England's extremity : " So 
many aliens of divers tongues had already multiplied 
for many years in England, and had been so enriched 
with revenues, lands, towns, and other property, that 
they held the English in the greatest contempt as an in- 
ferior race. There were indeed some who said — know- 
ing their secrets — that if their power should increase, 
they would destroy all the nobles of the land by poison, 2 
dethrone the king, and thus at length subdue all Eng- 
land to their sway forever. Moreover, four of the 
king's brothers — iEthelmar, bishop-elect of Winchester, 
William of Valence, Guy and Geoffrey of Lusignan, — 
exalted above the other aliens by dignities and riches 
beyond measure, raged against the English with in- 
tolerable pride, afflicting them cruelly with many 
injuries of various kinds. Nor did any one dare to 
oppose their presumptuous acts through fear of the 
king. 3 Yet not only these, but also Englishmen, kin- 

1 Ann. Wav., pp. 349, 350. 

2 Cf. Mat. Par., V., pp. 705, 707. Nearly all the chroniclers accuse 
the Poitevins of being poisoners. Reports need not be true to arouse 
popular indignation. 

3 Rish., Chronicon, pp. 3, 7. Mat. Par., V., pp. 594, 708, 738, 739 ; 
VI., pp. 400-409. Rymer, I., p. 373. Si quis contra ipsos (fratres 
regis) vel eorum alterum deferret in judicio qusestionem, Rex . . . 



154 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

died by the fire of avarice, rose against Englishmen, 1 
the greater against the smaller; and they strove by 
lawsuits and fines, by tallages, exactions, and various 
wrongs, to take from every man his property. The 
laws and ancient customs were decayed or nullified 
completely ; each man did what was right in his own 
eyes, and nowhere, except for money, could justice be 
readily procured. Nor can any one enumerate all the 
evils which at that time were being done in England. 
At length, in this year (1258), earls and barons, arch- 
bishops, bishops, and the other magnates of England — 
divinely roused from sleep — perceived the wretched 
prostration of the land, unanimously formed a league, 
and daringly exhibited lionlike courage and strength." 
For many years they had been powerless to accomplish 
any permanent reform: the church had been fettered 
by its allegiance to the pope, by the oppression of the 
royal power in alliance with the papal, and by the 
inner discord and weakness engendered by the presence 
of aliens in all ecclesiastical offices, from the arch- 
bishopric of Canterbury down to the humblest prebend 
with a salary attached : the barons, on the other hand, 
although they had bravely opposed both royal and papal 
encroachments, had been for the most part deprived 
of efficient aid from the clergy, and, above all, had 



contra conquerentem mirabiliter turbabatur ; et cui judex debebat 
esse propitius, ad eorum suggestionera fiebat adversarius, et nonnun- 
quam terribilis inimicus. 

1 Cf. Mat. Par., V., p. 316. Burt., p. 442. Robert of Gloucester, 
p. 533. 



part i THE REFORM PARLIAMENTS 155 

been torn into factions by mutual jealousies. It had 
assuredly been on account of no mere fear of pope or 
king, that the realm had not long ago been freed. 1 The 
means of binding the king had been too hard to find, 
and the barons had lacked a leader. But now both the 
hour and the man had come. The dangers which 
threatened, the very existence of the nation compelled 
united action on the part of its defenders, and the 
temper of the nation had been at length roused to 
such a point that drastic measures would be not only 
proposed, but enforced, if need be, at the point of the 
sword. The postponement of the reform had rendered 
its accomplishment certain, provided that success itself 
did not, as in the case of the Great Charter, 2 bring 
disunion in its train. And so it came to pass that in 
a series of assemblies between the first week of April, 3 
1258, and the middle of the following July, stringent 
measures for the welfare of the land were adopted and 
so far enforced that the land was rid of the aliens. 

The first of these parliaments met at London. The 
immediate topics for consideration were the Welsh war 
and the Sicilian enterprise, but the stormy discussion of 
these themes, and the abuses connected with them, led to 
the far more important subject of constitutional reform. 



1 Cf. Rish., Chronicon, p. 7. Quia, Romanorum extollentiam hu- 
miliando, curiam Romanam offenderent, turn quia regni statum et 
consuetudinas meliorando, et f ratrum regis elata cornua constringendo, 
regiam iudignationem in se ipsos provocarent. 

2 Vide Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., pp. 2, 3. 

3 The exact day is uncertain. Mat. Par., V., p. 676. Post diem 
Martis, quae vulgariter Hokedai appellatur, = after April 2d. 



156 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

In March, the Welsh had formed with certain mag- 
nates of Scotland a commercial treaty and a league of 
offence and defence. 1 Moreover, with boasts that they 
had not only beaten off the royal armies with heavy 
loss but had also conquered the whole nobility of Eng- 
land, they had recently invaded the county of Pem- 
broke with fire and sword. The danger was so urgent 
that even William de Valence was moved to complain 
— presumably, however, rather from regard to his lord- 
ship of Pembroke than from any desire to benefit the 
realm at large. Henry's answer to William at least 
was easy: "Then, dearest brother, expend your abun- 
dant treasures to avenge us." But after asserting in 
general terms that the successes of the Welsh were due 
to the consent and help of English traitors, William 
descended to specific accusations. Attacking Leicester 
openly, in the presence of the king and many nobles, 
he called him an old traitor and liar. The earl angrily 
rejoined, " No, no, William, I am no traitor nor the son 
of a traitor; our fathers were by no means alike." Un- 
doubtedly blood would have been shed, had not the 
king himself stepped between them. 2 However, after 
several days' debate, the Welsh question was disposed 
of by a general summons to assemble for the campaign 
at Chester on the 17th of June, with horses and arms. 3 

The more delicate task remained to be accomplished. 
The coming of Herlot, who, although not a legate, af- 

1 Rymer, I., p. 370. 

2 Mat. Par., V., pp. 076, 677. De Valence included Gloucester in 
the specific charge of treachery. 3 Ibid., p. 677. 



part i THE REFORM PARLIAMENTS 157 

fected all a legate's pomp and received from Henry the 
welcome of a legate, 1 had been the chief cause for 
the holding of the parliament. In the pope's name he 
now demanded from the king a sum of money so large 
that it " caused the ears of the hearers to tingle," 2 in- 
volving, as was said, 3 one-third of all the property, both 
real and personal, in England. The barons loudly com- 
plained. They could no longer pour out their "sub- 
stantiolas" except to their own irremediable destruction. 
Through his own folly, unwisely and improperly, with- 
out deliberation or the advice of his nobles, Henry had 
sought the acquisition of Sicily. Richard of Cornwall, 
a wiser man than he, had refused the same crown be- 
cause of the inaccessibility of the country and his fear 
of Roman intrigue and Sicilian treachery. Yet by 
shrewdly demanding terms which he knew that the 
pope would refuse to grant, he had nevertheless suc- 
ceeded in retaining papal favour. Henry, on the other 
hand, lured by a shadowy promise, had accepted the 
crown for Edmund, given all that he had to the pope, 
promised more, and opened up the way to papal ex- 
tortion. 4 Then, passing to more general topics of 
complaint, the barons reproached the king for non- 



1 Mat. Par., V., p. 673. 2 Ibid., p. 676. 

3 Theok., p. 163. Cf. Dunst., p. 208. Centum milia marcarum 
et amplius. 

4 Mat. Par., V., pp. 680, 681. Cf. Rymer, I., p. 302. For assump- 
tion of the business without the barons' consent, cf. Rymer, L, p. 373. 
Noster rex, absque nostro consilio et assensu, immo nobis reclamanti- 
bus et invitis, hoc negotium assumpsisset. The royalist Wykes says, 
p. 126, Rex autem minus provide negotio se immiscuit. 



158 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

observance of his promises to the church and for the 
violation of the Charters which he had so frequently 
confirmed for money. Contrary to the laws and customs 
of the realm he had placed his half-brothers, though 
aliens, in positions of the greatest influence, 1 nor did he 
allow any writ to go out from his chancery 2 against 
them, although their own arrogance and the abuses of 
their bailiffs were notorious. Simon de Montfort then 
inveighed against the presumption of the aliens and of 
William de Valence in particular, demanding instant 
justice. His appeal, significantly enough, was directed 
not to the king, but to the general body of peers. 3 
That the king had enriched foreigners at the expense 
of his natural subjects and to the subversion of the 
realm, did not fail to be mentioned. Especial impor- 
tance was attached to the fact — itself an incitement to 
remedy abuses by the strong hand — that the king's 
power was too weak to enforce the laws of the land or 
to check the incursions of the Welsh, an enemy uni- 
versally despised. The natural conclusion was that the 
excesses of the king demanded exceptional treatment. 4 
Herlot was told that Henry did not have so much 
money, and could not have it. When he threatened to 
excommunicate the king and all the magnates, saying 
that the king had bound them and their lands in pay- 

1 Cf. Rish., Chronicon, p. 3. Consiliarii, prse omnibus indigenis et 
naturalibus regni, secretiores ac specialiores. 

2 Cf. the remarkable passage in Mat. Par., V., p. 594. Also 
Oxenedes, p. 225. 

3 Mat. Par., V., p. 689. Non tamen regi, sed universitati. 

4 Ibid. Excessus regis tractatus exigit speciales. 



part i THE REFORM PARLIAMENTS 159 

ment of their claim, both laymen and clergy indignantly 
responded that they were free men, and it was therefore 
beyond the king's power so to bind them. 1 Finally, on 
the 30th of April, the magnates delivered their ultima- 
tum to the king. 

At three o'clock in the afternoon, earls, barons, and 
knights, all in their military dress and wearing their 
swords, repaired to the royal hall at Westminster. 
Leaving their weapons at the entrance, however, they 
advanced to salute the king with all due respect and 
deference. In a voice shaking with fear, Henry asked 
if they meant to take him captive, and what was their 
will. The barons at once disclaimed any hostile inten- 
tion, but through their spokesman, Roger Bigod, pro- 
ceeded to demand the immediate expulsion of the 
Poitevins, the appointment of twenty-four of the wisest 
men of England as a council whose advice the king and 
Edward should be bound by oath to follow, and the 
delivery of the great seal to whomsoever the twenty- 
four should name as chancellor. This mode of proced- 
ure, said Bigod, would redound to the honour and profit 
of the whole realm, and would release the king from his 
troubles. It had been unanimously adopted by the bar- 
onage. 2 On that very day 3 Henry yielded; and on the 
2d of May he published letters-patent 4 whose nature 



1 Dunst., p. 208. Mat. Par., V., p. 682. 

2 Theok., pp. 163, 164. Wisest men — videlicet, episc, comitum, 
baronum, electorum. Mat. Par., V., p. 682. Quasi uno ore. 
3 Theok., p. 164. 
4 Sel. Chart., pp. 380, 381. Rymer, I., pp. 370, 371. 



160 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

was such as to ensure a speedy reform. After reciting 
the summons to the parliament and the character of the 
business there to be transacted, the document contin- 
ues : " And since the magnates promised that if we 
would cause the state of the kingdom to be rectified by 
a council of our faithful subjects, and if the pope would 
so mitigate the conditions for the acquirement of Sicily 
that the business could be prosecuted with success, they 
would themselves faithfully labour to obtain a general 
aid from the commonalty of the kingdom for this pur- 
pose ; we have therefore granted to them that, before 
next Christmas, we will reform the state of our kingdom 
by the advice of worthy and faithful men of our realm 
of England, together with the counsel of a papal legate, 
— if one shall have entered in the meantime, — and this 
reform we will firmlv maintain and observe." The 
king next promises to be bound by ecclesiastical cen- 
sure in case he violates his covenant, and rehearses 
Edward's consent to the foregoing. 1 The document 
was signed by many of the aliens, in the presence of a 
large number of the nobility. By another letter-patent 2 
of the same date, the execution of the reform was placed 
in the hands of twenty-four men, twelve to be nomi- 
nated by the king and twelve by the barons. To their 
decrees the king and Edward swore to submit. Soon 
afterward, the parliament was adjourned to meet at 
Oxford on the 11th of June, when the reformatory 
measures were to be perfected. 

1 Edward gave his consent reluctantly. Theok., p. 164. 

2 Sel. Chart., p. 381. Rymer, I., p. 371. 



part i THE REFORM PARLIAMENTS 161 

Incredible as it may seem, Henry had not refrained 
even during this critical period from his wonted prodi- 
gality and extortion. With a war before him whose 
expenses he was too poor to defray, he yet found means 
to present 1000 marks to Thomas of Savoy and X200 
to the Poitevin William de Saint Hermete, his favour- 
ite carver. The former received rich gifts also from 
the queen, and at once crossed the Channel to continue 
with English gold his war with Turin. 1 

In the face of the barons' daily censure for his illegal 
exactions, and rendered desperate by their refusal to 
grant him money, Henry had recourse to a system of 
extortion from individual churchmen which well illus- 
trates his own shifty dealings, the character and 
methods of his agents, and the burdens which he 
imposed on the church. The king first induced 
Richard, the abbot of Westminster, to become his 
surety to the amount of 2500 marks, and thus obtained 
a leverage for his proposed exactions. He then sent 
Simon Passelew, a degenerate Englishman, to other 
abbeys on a similar errand. Coming first to Waltham, 
he showed the royal order and the abbot of Westmin- 
ster's acceptance, and demanded a similar compliance. 
The abbot replied that the abbey was not only unwill- 
ing to bind itself to the payment of money, but by the 
Decretals 2 was even positively forbidden to do so. To 



i Mat. Par., V., pp. 678, 702. 

2 Decret. III., tit. 23. De solutionibus. Firmiter inhibemus ne 
quis prsesumat ecclesiam sibi commissam pro alienis gravare debitis 

M 



162 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

Simon's assurance that Henry would give ample secu- 
rity, lie rejoined that he had no wish to oppose the king 
in a lawsuit, for they could not contend on equal terms. 
So after Simon had had recourse to threats, but in vain, 
he angrily took his way to St. Albans. Thither the 
abbot of Waltham had already despatched swift and 
secret messengers to give warning. Simon, asserting 
that he had just come from London after an all-night's 
ride, dozed for a moment before entering the abbot's 
presence, and then, opening the business as before, pro- 
ceeded at once to threats. The abbot in reply said 
that he could not assent, for it would be iniquitous and 
contrary to papal prohibition. He then produced a 
bull addressed to abbot Garinus and his successors, com- 
manding them under penalty of suspension and inter- 
dict to bind their abbey in no wise. Only then was the 
full extent of the king's duplicity revealed. Simon 
replied that the abbot's anxiety was groundless, for 
brother Mansuetus was now at court, sent by the pope 
at the king's request, and clothed with full powers 
expressly to absolve and free from their ecclesiastical 
obligations all men who were disposed to help the king 
in this great emergency. 1 To clinch the argument, he 
added that in case of a further refusal he should return 
at once to London to report the abbot's contumacy and 
contempt for the office and power of Mansuetus. The 
abbot persisting in his denial, Simon shifted his ground. 

aut litteras alicui seu sigilla concedere, quibus possent ecclesise obligari. 
Cited by Luard, Mat. Par., V., p. 683. 
i Mat. Par., V., pp. 679, 685, 686. 



part i THE REFORM PARLIAMENTS 163 

It would be his own ruin with the king, if he returned 
unsuccessful ; and besides, the whole wealth of the 
abbey was the gift of the king or of his predecessors, 
whence it was the abbot's bounden duty to come to the 
king's assistance. The first plea could have but little 
weight : to the second, the answer was given : " All 
things belong to the king for protection, not for de- 
struction. To this the king swore in his coronation- 
oath and frequently since. We will therefore not 
yield to your wicked suggestions." In sheer despair, 
Simon then resorted to his last wile, requesting the 
abbot to draw up documents such as the king desired, 
seal them, and deposit them in his own treasury, so 
that if his heart softened, the king might readily obtain 
them. Said the abbot, " We will not set an evil 
example to others," and so, confounded, the tempter 
withdrew. Foiled here, he proceeded to Reading, — 
not to London as he had said, — but the sturdy monks, 
" forewarned, withstood him manfully," and the king 
failed of his purpose. 1 It was largely on account of 
this failure that the king on the 30th of April had 
humiliated himself before the barons, and confessing 
that he had been misled too frequently by evil counsel, 2 
took for almost the first time in a quarter of a century 
a step in the direction of a genuine reform. 

During the five weeks which elapsed before parlia- 
ment reassembled, neither clergy nor baronage were 
idle. The latter, indeed, had demanded the adjourn- 

1 Mat. Par., V., pp. 682-688. 2 Ibid., p. 689, . 



164 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

ment, because from old experience they knew the king's 
faithlessness and the consequent need and excessive 
difficulty of " finding a knot with which to bind their 
Proteus." * The great earls of Gloucester, Leicester, 
Hereford, the Earl Marshall, and many other nobles 
therefore entered into a solemn league, and consolidated 
their power in order to withstand the assaults at once 
of the king and the aliens. 2 

As early as the 19th of April, Archbishop Boniface, at 
Herlot's 3 instance — for Herlot had been sent not only 
"to reform the Sicilian business," but incidentally to 
wring money from the clergy — had summoned a con- 
vocation 4 to meet at Merton on the Tuesday before 
June 11th. The primary cause of the meeting was the 
consideration of the papal demands, — especially for a 
tallage of three marks levied by Herlot on every reli- 
gious body throughout England, 5 — but the opportunity 
for complaining of the king's oppression of the church 
seems to have been eagerly embraced. No doubt the 
recent action of the baronage, so acceptable to the great 
body of the clergy, had proved stimulating ; their action, 
at any rate, at this convocation was in perfect accord 
with the baronial spirit, although the reforms proposed 
were foredoomed to a paper existence. 6 The preamble 

i Mat. Par., V., p. 494. 

2 Ibid., V., pp. 689, 690. Rish., Chronicon, p. 8. 

3 Rymer, I., pp. 358, 366. Burt., pp. 409-411. Theok., p. 163. 
Dunst., p. 208. Mat. Par., V., p. 676. 

4 Burt., pp. 411, 412. Theok., p. 163. "Parum ante." Date was 
June 6th. 6 Burt., p. 411. 

6 Theok., p. 163. Et cle oppressione, sed nihil profecti sunt. 



part i TEE REFORM PARLIAMENTS 165 

vigorously states that the church was oppressed con- 
trary to divine law, canon law, and the liberties guaran- 
teed by royal charter, and therefore its walls, sapped by 
the engines of the temporal power, must be repaired 
forthwith. The most significant article in the docu- 
ment is the order that any person guilty of wasting the 
property of churches, while vacant, shall be excommu- 
nicated without delay — even the king himself. 1 This 
struck at the fountain-head. The assembly also put on 
record the gravamina 2 formerly engrossed by the great 
bishop of Lincoln, indubitably proving that his spirit 
was still abroad in the land. 

The Mad Parliament 

By his consent to the project of reform, and to the 
election of the twenty-four who were to reconstruct the 
state of the realm "ad honorem Dei et ad fidem nostram 
ac regni nostri utilitatem," as well as by his oath to 
maintain and observe their ordinances, 3 the king had 
given full play to the forces which for twenty-five years 
had been baffled by his obstinacy and double-dealing, 
and chafing under the sense of their own impotence. 
Under the circumstances, moderation could scarcely be 
expected, nor could a constitution, perfect in all its 
details, be expected to result from the labours of two 
hostile political groups, — especially since the reformers 

1 Burt. , pp. 412-422. Special article is found on p. 420. 

2 Burt,, pp. 422-425. 

3 Sel. Chart., p. 381. Rymer, I., p. 371. 



166 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

were themselves men who had only recently buried 
mutual jealousies, whose moral standards were exceed- 
ingly dissimilar, and whose strongest bond of union 
was the common danger and the sense of nationality. 
Those reforms, to be sure, upon which the baronial 
party were heartily agreed — viz., the preservation of 
English nationality and constitutional freedom by means 
of the expulsion of alien elements from the common- 
wealth — were certain to be thoroughly carried out : it 
was equally certain, however, that all measures which 
involved theory rather than practice would meet with 
opposition from some quarter, and remain either un- 
touched or imperfect. In other words, the temporary 
work of destruction would in the main be well done ; 
the permanent reform of the constitution — a work 
which demanded the finest constructive statesman- 
ship — would be of very dubious success. The truth 
of this was proved by the sequel. 

On the 11th of June the barons assembled at Oxford 
to begin their arduous task. Profoundly distrusting 
the king's intentions, and fearing the intrigues of the 
aliens, they availed themselves of the summons to the 
Welsh war as a pretext for appearing fully armed and 
accompanied by large bodies of retainers. 1 As an extra 
precaution they ordered the seaports to be guarded. 2 
A petition for the redress of grievances had been drawn 



1 Mat. Par., V., pp. 690, 696. Burt., p. 438. Kish., Chronicon, 
p. 8. According to one writer, sixty thousand persons assembled. 
Rish., Chronicon, notes, p. 114. 

2 Mat. Par., V., p. 696. 



part i THE BEFOBM PARLIAMENTS 167 

up, and this was now presented. 1 It contained twenty- 
nine articles, all of undoubted justice, and all rehearsing 
violations of the principles contained in the Great 
Charter. By far the major part refer to various en- 
croachments of the royal power upon the rights of 
mesne lords, to abuses practised by itinerant justices, 
sheriffs, and royal purveyors, to violations of the forest 
charters, of the law of escheat, and of patronage- 
rights in the case of abbeys of private foundation, and 
to the impoverishment of the land by Christian usurers 
who were not subject to tallage, and by Jews in league 
with the powerful. 2 Most important of all, as illus- 
trating the very real perils which threatened English 
national independence, are the fourth, fifth, sixth, and 
fifteenth articles. The first of these requests that " the 
king's castles be committed to the guardianship of loyal 
men of English birth, on account of the many emergen- 
cies which might arise in England;' 1 the second requests 
particularly that such " royal castles as are situated on 
the sea-coast, where boats can land, be committed to 
faithful men of English birth on account of the very 
many and evident perils which may arise if they are 
entrusted to others." The third relates to the marriage 
of the king's female wards, requesting that " they should 
not be married with disparagement — that is, to men ivlio 
are not of the English nationality." The last is, if pos- 
sible, still more significant : " Likewise the barons ask 
that no one be permitted to fortify a castle at a sea- 

1 Sel. Chart., pp. 382-387. Burt., pp. 439-443. 

2 Cf. Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., pp. 76, 77. 



168 THE BARONS" WAR chap, hi 

port or on a neighbouring island, except by the consent 
of the council of the whole realm of England, because 
many dangers may thence arise." Nearly all the royal 
castles were at this time in the hand of aliens. 1 

Before these abuses could be redressed, the constitu- 
tional machinery had to be constructed. Arrangements 
had been made already for the appointment of the com- 
mittee of twenty-four ; the members were now named, 2 
and after the king and the reluctant Edward had sworn 
to accept and observe their provisions, 3 they entered at 
once upon their duties. It is unnecessary here to dis- 
cuss at length the curiously intricate and somewhat 
primitive methods 4 which their mode of procedure 
involved and which marked its tentative character. 
Their measures were to be of two kinds : first, the 
formation of a permanent constitution, involving the 
appointment of permanent officials and the regulation 
of their powers and duties ; second, the construction of 
temporary machinery to deal with current questions — 
the redress of grievances of all kinds, and the aid which 
the barons had promised provisionally for the war. 

Very early in the parliament the twenty-four had 



1 Burt., pp. 443, 444. Litera cujusdam de curia regis de par- 
liaments Oxonise. 

' 2 Shirley, II., pp. 127, 128. For their names, vide Burt., p. 447 ; 
Pauli, Gesch. von Eng., III., p. 717, n. 2 ; Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., 
pp. 77, 78, 85. The last-mentioned page contains a very useful table. 

3 Rymer, I., p. 373. Burt., p. 457. Theok. , p. 164. Wykes, p. 119. 
Osney, pp. 118, 119. Rish., Chronicon, p. 3. 

4 Vide Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., pp. 77, 78, n. 4. Pauli, Gesch. 
von Eng., III., pp. 716-718. 



PART I 



IRE REFORM PARLIAMENTS 169 



appointed Hugh Bigod justiciar, 1 and by a system of 
cross selection the twelve who represented the king's 
interest 2 had named two of the opposing twelve, who 
in turn had nominated two of the royalist twelve, to act 
conjointly 3 in the nomination of a permanent council 
of fifteen. This body was empowered " to advise the 
king in good faith concerning the government of the 
realm and all things which appertained to the king or 
to the kingdom ; and to amend and redress all things 
which they shall see require to be redressed and 
amended. And over the chief justice and over all the 
people. And if they cannot all be present, that which 
the majority shall do shall be firm and established." 4 
This council was to be confirmed by the twenty-four. 
As finally constituted, it contained ten of the baronial 
and but five of the royal party. 5 

In order to ensure the due hearing and redress of 
future grievances, it was next provided that a parlia- 
ment should meet three times a year — on the octave 6 
of St. Michael, on the morrow 7 of Candlemas, and on 
the 1st of June. This parliament was to consist of 



iBurt., p. 443. Mat. Par., V., p. 698. Wykes, p. 120. Osney, 

p. 119. 

2 Rymer, I., p. 371. Sel. Chart., p. 381. Per XII fideles de concilio 
nostro jam electos et per alios XII fideles nostros, electos ex parte 
procerum ipsorum. Shirley, II., pp. 127, 128. June 26, 1258. 

3 Burt., p. 449. Sel. Chart., p. 389. 

4 Burt., pp. 453, 505. 

5 For names, vide Burt., p. 449. Cf. Pauli, Gesch. von Eng., III., 
pp. 717, 718. The royal order for the election of the fifteen is dated 
June 26, 1258. Shirley, II., pp. 127, 128. 

6 October 6th. 7 February 3d. 



170 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

the permanent council of fifteen plus twelve others 
elected by the barons in behalf of the entire com- 
monalty of the whole land. It was to assemble whether 
specially summoned or not, and provision was made for 
its summons on extraordinary occasions by royal writ. 
Whatever the parliament decreed was to bind the com- 
monalty. The object to be attained by limiting the 
membership to so few was stated to be the saving of 
cost to the community. 1 It served, however, to deepen 
the oligarchical character of the whole scheme and to 
ensure its ultimate insufficiency. 

The next step was to provide for the faithful dis- 
charge of the duties of the higher officials. To this end 
the tenure of office was limited to one year in the case 
of the three great officials and of the sheriffs. At the 
end of each year examination of accounts and conduct 
was to be made before the king, the council, and the 
official's successor. Reappointment was not definitely 
forbidden, however. The duties of all officials were 
clearly stated, and a stringent oath of faithful per- 
formance was exacted. The justiciar was sworn to act 
in all cases for the profit of the king and kingdom, 
according to the provisions of the twenty-four and by 
the counsel of the king and his magnates. The chan- 
cellor was sworn to seal no writs, except writs of 
course, without the commandment of the king and 
council, and to seal nothing contrary to the provisions 
of the twenty-four. Gifts of a great wardship or es- 

1 Sel. Chart., pp. 390, 392, 394, 396. Burt., pp. 449, 452, 502, 504. 



*art i THE REFORM PARLIAMENTS 171 

cheats required the formal assent of the great council, 
or of the major part. The treasurer's accounts were to 
be audited yearly, and posts at the treasury were to be 
filled by the nominees of the twenty-four. " To the 
treasury all issues of the land should come, and no part 
elsewhere." 1 In these words the king's misuse of the 
finances received decisive check. 

It is unfortunate that the method of the appointment 
of the great officials is not definitely stated; it was 
probably the result of a compromise, for although Hugh 
Bigod, at this time a member of the baronial party, 
had been made justiciar at once, the great seal still 
remained in the hands of the king's nominee. Then, 
too, Philip Lovel, a royal favourite, retained the head- 
ship of the treasury until October, when, in conse- 
quence of depredations on the royal game-preserves, he 
lost both the royal favour and his place. The barons, 
mainly at the instance of the justiciar, then appointed 
John of Crakehall in his stead, at the same time making 
sweeping changes at the exchequer. In this way the 
late scene of riotous prodigality was transformed. 2 

This, together with the reconfirmation of the Char- 
ters, 3 completed the permanent constitution as estab- 
lished by the twenty-four. Meanwhile, other ordinances 
of scarcely less moment had been passed by them for 

1 Burt., pp. 448, 450, 451. Dunst., pp. 209, 210. Sel. Chart, pp. 
389, 390, 391. E la vengent totes les issues de la tere, et en nule part 
ailurs. 

2 Mat. Par., V., pp. 714, 715, 719, 720. Dunst., p. 210. Cf. 
Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., p. 80. 

3 Burt., pp. 452, 504. Sel. Chart., pp. 391, 395. 



172 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

the regulation of current affairs. The amendment of 
the state of the church was committed to the original 
twenty-four, " when they shall see place and time." 1 
Another special body of twenty-four was elected by 
the barons to treat of the aid for the king. 2 The 
importance of the cities received the following recog- 
nition: 3 "Be it remembered to amend the exchange of 
London, and the city of London, and all the other 
cities of the king which have gone to shame and de- 
struction by the tallages and other oppressions." And 
first of all in the order of time, 4 and certainly not last 
in importance, provision had been made for the custody 
of the royal castles. These had been, as a general rule, 
in the hands of aliens; 5 they were now entrusted to sure 
men of English birth, sworn to keep them loyally and 
in good faith, for the use of the king and his heirs, and 
to give them up only to the king and his heirs, and that 
by the written order of the royal council. This provi- 
sion was to be binding for twelve years only. 6 A second 
ordinance 7 of kindred nature provided that in view of 
the king's poverty, and the grave perils which would 
consequently ensue if the realm should be attacked by 
a foreign power, 8 all lands, holdings, and castles which 

1 Burt., p. 450. Sel. Chart., p. 390. 

2 Burt., p. 450. Sel. Chart,, p. 390. 

3 Burt., pp. 452, 504. Sel. Chart., pp. 392, 395. 

4 Immediately after the justiciar's appointment. Burt., p. 443. 

5 Burt., pp. 443, 444. Blaauw, Barons' War, p. 57, n. 2, enumer- 
ates fifteen. 

6 Burt., pp. 443, 444, 448, 449, 453. Sel. Chart., pp. 389, 392, 393. 

7 Burt., p. 444. 

8 Peace was made with Wales June 17, 1258. Kymer, I., p. 372. 



part i THE REFORM PARLIAMENTS 173 

had been alienated by the king should be restored forth- 
with. 

Although the Poitevins, as well as the king, Edward, 
and the English barons, had sworn to accept the reforms 
decreed by the council of twenty-four, the first named 
had none the less tried with all their power, exercising 
undue influence particularly upon the prince, to prevent 
the council from accomplishing its task. 1 When, there- 
fore, the king on the 22d of June 2 took the decisive 
step of issuing a writ requiring the surrender of the 
royal castles, the Poitevins flatly refused to comply. 
A stormy scene ensued. Simon de Montfort, in prompt 
obedience to the king's command, had already surren- 
dered his two castles of Odiham and Kenilworth. It 
must have afforded the proud earl rare satisfaction to be 
able from his vantage-ground of constitutional authority 
to say to the obstreperous William de Valence, " Be 
sure that we will have the castles or your head" — a 
saying to which the rest assented. 3 Henry d'Almayne, 
son of Richard of Cornwall, also refusing to swear to 
this provision on the ground that he had no land ex- 
cept at his father's will, that he could therefore take 
no oath without his father's permission, and besides 
was not a peer, the baronage returned the answer 
that if he did not swear, he should never obtain 
one furrow of land in England. They then granted 

i Rymer, I., p. 373. Burt., p. 448. Sel. Chart, p. 388. Mat. 
Par., V., pp. 696, 697. 

2 42 Pat. 6. Vide Pauli, Gesch. von Eng., III., p. 720, n. 1. 

3 Mat. Par. , V., pp. 697, 698. 



174 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

him a respite of forty days in which to consult his 
father. 1 

At the opening of the parliament the twent} T -four had 
sworn a most solemn oath " not to fail for gift nor for 
promise, for love nor for hate, nor for fear of any one, 
nor for gain, nor for loss, loyally to do according to the 
tenor of the letter which the king and his son have 
together given " for the reformation of the realm. 2 
According to Matthew Paris the barons now renewed 3 
their oath at a meeting in the house of the Fratres Prse- 
dicatores, vowing never to be turned from their purpose 
of ridding the land of the aliens and of enacting praise- 
worthy laws. All who refused to join them should be 
compelled to do so, or be considered mortal enemies. 4 

After de Montfort's speech to de Valence, the aliens, 
together with John of Warenne whom they seem to 
have overpersuaded, perceived that it was necessary to 
seek refuge in night. Leaving Oxford secretly while 
the noonday meal was preparing, they spurred to Win- 
chester, there to seek refuge in the castle of Wolvesham, 
under the fostering care of Bishop ^Ethelmar. In guilty 
terror they cast frequent looks behind them as they fled, 
and caused their followers to mount high watch-towers 

1 Burt., p. 444. Mat. Par., V., p. 697. 

2 Burt., p. 448. Sel. Chart., p. 393. Mat. Par., V., p. 696. 

3 Mat. Par., V., p. 697. 

4 Mat. Par., V., p. 697. Dunst., p. 209. Wykes, pp. 119, 120. 
Pish., Chronicon, p. 8. Quod utique omnium baronum fixuui erat 
propositum ut eos . . . ab Anglia expellerent, et sic compendiosius 
de negociis regni tractarent et disponerent. Rish., Chronica, pp. 2, 3. 
Non tamen omnes, sed prsecipue Pictavenses, — a convincing exam- 
ple of the fusion of the constitutional and national movements. 



part i THE REFORM PARLIAMENTS 175 

to see if perchance the barons were already in pursuit. 1 
They were true Ishmaelites ; even the queen had turned 
against them. 2 

Perceiving the full gravity of the situation, the barons 
had already ordered that the seaports should be still 
more strictly guarded, and that London gates should be 
barred at night. 

Per noctes portse clauduntur Londoniarum 
Moenia ne forte fraus frangat Francigenarum 

ran an epigram of the time. 3 Without delay the king 
and the barons proceeded with horses and arms to Win- 
chester, resolved to prevent any importation of alien 
troops and to give the land quiet. And thus, says 
Matthew Paris, the Oxford parliament was terminated, 
an end having been reached, not appointed. 4 This 
occurred on the 22d of June, or a little later. 5 Until 
the 5th of July 6 a series of ignominious negotiations 7 

!Burt,, p. 444. Mat. Par., V., pp. 696-698. Theok., p. 165. 
Rish., Chronicon, p. 8. Dunst., p. 209, says, clam et de nocte . . . 
recesserunt. Ant. Leg., p. 38. 

2 Mat. Par., V., 703. . . . regina Francise . . . de Pictavensibus 
illis reposuerat querimoniam, quod enormiter scandalizaverant et 
diffamaverant sororem suam reginam Anglias. Waverley, p. 355. 
Hsec quidem provisio imprimis placuit reginse, dum quidam barbari 
sibi displieentes Anglise cogerentur valefacere. 

3 Mat. Par., V., p. 697. 4 Ibid, p. 698. 

5 The writ demanding the castles was dated on that day, and Mat- 
thew's account would lead one to believe that the aliens fled almost 
at once after de Montfort's speech. Ann. Winton., p. 97, dates the 
"parliament of Winchester" circa July 2d. 

6 Rymer, I., p. 374. 

7 Burt., pp. 444, 445. Rymer, I., p. 373. Rish., Chronicon, pp. 
8, 9. 



176 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

proceeded; John of Warenne made his peace with the 
baronial party and swore to the provisions in toto ; but 
although the Poitevins finally promised a similar com- 
pliance, they were told that they were unworthy of 
credence, and at last, on their refusal to stand trial, were 
banished from the realm. 1 On the 14th of July 2 the 
king's half-brothers, together with several foreigners of 
lesser note, crossed the Straits of Dover. Out of their 
immense accumulations they bore with them, by per- 
mission, only 6000 marks. 3 The rest — except cer- 
tain large sums which they contrived later to smuggle 
across — fell to the coffers of the state. 4 And the land 
had rest from their exactions. 5 

This great victory did not stop the action of the pro- 
visional government. No sooner had the disturbing in- 
fluence of the aliens been removed than Prince Edward, 
however reluctantly, submitted himself to the barons 
and received four counsellors whom they placed by his 
side. The fickle king, passing from one extreme to the 
other, had frequently asked the barons to station only 

!Burt., p. 445. Mat. Par., V., p. 702. Theok., p. 165. Rish., 
Chronicon, pp. 8, 9. Dunst. , p. 209. Ant. Leg., p. 38. Osney, p. 119. 

2 Safe-conduct, July 5th, Rymer, I., p. 374. Burt., p. 445. Mat. 
Par., V., p. 702, dates their departure July 18th. 

3 Burt., p. 445. Cf. Lib. de Ant. Leg., p. 38. Quibus vero non 
fuit permissura ad ducendum secum aliquid de thesauris suis, nisi 
de tantumrnodo quantum oportebat eis ad expensas. Also Rymer, 
L, p. 374. 

* Rymer, I., p. 377. Mat. Par., V., pp. 704, 713, 730 ; VI., p. 405. 
Burt., p. 445. Dunst., p. 209. 

5 Taxster, p. 187 ; apud B. Cotton, p. 137. Quibus expulsis, 
paulatim prsedictae tortuosae exactiones cessare cceperunt. 



part i THE REFORM PARLIAMENTS 177 

native Englishmen about his person, and this was also 
done. 1 On the 23d of July, a deputation of the baron- 
age presented themselves before the citizens of London 
in Guildhall and secured their exceedingly important 
adherence to the Provisions. To a charter already 
fortified by the seals of Henry, Edward, and the barons, 
the city seal was now attached ; from this time on, the 
Provisors held colloquies from day to day, frequently 
at the New Temple, reforming the uses and customs of 
the realm. 2 On the 28th of July, Henry, in compliance 
with the Provisions, issued a general writ to all the 
sheriffs to inquire by the recognition of four discreet 
men of each county into the abuses and excesses there 
committed in times past. 3 A sealed report was to be 
delivered by the sheriff in person to the council at the 
opening of the October parliament. The moral effect 
of this measure must have been very great, for it prom- 
ised earnestness and better times. 

Another procedure 4 was designed to secure the 
cordial support of the lower clergy. Mindful of the 
financial and spiritual injuries which had been in- 
flicted upon the realm by the foreigners who had been 
forced into English benefices by the pope and the king 
— - especially to the pecuniary loss of the lower clergy, 
who were thus deprived of many valuable livings — the 

1 Burt., p. 445. Edward's four were John de Balliol, John de 
Grey, Stephen Longespe'e, and Roger de Montalt. 

2 Ant. Leg., pp. 38, 39. Mat. Par., V., p. 704. "In festo Marise 
Magdalense," July 22d. 

3 Bart., pp. 446, 456. Sel. Chart., p. 387. Mat. Par., V., p. 714. 

4 Rish., Chronicon, pp. 9, 10. 

N 



178 THE BARONS" WAR chap, hi 

barons ordered that the revenues due to Italian priests 
should not be delivered to the aliens, but instead to 
procurators appointed by the barons. Bishops were in 
like manner commanded not to defend the foreigners 
by ecclesiastical censure, nor to interfere in any way 
for their protection. The very language as well as the 
spirit of this measure, forcibly recalls the fierce out- 
burst of national enthusiasm in the Twenge riots of 
twenty-seven years before. 1 For three years the ex- 
cesses of the pope were stopped. 

On the 4th of August, Henry issued letters-patent 
announcing his intention to be bound by the decisions 
of the permanent council of fifteen, and requiring his 
subjects, both clerical and lay, to render them implicit 
obedience. 2 If anything more could possibly be want- 
ing to establish irrefragably the lawful position of the 
twenty-four, and the constitutionality of their decrees, 
it was furnished on the 18th of October. The Provi- 
sions of Oxford were published 3 then for the first time 
officially, and the king signified his adherence to them 
in a document 4 which enjoys the unique honour of being 
the first state-paper in the English language the word- 
ing of which is extant. Both the Provisions and the 
king's adherence to them were published in Latin, 
French, and English — a remarkable testimony to the 

1 Cf. Mat. Par., III., pp. 208 et seq. Also supra, pp. 90, 91, and 
n. 4. This order dates between 1258-1263. 

2 Shirley, II., p. 129. 

3 The formal publication had been delayed by Gloucester's illness, 
according to Mat. Par., V., pp. 704, 705. 

4Sel. Chart., pp. 396-398. 



part i THE BEFORM PARLIAMENTS 179 

still imperfect homogeneity of England, its increasing 
political solidarity, the growing political importance of 
the commons, and the anxiety of the barons to have their 
measures known to all classes of the commonwealth. 

The Provisions themselves, unfortunately, do not ex- 
ist in their original form. They seem to have been five 
in number, four of which were acceptable to moderate 
members of both parties. 1 None of them, if judged by 
the real needs of the times and the king's instability, 
were of such a character as to justify the opprobrious 
epithet of " Mad." 2 All the chroniclers agree, how- 
ever, in considering these Provisions the cause of the 
later war. The royalist Wykes, while censuring bit- 
terly the establishment of an executive council, never- 
theless finds the true cause of war in what he terms 
the "fifth provision" — viz., that if any one should dare 
to thwart (contraire) the Provisions, or refuse to keep 
them, he should be decreed a public enemy. 3 William 
de Rishanger, an ardent admirer of de Montfort, with 
a truer political sense qualifies his praise of the whole 
body of the Provisions by saying that they all would 
advantage the realm, " provided they be observed firmly 
and inviolably by each and all ; ' he then attributes 
the immediate cause of war to the same article which 
Wykes mentions. 4 As a matter of fact, if there had 
been no Provisions in the year 1258, a rebellion must 
have taken their place ; the fundamental causes of the 
later war were essentially the same as the causes of the 

1 Wykes, p. 119. 2 Ant. Leg., p. 37. Illud insane Parliamentum. 
3 Wykes, pp. 119, 120. * Kish., Chronicon, pp. 2, 3. 



180 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

assembling of the June parliament — manifold viola- 
tions of national and constitutional rights; the immedi- 
ate occasion was the attempted limitation of the royal 
power by a standing committee. This was a provision 
to which no mediseval king would peaceably submit. 
The fifth article was but its corollary — a token that 
the barons were in earnest. 

The general results of the Provisions are thus summed 
up by Daniel, 1 a writer of the early seventeenth cen- 
tury : " Wherein we see what effects it wrought, how 
no side got but misery and vexation ; whilst the one 
struggled to doe more than it should, and the other to 
doe lesse than it ought, they both had the worst, ac- 
cording to the usual events of such embroylements." 
The primary causes of the war amply justified it; the 
conduct of that wing of the baronial party which was 
under de Clare's leadership immeasurably weakened 
the moral strength of the baronial claims; the king 
renewed his intrigues and demands for irresponsible 
power under circumstances which gave his cause ficti- 
tious strength ; and the result was a conflict which 
would have been ignominious enough for all parties 
had not the personal character and broad aims of Simon 
de Montfort lifted the strife far above the pettiness of 
a mere squabble for the exercise of barren power into 
the grandeur of an initial contest for the rights of the 
people. 

1 Collection of the Hist, of Eng., p. 155. Cited by Halliwell in the 
notes to Rish., Chronicon, p. 115. Daniel is published in the first 
volume of Kennet's Complete Hist, of Eng., 3 vols., folio, 1706. 



part ii THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BARONS 181 



PART II 

The Government of the Barons: War and Peace 

The history of England from the October parliament 
of 1258, at which the barons firmly seized the reins of 
power by publishing Henry's formal adhesion to the 
Provisions of Oxford and by installing their nominees 
in office, is for a considerable period exceedingly intri- 
cate. 1 As is usual in such cases, however, there exists 
an underlying chain of causation whose continuity 
remains unbroken, and which is itself far more impor- 
tant than any of the details which serve to reveal its 
existence. The chain now in question was forged by 
the nature of the rule of the baronial oligarchy, by the 
unchanged character of king and Roman court, by the 
steady persistence of the English people and their 
chosen leader in the struggle for liberty, and by the 
ferment of political ideas. 

The external history of the reign from this time on 
falls naturally into five divisions. The first extends 
from October, 1258, to the death 2 of the earl of Glouces- 

1 For this period, Shirley's Royal Letters, Vol. II., contains the 
most recently printed documents ; the details in the Preface, pp. viii- 
xiv, are also very valuable. Pauli, Gesch. von Eng., Vol. III., was 
printed before these documents were published, and is therefore in- 
adequate between 1260-1263. For the best descriptions of the time, 
vide Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., pp. 81-93. Pauli, Simon v. Montfort, 
pp. 94-137. 2 Burt., p. 499. 



182 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

ter on the 15th of July, 1262 ; the second embraces 
the first campaign of the Barons' War, and extends 
to the Award of Amiens, 1 Jan. 23d, 1264; the third 
includes the battle of Lewes, and is terminated by the 
Mise of Lewes, 2 May 15th, 1264; the fourth is the period 
of Simon's independent rule, and is closed by the battle 
of Evesham, 3 Aug. 4th, 1265 ; the fifth and last includes 
the episode of the Disinherited, and is terminated by 
the final pacification and the end of the reign. The 
binding links throughout are continuous constitutional 
progress and the maintenance of political ideas. 

The first period is characterized by the comparatively 
successful management of foreign affairs 4 by the baro- 
nial government as the sworn champions of English 
nationality, by their failure in domestic rule owing to 
internal dissensions in the governing body, 5 by the joint 

i Sel. Chart., pp. 406-409. Rymer, I., pp. 433, 434. 

2 Rish., Chronicon, p. 37. Sel. Chart., pp. 334, 335. Wykes, p. 152. 
Vide Blaauw, p. 191. 

3 Rish., Chronicon, p. 47. Lanercost, p. 76. Wykes, pp. 171, 172. 

4 Peace with Wales, Rymer, I., p. 372. June 17, 1258. Cf. Mat. 
Par., V., p. 727. With Scotland, Rymer, I., pp. 376, 378. With 
France, on the basis of the surrender of Normandy, Rymer, I., pp. 
383, 384, 388-390. Letters to the pope, renouncing Sicily and de- 
nouncing iEthelmar, Rymer, I., p. 373. Theok., pp. 170-174. Burt., 
pp. 457-460. Mat. Par., V., pp. 716, 717 ; VI., pp. 400-409. Por the 
pope's evasive answer, Mat. Par., VI., pp. 410-416. Blaauw, p. 66, 
erroneously cites Rymer, I., p. 393, of the date 1200. 

5 Due partly to the cumbrousness of the form of government, diver- 
gence of general political views, and mutual jealousies. Gloucester 
led one wing of the baronial party, Leicester the other. The quarrel 
broke out in 1259, at the Spring parliament. Mat. Par., V., pp. 737, 
744. The immediate cause was probably the Ordinance of March 28, 
1259 (Rymer, I., p. 381), which secured to vassals rights corresponding 



part ii THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BARONS 183 

attempt of pope and king as " lord of the laws " 1 to 
restore the royal despotism, by frequent arbitrations 2 
between the king and the baronage which reached no 
definite results except to weaken the baronial party 
and to decentralize its aims, and finally, by the gradual 
transference of the centre of diplomacy — portentous 
change — from Rome to France. 3 

to those which the king had guaranteed their lords. Cf. Stubbs' Const. 
Hist., II., p. 82. Differences concerning the French treaty aggravated 
the quarrel. Cf. Mat. Par., V., p. 745. Wykes, p. 123. Also Ryrner, 
I., pp. 385, 386, 392. The result was that Simon remained much 
abroad (Mat. Par., V., pp. 732, 737, 744, 745. Mat. West., p. 367. 
Dunst., p. 217. Osney, p. 129. Rymer, I., p. 409), while Gloucester 
worked against him with the king. Mat. Par., V., p. 745. Dunst., 
p. 215 (1260). Dom. rex per falsos accusatores contra com. Simonem 
irse suae frsena relaxavit. Dunst., p. 217 (1261). Inter heec comes 
Glov. quasi apostatavit, recedens a consilio Simonis, etc. Cf. Shirley, 
II., p. 243. For popular ideas of the general discord, vide Wright's 
Pol. Songs, pp. 121-124. Rish., Chronicon, 18-20. This discord, so 
far as rooted in differences of political aims, was the chief cause of 
the barons' failure. E.g. Rish., Chronicon, 6. Donee inimico super- 
seminante zizania, etc. 

1 Rymer, I., p. 406. May 7, 1261. "Principes, legum dominos." 
Bull of Absolution to the Magnates of England. 

2 Arbitrations with the baronage concerning sheriffs, etc., Shirley, II., 
pp. 192-194, 196, 198. Cf. Pref., pp. xi., xii. Rymer, I., pp. 409, 415. 
Wykes, p. 130. Rish., Chronica, p. 8. Arbitration with Leicester and 
France, Shirley, IL, pp. 168-171, 173, 174, 242-245. Rymer, I., pp. 416, 
418, 422. It was shortly after the cessation of these latter negotia- 
tions, which Leicester broke off because "non videbatur . . . quod 
propter qusedam . . . ad honorem suum pacem facere posset his 
diebus" (Shirley, IL, p. 243. Feb. 16, 1263), that war broke out. 
Gloucester had died in the summer before. 

3 This change was caused largely by the pope's partisanship, — 
which rendered the arbitration of a legate unwelcome and impossible, 
— by Leicester's prolonged residence in France, by the French jour- 
neys of the king, by the introduction into England of mercenary 



184 THE BARONS' WAR chap, in 

The most significant tokens of general discontent and 
the need of a more comprehensive constitution than 
was established by either Magna Charta or the Provi- 
sions of Oxford were, first, the interposition, in October, 
1259, of the unrepresented " Community of the Knight- 
hood of England' in behalf of the execution of the 
Provisions of Oxford, the performance of baronial prom- 
ises which had been violated, and the proper observance 



troops by both parties — Rymer, I., pp. 396, 409; Dunst., p. 214; 
Shirley, II., pp. 193, 194 — and especially by that clause in the French 
treaty which enabled the king to purchase mercenaries by means of 
Louis' payment of money in lieu of five hundred knights to serve Henry 
for two years — e li Rois d'Angleterre ne doit ces deniers despendre, 
forsque el servise Deu, ou de l'eglise, ou au profit del roialme d'Angle- 
terre, etc. Rymer, I., pp. 376, 388, 389. October, 1259. The last 
receipt for this money, significantly enough, is dated May 14, 1264, from 
the battlefield of Lewes. Rymer, L, p. 440. This change of the diplo- 
matic centre is evidenced (a) by frequent references to France as ar- 
bitrator in baronial and royal negotiations : (1263) Rish., Chronicon, 
pp. 14, 15. Ant. Leg., p. 57. Dunst., p. 225. (1264) Award of 
Amiens; Negotiations at Brackley ; Mar. 13, 1264. Rymer, I., pp. 
436, 437. Mise of Lewes and negotiations in pursuance thereof. Rish., 
Chronicon, p. 37. Ant. Leg. , p. 63. Shirley, II. , pp. 258, 259, 261-264, 
274,276. Rymer, I., pp. 446, 455. Also by the fact that Louis' assent 
to the Mise of Lewes was demanded. Shirley, II., pp. 257, 258. (b) By 
the fears of indefinite evils which might flow from the king's journeys 
to France. Rymer, I., pp. 429, 432. Theok., p. 180. Mat. West., p. 
378. Rish., Chronica, p. 10. Dunst., p. 218 (1262). Causam itineris 
fere omnibus cismarinis ignorantibus, et mala hide futura multum 
pavescentibus. (c) By the private negotiations already mentioned 
between the king and Simon, (d) By the stay of the queen in France 
and the danger of alien invasions, (e) By the fact that it was from 
France, in 1260, that the king committed his first definite breach of 
the Oxford Provisions, ordering (1) no parliament to be held till his 
return, Shirley, II., p. 150 ; (2) resuming the Sicilian affair, Shirley, 
II., pp. 147, 148. 



part ii THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BARONS 185 

of the laws ; and second, the writ issued jointly by 
Leicester, Gloucester, and the bishop of Worcester, 
summoning three knights of each shire to come to 
St. Albans, secum traetaturi super communibus nego- 
tiis regni, and the counter-summons 1 of the king. The 
most important single events of this period — the death 
of Gloucester excepted — were undoubtedly the acqui- 
sition and production of the papal bulls 2 which ab- 

1 Burt., p. 471. " Communitas bachelerise Anglise." The sum- 
mons to the knights included only those " citra Trentam." Sel. Chart., 
pp. 405, 406. Shirley, II., p. 179. Summons was for Sept. 21, 1261. 

2 After the Provisions of Oxford had been enacted, the pope first 
showed his readiness to lend assistance by assigning the empire to 
Richard of Cornwall (Burt., pp. 469, 470. April 30, 1259. Rymer, I., 
p. 382), by not annulling the Sicilian compact, and by his interposition 
in favour of iEthelmar of Winchester. Mat. Par., VI., p. 415. Shirley, 
II., p. 138. Mat. West., p. 377. In flat defiance of the request of the 
baronial government, iEthelmar was consecrated in May, 1260, but 
died while on his way to England. Wykes, p. 124. AVav., p. 352. 
Winton., p. 98. Ant. Leg., p. 49. Dunst., p. 216. Osney, p. 125. 
Theok., p. 169. Mat. West., pp. 368,369. Henry gladly accepted the 
papal overtures, and the result was the first bull of dispensation, Alex- 
ander's, April 13, 1261. Rymer, I., p. 405. Produced at Winchester, 
June 12, 1261. Wykes, p. 128. The second bull, Urban's confirma- 
tion, was dated Feb. 25, 1262. Rymer, I., p. 416. It was produced 
at London, April 23, 1262 (Wykes, p. 130), and published throughout 
England, May 2, 1262. Rymer, I., p. 419. Ant. Leg., p. 50. For 
preliminary negotiations, which were difficult, vide Rymer, I., pp. 410, 
414. Shirley, II. (September, 1261), pp. 188-192, 207-209. Cf. Shir- 
ley, II., pp. 104-106. This letter is misplaced by Shirley, under the year 
1254. The pope could not be quoted as saying the following words 
until Normandy had been definitely relinquished by treaty : ' ' Indig- 
nanter qusesivit (papa) quare nunc habuistis (sc. Rex Henricus) sigil- 
lum majoris magnitudinis quam tempore quo fuistis dux Normannice, 
et hoc in opprobrium. Also vide the address, from which "dux Nor- 
manniae " is scrupulously omitted. The letter belongs, on its face, to 
1261-1262. 



186 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

solved Henry and the magnates from their oaths to the 
Provisions, and forbade their observance. The produc- 
tion of the first bull paved the king's way for active 
measures ; the remainder of the year 1261 and the early 
part of 1262 witnessed the presence in England of rival 
justiciars and chancellors, 1 and of a double set of sher- 
iffs 2 and aspirants for the custody of royal castles. 3 
Both parties had already brought in mercenaries. 4 The 
two sets of officials clashed, and it seemed that nothing 
short of a miracle could prevent the clashing of swords 
as well. But Alexander died, Gloucester deserted his 
party, 5 Leicester was still entangled in the private 
French negotiations, and the storm blew over. The 
production of the second bull brought about a com- 
promise of which Simon disapproved, and which conse- 
quently led him to prolong his stay in France. 6 The 
true significance of the production of the papal bulls is 
therefore this: it revealed the fixed determination of 
the king to annul the Provisions of Oxford by fair 
means or foul, defined the position of the pope with 
respect to English liberty almost as clearly as in the 
corresponding case of Magna Charta, and practically 
presented to the national party the ultimatum, yield or 



*Ant. Leg., p. 49. Mat. West., pp. 380-381. Rish., Chronica, 
p. 10. Wykes, p. 129. Dunst., p. 217. 

2 Rymer, I., p. 409. Mat. West., pp. 380, 381. Shirley, II., pp. 
192, 193. 

3 Rymer, I., pp. 408, 409. Cf. Shirley, II., Pref., p. xi, n. 2. 
Wykes, pp. 125, 127. Mat. West., p. 379. 

4 Rymer, I., pp. 396, 409. Shirley, II., pp. 193, 194. Dunst., p. 214. 

5 Dunst., p. 217. 6 Wykes, p. 131. 



part ii THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BARONS 187 

fight. The answer at first was postponed, but the death 
of Gloucester, by placing Simon at the head of an undi- 
vided party, speedily decided the question in favour of 
the latter alternative. 

The second subdivision of the reign forms the com- 
mencement of the Barons' War proper; its immediate 
causes were the refusal of the young earl of Gloucester 1 
to do homage to Edward as commanded by the king, 2 
and the refusal of the king to reconfirm and observe 
the Provisions of Oxford as demanded by Simon on 
behalf of the barons. 3 The more remote causes, as al- 
ready stated, were practically the same as the causes 
of the Mad Parliament of Oxford. The same ideas 
were still cherished by both parties, and in many re- 
spects even the external history of the years antecedent 
to 1258 had been repeated between 1261 and 1263. 
This is especially true of the discords in the baronial 
ranks which had enabled the king to play off one party 
against the other, the resumption by the king of the 
old alliance with the pope, the renewal of the Sicilian 
negotiations, 4 and the unrest of the Welsh border. 5 

1 Dunst., p. 220. He joined Leicester's party, according to Wykes, 
p. 140, instigante matre sua, blanditiis allectum. 

2 Rymer, L, pp. 425, 427. Ant. Leg., p. 53. Dunst., p. 220. 

3 Dunst., pp. 221, 222. 

4 Rymer, I., p. 405. March, 1261. 

5 July 16, 1259, ratification of the truce with Wales for one year, 
Rymer, I., p. 387. Concerning reparation for breach of truce, and 
safe conduct for Welsh envoys, Feb. 25, 1260, Rymer, I., p. 394. 
Summons to military service against Llewellyn, Aug. 1, 1260, Rymer, 
I., p. 398. Other measures of the year 1260, Rymer, I., pp. 399, 400. 
Shirley, II., pp. 156, 157. March 12, 1261, prolongation of truce, 



188 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

The military operations of this campaign are impor- 
tant not so much from their magnitude, the success 
achieved by the barons, and the fresh revelation of 
Simon's oft-praised military skill, 1 as for the manifest 
determination of the great body of the English people 
to preserve their ancient and just liberties or to die in 
their defence. The national character of the war is 
shown most clearly by the treatment 2 accorded to the 

Rymer, I., p. 404. 1262, negotiations for a peace, January 8th, 
Rymer, I., p. 414 ; June 8th, Rymer, I., p. 420 ; August 24th and 25th, 
Shirley, II., pp. 214-217. Rymer, I., p. 421. Complaints of Llew- 
ellyn, as dated by Shirley, II., September 26th or 27th, pp. 218, 219. 
Great outbreak of autumn of 1262, in which the Welsh penetrate to 
Bergavenny, and which preludes the barons' campaign of 1263, Shir- 
ley, II., pp. 219-221. This is the letter which Pauli, III., p. 705, and 
Rymer, I., p. 339, assign erroneously to 1256. The mention of Basset 
as justiciar is decisive. Cf. Wykes, 129. Memorandum, quod in 
Pascha predicta (1261) Dom. Rex, dum fuit apud Wintoniam fecit 
Cap. Justitiarium de Phil. Basset, etc. For progress of the war, vide 
Shirley, II., pp. 227-233. Rymer, I., pp. 423, 425, 430, 433. 

iMailros, pp. 193, 216. Rish., Chronicon, pp. 12, 25, 31, 6: 
Armorum usu et rei militaris experientia omnibus in suo tempore 
anteponendus. 

2 Mat. West., p. 383. Rish., Chronicon, pp. 10-12. Rish., Chron- 
ica, p. 17. Trivet, pp. 250, 251. Robert of Gloucester, pp. 535-538. 
Ant. Leg., p. 53. Et semper vexillum Dom. regis coram se detulerunt 
(barones). Dunst., p. 222. Qui (barones) primo aggressi sunt Pe- 
trum episc. Herefordise, et ipsum ceperunt, et omnia ejus bona diri- 
puerunt ; idem facientes de maneriis Galfridi de Langele et ejus 
bonis ; nulli ommino malum vel damnum inferentes, nisi alienigenis ; 
et ipsis quia contra statuta Oxonice consilium vel auxilium impende- 
runt, vel summoniti ad ipsos venire noluerunt ; quos omnes juramenti 
sui transgressores reputabant et felones vocabant ; et omnia bona 
istorum, ubicunque inventa, deprredati sunt, insuper terras et eccle- 
sias alienigenarum, quas feofando et instituendo dederunt. Sed hoc 
erat contra jura, nee stare potuit. The words in italics are a striking 
instance of the connection between the national and the constitutional 



part ii THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BARONS 189 

foreign contemners of the Provisions of Oxford, which 
to a remarkable degree resembles that of the Twenge 
riots of thirty-two years before, by the use of the Eng- 
lish language as a shibboleth 1 for discovering the ene- 
mies of the realm, by the determination at all hazards 
to obtain the control of the castles and to place the 
administration of the state in the hands of men of Eng- 
lish birth, instincts, and training. The most significant 
single manifestation of the strength of the desire for 
national self-government was the offer submitted to the 
king at London to accept arbitration upon every point 
at issue, including the complete reconstruction, if nec- 
essary, of the Oxford decrees, yet insisting 2 that the 
administration of the realm be entrusted to native 
Englishmen. There were no Guelfs or Ghibellines in 
England to maintain a title blindly for years after its 
effective meaning had been completely lost ; the Provi- 
sions of Oxford were no fetish; national freedom was 
the one longing of the people. 



movement. Cf. Wykes, pp. 134, 135. It must be remembered that 
Leicester's party was held responsible by the royalists for the conduct 
of such free lances as Robert Ferrers, earl of Derby, — iste verbotenus 
quin pocius fraudulenter consuli (Simoni) adherens . . . undique 
deprsedando nomine baronum infinita mala perpetravit, parta regis 
destruxit etiam post pacem clamatam, — and was later imprisoned for 
treachery. Rish., Chronicon, pp. 20, 21. 

1 Mat. West., p. 383. Tunc erat triste emulis alienigenis videre 
confusionem eorum. Nam quicumque Anglicum idioma loqui nesciret 
vilipenderetur a vulgo et despectui habere tur. 

2 Ant. Leg., p. 51. Item petunt quod regnum de cetero per indi- 
genas fideles et utiles sub Dom. Rege gubernetur et non per alios, 
sicut fit communiter in omnibus aliis mundi regnis. 



190 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

The two most important political acts of the period 
were the final acceptance of Louis as an arbitrator, and 
the formal adhesion 1 of the Londoners for peace or for 
war, for good or for ill, to the party of Simon de Mont- 
fort. The most unmistakable sign of the drift of the 
times was the growing power of the city communes, 2 
especially in London. The day of the popular constitu- 
tion was now not far distant. 

The third period opens with Louis' formal Award at 
Amiens ; 3 this annulled the Provisions of Oxford in 
toto together with the whole body of dependent legisla- 
tion, stated definitely that the king was free to appoint 
all officers of state and to install aliens in any position 
whatever in which he saw fit to employ them, and 
emphasized the authority of the pope by assigning 
his earlier cassation of the Provisions as a chief 

1 Ant. Leg., pp. 53, 54. About the 24th of June the barons sent 
the following message to London under Simon's seal : An vellent 
observare dictas ordinationes et statuta, facta ad honorem Dei, etc., 
an potius adherere illis qui voluerunt illas infringere. A favourable 
answer was given later, et ita Barones et Cives sunt confederati, 
dicentes salva fide Dom. Regis — an empty reservation. League was 
renewed in 1264 in writing. Ant. Leg., p. 62. The importance of 
London to the barons is well expressed by the chronicler of Mailros, 
p. 195. Sine tante civitatis eximio et permaximo auxilio, expulsionem 
alienorum nullatenus facere potuissent, etc. 

2 Ant. Leg., pp. 55, 61. Winton., p. 101. Communitas Londoniss, 
ut dicitur, mira fecit et laude digna. Wykes, p. 138. Ex hac igitur 
protervia per universum regnum Angliae consuetudo detestabilis ino- 
levit, quod in omnibus psene civitatibus et burgis fieret conjuratio 
ribaldorum qui se bachilarios publice proclamabant. 

3 Ant. Leg., pp. 59-61. Rymer, I., pp. 433, 434. Sel. Chart., 
pp. 406-409. Shirley, II., pp. 251, 252. Confirmed by Urban, 
March 16, 1264. Rymer, I., pp. 436-438. 



part ii THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BARONS 191 

reason 1 for their rejection by himself. The views of the 
three autocrats would naturally be similar. All rancour, 
continued the document, was to be laid aside by both 
parties, and the Award was not to be so interpreted as 
"to prejudice the royal privileges, charters, statutes, 
and the laudable customs of the kingdom as they ex- 
isted before the Oxford Statutes." The Award went 
much further than was originally intended 2 by at least 
one of the contracting parties ; therefore while it seemed 
to guarantee the king's final success, it aroused such a 
storm of discontent that its only important actual effect 
was to unite all the elements of the opposition more 
firmly, and to draw party lines more tightly than ever, 
through the opportunity which it gave to dissidents of 
withdrawing from the baronial party once for all. 3 It is 
fruitless here to discuss the question whether Simon's 
subsequent action in refusing to observe the Award 
was technically justified or not. 4 That instrument for- 
mally recognized the Magna Charta — the basis, as the 

1 Maxime cum appareat summum pontificem eas (provisiones) per 
litteras suas cassas et irritas nunciasse. 

2 Dunst., p. 227. (Rex Francise) proprii honoris immemor, et se 
ultra potestatem sibi concessam extendens. Cf. even the royalist 
Wykes, p. 139. Forte minus sapienter et utiliter quam deceret eruc- 
tatione siquidem improvisa suum prsecipitavit arbitrium. The barons 
evidently had not purposed to submit the question of alien castle- 
guards and councillors to Louis of France. 

3Cf. Rish., Chronicon, pp. 17, 18. Ab hoc tempore factus est 
novissimus (error) pejor priore. . . . Et (Simon) dixit secretioribus 
suis, " In multis terris et provinciis diversarum nationum, tarn paga- 
norum quam christianorum, extiti : sed in nullis gentibus tantam infi- 
delitatem et deceptionem reppero, quantam in Anglia jam expertus 
sum." 4 Vide Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., p. 92. 



192 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

national party firmly believed, of the Provisions of 
Oxford ; 1 the Award was self-contradictory 2 and there- 
fore could not be executed to the letter; and at the 
most it simply caused a recurrence to the state of affairs 
as it existed on the 10th of June, 1258. If Proteus 
then needed to be bound, the same necessity still 
existed, for his nature was unchanged. To all intents 
and purposes the domestic situation was also the same 
as at the earlier date. Sicily, indeed, was lost 3 to the 
king forever, but the vicious alliance with the papacy 
was more closely knit than ever and was still more 
directly opposed to the expressed wishes of the nation, 
while the augmented rage of the people against royal 
misgovernment in general fully compensated for the 
friction formerly engendered by the pope's Sicilian 
demands. The young earl of Gloucester, the city of 
London, and the Cinq Ports had never submitted to the 
arbitration and were joined by nearly all the city-com- 
munes in England in rejecting it. 4 After Henry had 
refused the offer of the national party to accept Louis' 
dictum as it stood, with the single exception of the 
clause which sanctioned the employment of aliens in 



1 Rish., Chronicon, p. 17. Rish., Chronica, p. 12. Wigorn., p. 448. 

2 Wigorn., p. 418. Dicti barones audientes contrarietatem dicti 
dom. regis . . . dictis suis renunciarunt de piano. 

3 Rymer, I., pp. 428, 429, July 28, 1263. Cf. Raynaldus, 1262, 
XX. Mansi, T. III., XXII., p. 89. 

4 Ant. Leg., p. 61. Gloucester's name does not appear in the lists 
of those who subscribed to the arbitration. These lists show clearly 
the position and adherents of the parties. Shirley, II., p. 252. Rymer, 
I., pp. 433, 434. Sel. Chart., pp. 406, 407. 



part ii THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BARONS 193 

the service of the state, 1 the renewal of war was inevi- 
table, and the march of events went steadily on until 
Henry's power lay shattered on the bloody field of 
Lewes. 

The fourth subdivision is the grand creative era; it 
was a time of great commotion. All the energies of 
the skilful politician, warrior, and statesman were 
tasked to defend himself against attacks from abroad, 
open enemies at home, and secret traitors. The turn- 
ing-point of the struggle was the escape 2 of Edward 
at the Feast of Pentecost from his quasi-confinement at 
Hereford, and his immediate alliance with the treach- 
erous Gloucester and the Marchers. 3 The end of the 
great drama was at hand. The capture of the army of 
the younger Simon at the castle of Kenilworth was but 
the prelude to the fatal day of Evesham. 

Leicester's rule had lasted only fifteen short months. 
The Charters 4 and the Provisions of Oxford 5 were of 
course confirmed. The reformation of the state of the 



1 Pauli, Simon v. Montfort, p. 133, n. 1. Copie einer Aufzeichnung 
des Stadtschreibers von London in MS. Mus. Brit., Add. 5444, fol. 6G, 
b. quod saltern unicum et solum remittat articulum, viz. quod alieni- 
genis ab Anglia remotis per indigenas gubernetur, et omnibus statutis 
provisionibus et ordinationibus regis Francise aquiescat. Vide also 
Blaauw, p. 105, n. 1. Henry was then at Oxford and the barons were 
at Brackley. 

2 Rymer, I., p. 455. Wav., p. 362. Rish., Chronicon, p. 43. Lan., 
p. 79. Wykes, p. 163. Mail., p. 198. Dunst., p. 239. Rish., 
Chronica, pp. 33, 34. Nangis, I., p. 228. 

3 Wykes, pp. 164, 165. 

4 Rymer, I., p. 453. Sel. Chart., pp. 416-418. 

5 Rymer, I., p. 453. Wav., pp. 358-361. Ant. Leg., p. 71. Osney, 
pp. 158, 159. 



194 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

church was entrusted to three elected bishops ; their 
decisions were final, and the secular power was to exe- 
cute their behests, 1 if summoned to do so. The excel- 
lent understanding which existed between the patriotic 
heads of the church and the practical head of the state 
was further cemented by the association of the bishop 
of Chichester with Gloucester and Leicester in the chief 
executive council, 2 by a decree which made sacrilege a 
capital offence, 3 and by the grant of a tenth to protect 
the state from invasion. 4 In strict accordance with the 
national programme of 1231 and 1263, it was enacted 
that the revenues of non-resident incumbents and of 
benefice-holders who had opposed the welfare of the 
land should be confiscated to the uses of the state. 5 
Henceforth, too, the dignitaries as well as the rank and 
file of the clergy were to obtain their incomes not as a 
reward for existence but for services rendered. Arch- 
bishop Boniface himself was warned that if he re- 

1 The bishops were empowered " a purver les choses ke hesoignables 
sont e profitables a plein reformement del estat de saint eglise, a honur 
Deu, a la foi nostre seinur le Roi, e au profit du reaume. Rymer, I., 
pp. 443, 444. 

2 Rymer, I., pp. 443, 444. 

3 Rish., Chronica, p. 29. Sed et licet Comes prcecepta dedisset, sub 
pcena decapitationis, ne quis ad sanctam ecclesiam vel ccemeterium 
deprsedaturus intrare preesumeret, nee religiosis viris, vel eorum 
famulis, manus violentas inferret, nihil hac industria fere profecit. 

4 Rymer, L, p. 445. Rish., Chronicon, p. 36. Ant. Leg., p. 69. 
Dunst., p. 223. Cf. Wykes, p. 155. 

5 Rymer, I., p. 444. Purveu est ke les bens des benefices de seinte 
eglise des aliens, e des autres ke ont est contre la terre, soient coilli e 
sauvement garde par les mains des prelaz, descques atant ke soit pur- 
veu par comun conseil ke leu devera faire. 



part ii THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BARONS 195 

mained longer out of England and neglected to provide 
for the administration of his see, the government would 
take care that the emoluments thereof should not be 
spent abroad. 1 Such are the principal acts of Simon 
de Montfort, which most clearly justify his headship of 
the national-ecclesiastical party, foreshadow his church- 
policy, and together with his earlier career and tragic 
death for the liberties of England caused him to be 
styled the Second Martyr of Canterbury. 2 

Owing to the brief duration of his rule, much that 
Simon would have done he could not; the ultimate 
tendency of his policy must therefore be rather con- 
jectured than known. It seems certain, however, that 
the author of the Mise of Lewes 3 and of the con- 
stitution 4 of 1264-1265 would have ruled England as 

1 Rymer, I., p. 444. June 25, 1264. Nee enira si secus egeritis, 
proventus archiepiscopales ad vos extra regnum de cetero deferri sus- 
tinebimus, set sicut onera recusatis ita et emolumenta vobis extra 
regnum agentibus, subtrahere curabimus in future 

2 Wright, Pol. Songs, pp. 125-127. Mailros, pp. 211, 212. Non 
minus occubuit Simon pro justa ratione legitimarmn possessionum 
Anglie, quam Thomas pro legitima ratione ecclesiarum Anglie olim 
occubuerat. The same chronicler devotes six pages, pp. 205-211, of 
his work to drawing an elaborate parallel between Simon Peter, the 
Pock of the Church, and Simon de Montfort, the Rock of the Church 
in the State. 

3 Rish., Chronicon, p. 37. Sel. Chart., p. 335, Mise of Lewes. Ter- 
tium : quod isti arbitri jurabunt quod eligant consiliarios indigenas 
tantum, quos ipsi regi et regno noverunt utiliores. Quartum : quod 
rex credat consiliariis suis sine personarum acceptione, in justitia ex- 
hibenda et in ministris officialibus vel ballivis suis de Anglicis tantum- 
modo et indigenis creandis, constituendis. Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., 
p. 93, points out the intermediary position of the Mise of Lewes be- 
tween the constitutions of 1258 and 1264-1265. 

4 Rymer, I., p. 443. Sel. Chart., p. 414. Extract from the De 



196 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

a nation and with the aid of Englishmen. Of schemes 
of foreign conquest not a single trace exists. If one 
may be permitted to trust the analogy of a more modern 
time, Simon's apparent adoption of the first protective 
tariff 1 would have ushered in an era whose appropriate 
motto must have been "England for Englishmen." 

The spirit of the great earl was chivalrous and noble ; 
his statesmanship was of the highest order; but his 
patriotism or his ambition, or both, had placed him in 
an impossible position. Assuredly he was not of those 
who " fain would climb but that they fear to fall," and 
whither his towering ambition would have led him, no 
one can definitely say. From another standpoint, too, 
the permanence of his work was endangered. His 
impetuosity might easily have caused him, as it has 
so many others, to adopt political short cuts, and to 

Ordinatione pro pace regni. Item ordinatum est quod predicti tres 
electores et consiliarii . . . et castrorum custodes et ceteri ballivi 
dom. regis, semper shit indigent. Ordained at London, in parlia- 
ment, June, 1264. For the summons to the parliament of Jan. 20, 
1265, vide Rymer, I., p. 449. Sel. Chart., p. 415. 

s 1 Wykes, p. 158. Walt. Hem., p. 306, includes the following among 
the Provisions of Oxford, but it possibly refers to this later occurrence. 
Statuerunt insuper quod lanse terrae operarentur in Anglia nee alieni- 
genis venderentur, et quod omnes uterentur pannis laneis infra limites 
terrse operatis, etc. The whole movement, however, seems not to 
have been original with de Montfort, but rather a reprisal for the 
legate's order : Omnes insuper, qui eis, in prsedicta rebellione manen- 
tibus, arma, equos, bladum, vinum vel alia victualia ferrent in An- 
gliam, vel ferri facerent ; . . . pari excommunicationis sententia inno- 
davimus. Rymer, I., p. 447. Oct. 20, 1264. At the birth of the 
House of Commons, England set a precedent which America was 
glad to follow in the days of patriotic enthusiasm just before the 
Revolution. 



part ii THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BARONS 197 

impose upon the nation a constitution which was the 
result not of internal growth but of external will. The 
beneficence of the will would have made but little dif- 
ference in the ultimate result. As it was, however, 
he lived just long enough to interpret the spirit of 
the nation and to justify its hopes, to set the broad 
seal to his own political greatness, and to educate a 
successor even greater than himself. 1 Grosseteste, Si- 
mon, and Edward are the links of the golden chain 
which bound England to national unity and complete- 
ness. 

The jealousy and selfishness of the earl of Gloucester, 
rightly or wrongly based, had been the immediate cause 
of Leicester's death. 2 In the last subdivision of the 
reign, however, he somewhat retrieved his reputation. 3 

1 Cf. Freeman, Hist, of the Norm. Conq., V., pp. 728, 729. Stubbs' 
Const. Hist., II., pp. 103, 104. 

2 For their quarrel, vide Rish., Chronicon, pp. 41, 42. Eish., 
Chronica, pp. 31, 32. Ant. Leg., p. 73. Osney, p. 162. Rymer, I., 
pp. 450, 455, 456. Dunst., p. 238. Trivet, p. 263. Walt. Hem., 
pp. 319, 320. Wykes, pp. 153, 160, 161. Wav., p. 358. Rob. 
Glouc., pp. 550, 551. Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., p. 98. Pauli, III., pp. 
785, 786. Pauli, Sim. v. Mont., pp. 172, 173. Blaauw, pp. 224-232. 

3 (a) He restrained the king from his fury against the Disinherited. 
Rish., Chronicon, p. 59. Dunst., p. 245. (6) He favoured the 
Dictum of Kenilworth, and was one of the committee who drew it 
up. Sel. Chart., p. 419. Stat, of Realm, I., p. 12. Rish., Chroni- 
con, p. 59. (c) He opposed the Marchers, the most radical of the" 
royalists. Rish., Chronicon, pp. 59, 60. Rish., Chronica, pp. 45, 46. 
Dunst., p. 245. (d) He refused to march against Ely, revolted, and 
entered London, because he desired the removal of aliens and the 
reinstatement of the Disinherited. Rish., Chronicon, p. 60. Osney, 
pp. 199, 200. Dunst., p. 245. Trivet, p. 271. Cf. Rish., Chronica, 
p. 57. Ant. Leg., pp. 90-93. Wykes, pp. 198, 199. Winton., p. 105. 



198 THE B AEONS' WAR chap, hi 

The intolerant madness 1 of the parliament of Win- 
chester had disinherited the adherents of the earl of 
Leicester, and parted their lands and goods among 
the royalists ; in Kenil worth, Axyholm, and Ely — 
that chosen home of English liberties, where Here- 
ward fought the last battles of the Saxon and from 
whose neighbourhood at a later day came the most 
determined opponents of that monarch who sought to 
overthrow the system whose foundation Simon had 
just laid — rebellion still existed. It was hopeless from 
the start, for it possessed no unity of plan or action ; 2 
although the cry for the Provisions of Oxford still 
was stoutly raised, 3 the great desire of the insurgents 
was to win back their ancient patrimonies. They made 
a gallant fight, maintaining their position until men's 
minds had time to cool, and until a reaction against 
royal tyranny, the greed of the court, and the unheed- 
ing prodigality of the king, had once more set in. In 
a certain sense Earl Simon was still at their head : the 

(e) His original compact with Edward at Ludlow, in 1264. Wykes, 
pp. 164, 165. (/) Final treaty with the king, June 16, 1267. Rymer, 
I., p. 472. 

1 Vide the royalist Wykes, p. 183. Post inopinatam Eveshamise 
triumphalem victoriam, rex et sui complices non sicut decuerat cau- 
tiores effecti, sed potius stultiores, etc. P. 219 (1268) : Eodem anno 
rex sano fretus consilio promisit et statuit, quod exhseredati, quorum 
terras diversis personis minus consulte contulerat, etc. The actions 
speak for themselves. The date of the parliament was Sept. 8, 1265. 
Rymer, I., p. 462. Rish., Chronica, pp. 37, 38. Rish., Chronicon, 
pp. 48, 49. Osney, pp. 173, 178, 179. Ant. Leg., p. 76. Wykes, 
p. 176. Trivet, p. 267. Cf. Uunst., p. 239. Wav., p. 366. 

2 Cf. Osney, pp. 185, 186. Peterb., p. 18. 

3 Rish., Chronicon, pp. 60, 63, 64. 



part ii THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BARONS 199 

first sign of the coming reaction had been the popular 
canonization of the national hero, 1 and as the struggle 
approached its end, a special article in the Dictum of 
Kenilworth provided that henceforth no man should 
hail Leicester as a saint or mention his pretended mira- 
cles. 2 Harsh as the terms of this celebrated Dictum 
were, yet they were far milder than those of Winches- 
ter : the chief difficulty lay in the fact that they were 
not observed. What the strong hand of the Marchers 
had won, the Marchers sought to keep. At the critical 
moment the earl of Gloucester interposed. First he 
demanded that the covenant which Edward had made 
with him at Ludlow 3 should be kept ; then, raising an 
army, he hastened to London. The city at first re- 
ceived him cautiously enough, 4 but later, exasperated 

1 A collection of Simon's alleged miracles is published in Halliwell's 
edition of Rish., Chronicon, under the title " Miracula Simonis de 
Montfort," pp. 67-110. For their immediate effect, vide Mail., p. 201. 
Rish., Chronicon, p. 49. Infra breve tempus suae mortis, crebris cepit 
ostendere miraculis. Quid ergo ? suspiria mutantur in laudis prse- 
conia, et revixit pristinse Isetitise magnitudo. In this movement the 
Minorites played an interesting part. Mail., p. 212. Post occubitum 
vero Simonis in mortem pretiosam, fratres Minores, quos ipse dilexerat 
religioso more, qui et ipsi conscii fuerunt conscientie ejus in plurimis, 
materiam loquendi sumentes de vita ejus, ex optimis gestis ejus vene- 
randam de illo ediderunt hystoriam, sc. lectiones, responsoria, versus, 
hymnum et alia que pertinent ad decus unius martirie et honorem. 

2 Sel. Chart., pp. 420, 421. Stat. Realm, I., p. 13. 

3 Wykes, pp. 164, 165. (1) To preserve the ancient laws, good and 
approved. (2) To abolish evil customs. (3) To urge the king to 
remove aliens from the realm and council. (4) Not to allow aliens 
to be castle-guards or administrators. (5) Et quod res indigenarum 
sibi fidelium consilio regeretur. 

* Ant. Leg., p. 90. 



200 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

by the heavy penalties 1 which the king, incapable alike 
of learning by experience and of self-restraint, had 
inflicted upon them, de Montfort's following gave him 
their unqualified support. 2 Many of the Ely rebels 
speedily joined him, 3 and the royal army dared not 
storm the city. For the last time in the Barons' War, 
Richard of Germany appeared in his oft-repeated role 
of mediator, and this time with success. 4 Gloucester's 
rising had ensured the relief of the Disinherited ; their 
protracted resistance had given a second object-lesson 
to the wielders of the royal power, had secured for 
themselves through the Dictum of Kenilworth the 
ultimate enjoyment of their ancestral estates, and had 
stopped the king and the radical party in their head- 
long career of spoliation. Their revolt had therefore 
tended to the formation of a more lasting and benefi- 
cent peace. 

All parties, in truth, were heartily weary of the war, 

1 For Henry's injudicious treatment of London in suspending the 
city charter, imprisoning citizens in violation of his safe conduct, con- 
fiscating their goods, and levying a heavy fine (20,000 marks) for the 
repurchase of peace, vide Nangis, I., p. 229. Rish., Chronica, p. 38. 
Fabyan, pp. 360-364. Winton., p. 103. Ant. Leg., pp. 77-80. Trivet, 
p. 267. Rob. Glouc, p. 561. Wav, p. 366, 367. Shirley, II., pp. 293, 
294. Rymer, I., p. 464. Wykes, pp. 177, 178, 184, 176. Ibique 
( Wyndeshoriam) venientes cives Londoniarum sub specie treviaruni, 
majores eorum minus honeste quam regiam decebat dignitatem de 
proceruin suorum concilio captivavit et captivatos carcerali custodise 
mancipavit, etc. 

2 Ant. Leg., p. 91. Minutus populus. 

8 Wykes, p. 199. Winton., p. 105. Dunst., p. 245. Ant. Leg., p. 90. 
4 Rymer, I., p. 472. Rish., Chronica, p. 57. Osney, p. 205. Ant. 
Leg., p. 92. Dunst., p. 246. Wykes, p. 205. Trivet, p. 272. 



part ii THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BARONS 201 

when on the 18th of November, 1267, the Statute of 
Marlborough 1 brought it to a close. Ely had already 
surrendered to Prince Edward, peace had been made 
with Llewellyn, the barons' stanch ally, 2 the fields had 
yielded up abundant harvests, 3 and kindly legislation 
was the one thing needed to heal the wounds of war. 
Never, therefore, was legal enactment more timely than 
this notable Statute of Marlborough. " It was Pro- 
vided " — so runs the preamble 4 — " and established 
and ordained (that) (whereas the Realm of England 
having been of late depressed by manifold Troubles and 
the evils of Dissensions, standeth in need of a Reform 
of the Laws and Usages, whereby the Peace and Tran- 
quillity of the People may be preserved, whereto it 
behoved the King and his liege men to apply an whole- 
some Remedy) the Provisions, Ordinances, and Statutes 
underwritten should be firmly and inviolably observed 
by all the Peojole of the same Realm, as well high as 
low, forever." No less admirable than the promise of 
its preamble was the statute's general spirit. The de- 
sire to make the penalty correspond to the offence 
was throughout predominant, and the incorporation of 
the reforms 6 established by the baronial government 
of 1259 at the instance of the knights was a pledge of 

1 Mentioned by Trivet, p. 274. Cont. Mat. Par., p. 1006. Stat, of 
Realm, I., pp. 19-25. 

2 Sept. 29, 1267. Rymer, I., pp. 473, 474. 

3 Wykes, p. 211. 

4 Stat, of Realm, I., p. 19, n. 1. 

5 Provisions of Westminster. Burt., p. 480 et seq. Sel. Chart., 
pp. 401-405. Stat, of Realm, I., pp. 8-11. 



202 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

lasting amity. The great Charters of Liberty were 
solemnly confirmed, 1 and the presence of the legate 
guaranteed immunity from Rome. 

The following year the clergy granted a tenth for the 
relief of the Disinherited, 2 and at the January parlia- 
ment of London in 1271, their lands were finally re- 
stored. 3 By an ordinance of the 12th of February, 
1270, a permanent reform of the treasury, that earlier 
seat of unlimited prodigality and wrong, had already 
been effected. 4 More than all, the course of nature had 
been busily at work, and the aliens around whom the 
abuses of the reign had centred had dropped off one by 
one. Henry, too, was growing old, and his energies 
for good and ill were slackening. Through the ad- 
ministration of the state by a prince whose aims and 
sympathies were deeply national, and whose councillors 
were to be selected from that younger generation whose 
hearts were once as wax 5 in the moulding hands of 
Simon de Montfort, England was passing to happier 
days, — days of national unity and constitutional com- 
pleteness. 

1 Art. V. " The Great Charter shall be observed in all his articles, 
as well in such as pertain to the king, as to other. ..." 

2 Wykes, pp. 219, 220. Peterb., p. 19. " Quadragesima." 

3 Sel. Chart., p. 337. Winton., p. 110. Per comrnunem assensum 
dom. Pvicardi, regis Alemannire, Gilberti com. Glovernige, Philippi 
Basset et aliorum. 

4 Rymer, I., p. 483. Ordinationes super statu scaccarii Regis. 

5 Wykes, pp. 133, 134. Cum junioribus Anglian pueris . . . quos 
vere et autonomatice pueros nominare possumus, qui tanquam cera 
liquescens ductiles ad quamlibet lormarn, etc. 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 203 



PART III 

Parties and Principles 

Through the infinite variety of external events which 
makes the political history of the reign of Henry III. 
so difficult of comprehension, the influence of two 
parties — royalist and national — can always he dis- 
cerned with more or less clearness. The personnel of 
the parties changes from time to time, and the politi- 
cal devices which are employed to curb the royal 
power also vary constantly, yet underneath the surface 
the motive-power remains ever the same and urges 
the state unceasingly along the road of constitutional 
progress. 

In the early part of Henry's reign — while Peter 
des Roches was active — the royalist party consisted 
mainly of the favourers of aliens and the favourers 
of Rome. These two classes were practically identical, 
and throughout nearly the whole of Henry's indepen- 
dent reign formed the basis of his power. Their policy 
was selfish, unconstitutional, and unnational. In the 
later years of the Barons' War this party was joined by 
the Marchers, and in their company became identified 
with the policy of reaction and spoliation which tri- 
umphed at Winchester. As soon, however, as it was 
known at Rome that by the victory of Evesham the 



204 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

royal power had been re-established, the pope reverted 
to the traditional papal policy of clemency at the 
moment of success, and counselled moderation. 1 At 
this time the Roman branch of the royalist party 
abandoned the Marchers and acted in unison with a 
second section of the king's supporters which belonged 
to the English baronage. At various periods before 
the Mad Parliament, individual nobles had sided with 
the king, 2 but usually from more or less temporary 
reasons of personal advantage. Since the dissolution 
of that body, and particularly since the outbreak of the 
civil war, these fugitive elements had become perma- 
nently attached to the crown and formed the nucleus 
of the second section of the royal party. Many of its 
members had been influenced by jealousy or self-seeking 
to desert the nationalists, 3 but many others were doubt- 
less convinced that baronial rule meant anarchy, and 
that through the subversion of the monarchy the exist- 
ence of the state was threatened. Among the latter 
class were numbered Richard of Germany, his son 

1 Rymer, I., p. 463. Oct. 4, 1265. Celsitudinem regiam monemus, 
etc., sano tibi consilio in remissionem nichilominus peccaminum 
suadentes, quatinus diligenter attendens, quod dementia firmat impe- 
rium . . . te clementem exhibeas, et benignitate utaris ; . . . Plures 
etenini ad tuum, et ipsius, aliorumque tuorum amorem humanitas 
remissionis alliciet, quam pcenpe duritia castigaret ; cum fervor vin- 
dictaa paucorum odium reprimat, multorum irritet. 

2 As in 1255. At the Mad Parliament itself the king was not with- 
out supporters, but his ' ' party was very poor in the historic names of 
England." Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., p. 78. 

3 Push., Chronicon, pp. 17, 18. Rish., Chronica, pp. 12, 13. Trivet, 
p. 253. 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 205 

Henry, Gilbert of Gloucester, the Earl Marshall, Philip 
Basset, and Edward himself. 1 It is needless to say 
that their programme was national in character, and 
was based on the observance of the Charters. With 
the assistance of the legate they withstood the violence 
of the Marchers, 2 drew up and enforced the Dictum of 
Kenilworth, and in the Statute of Marlborough con- 
ceded nearly all which had been enacted by the Mad 
Parliament at Oxford. 3 The national party 4 had been 
defeated in war, but its spirit was still abroad in the 
land, and the noblest part of its work was destined to 
be preserved. 



1 Cf. Rish., Chronicon, p. 05. Also supra, p. 199, n. 3. 

2 Rish., Chronicon, pp. 57, 59, 65. Chronica, pp. 45, 46. 

3 Cf. B. Cotton, p. 143 (1267). Evidently referring to the Stat- 
ute of Marlborough, he writes : " Eodem anno rex concessit statuta 
Oxoni* observari, exceptis paucis." The appointment of the great 
officers and sheriffs was left in the king's hands. Cf. Stubbs' Const. 
Hist., II., p. 101. 

4 The movement of parties from 1258-1267 had been very peculiar. 
Broadly speaking, in October, 1258, the royal party, in so far as it still 
existed, was entirely unnational ; the party of reform entirely national. 
One wing of the latter party was national and aristocratic ; another was 
national and democratic in tendency, the wing which we have called 
the national-ecclesiastical. It was the gradual falling away of the 
first wing to the king's side which produced a royalist-national party. 
The ultimate completion of the national programme and of the national 
constitution was due solely to the persistence of the national-demo- 
cratic wing, which is therefore the national party par excellence. That 
part of its work which was embodied in the Statute of Marlborough 
was preserved mainly by the influence of the royalist-national party, 
headed by the leaders above mentioned, assisted by the legate, and 
impelled by the occurrences since the parliament of Winchester. It 
was reserved for Edward to preserve, quicken, and complete the 
constitutional development. 



206 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

During the struggle the king had sought in all quar- 
ters to obtain allies. At Lewes the great Scotch lords 
had fought beneath his banner. 1 By personal visits to 
France he had sought to counteract the influence of 
Simon de Montfort, and had at last succeeded in win- 
ning Louis to his side through the natural influence of 
autocratic ideas, the support of Rome, and the kinship 
of the queens 2 of France and England. But throughout 
all, Henry's steadiest ally was Rome. 

Immediately after the promulgation of the Provisions 
of Oxford, the pope had entered upon a policy of eva- 
sion toward the barons and of invitation toward the 
king ; the papal bulls of dispensation proclaimed the 
result. Henceforth the spiritual weapons of the papacy 
were unreservedly at his command. The Award of 
Amiens was hastily confirmed, and all recalcitrants 
were visited with spiritual penalties. 3 After the battle 
of Lewes, Guy Foulquois, cardinal-bishop of Sabina, 
was sent at the request of the queen and the aliens as 
legate of the Apostolic See to England, 4 but the barons 
wisely forbade 5 him to enter. He was therefore forced 
to content himself with summoning the foremost pre- 



1 Dunst., p. 232. Rish., Chronicon, pp. 26, 33. Mail., p. 192. 
Trivet, p. 260. 

2 Cf. Dunst., p. 227. Rex vero Francise ad instantiam uxoris suse 
et reginae Anglise, ut dictum est, etc. (1264). 

3 Rymer, I., pp. 436-438. 

4 Rish., Chronicon, p. 38. Dunst., p. 233. Osney, p. 151. 

5 Rish., Chronicon, p. 39. Dunst., p. 241. Wykes, p. 155. 
Rymer, I., p. 447. Nangis, I., p. 225. Cf. Rish., Chronica, page 
31. 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 207 

lates of the national party to Boulogne, 1 and ordering 
them to publish his decree in England. 2 Leicester, 
Gloucester, and Roger of Norfolk were excommuni- 
cated by name, and all their adherents en masse; 
London and the Cinq Ports were placed by name under 
interdict, and all other places and lands adhering or 
belonging to the barons shared the same fate under a 
general sentence. The importation of arms, food, and 
wine was forbidden, and the Provisions of Oxford, and 
all legislation dependent upon them, were declared null 
and void. 3 The cardinal had been sent ostensibly as an 
angel of peace, but he brought not peace but a sword. 4 
Had Rome had its will, de Montfort's parliament had 
never seen the light. 

The bulls of excommunication had been entrusted to 
the bishops to be carried into England, but when the 
bold mariners of the Cinq Ports sailed out and seized 
the documents, they met with no resistance. 5 The 

1 London, Worcester, Chichester, Winchester, et al. Wykes, p. 156. 
Qui comitis et baronum prsecipue f autores extiterant. Dunst. , p. 234. 
Trivet, p. 268. Cf. Rish., Chronicon, p. 39, and Rymer, I., pp. 446, 
447. 

2 Rish., Chronicon, pp. 38, 39. Wykes, p. 156. 

3 Rymer, I., pp. 447, 448. Nov. 20, 1264. Cf. Rymer, I., p. 459. 
Ad futuram rei memoriam, Sept. 13, 1265. 

4 Rish., Chronicon, p. 38. Wykes, p. 155. Cf. Dunst., p. 233. 
Habens potestatem utriusque gladii : et per unum, (ut) episcopos, 
barones Anglise excommunicare nolentes, deponeret ; et per alium, 
quosdam barones usque ad triginta exhseredaret. 

5 Wykes, pp. 156, 157. Obtento quidem super hoc rescripto apos- 
tolico, pelago se credentes (episcopi), sponte nescio vel invite, com- 
prehensi sunt in mari a Quinque Portuensibus, qui scripta eorum 
autentica dilaniata minuatim vel concisa projecerunt in mare, etc. 



208 THE BARONS' WAR chap, in 

great canon of William the Conqueror had been long 
obsolete, but in the presence of a mighty national sen- 
timent it was needed no longer. At a great meeting 
of the clergy a unanimous appeal against the legate's 
action was taken ; it was approved later by the barons, 
and sent under their seal to Rome. 1 Shortly after- 
wards the legate himself became pope Clement IV. 
No peace with Rome was possible. About the first of 
November, 1265, Cardinal Ottobon reached England. 2 
The battle had then been fought and won, and he could 
at once enter upon the congenial task of punishing 
those prelates who, in defence of their country's liber- 
ties, had braved the thunders of Rome. The noble 
Walter of Worcester was soon beyond his reach, 
"snatched that he might not see evil days," 3 but the 
bishops of Chichester, Winchester, and London were 
sent to Rome to await the pleasure of the pope. 4 
Ottobon also diverted to the uses of the king and 
Edward the tenth which had been granted to de Mont- 
fort by the prelates to guard England against inva- 
sion, 5 and later procured for the king the grant of a 
tenth for three years. 6 This conduct, together with the 

1 Rish., Chronicon, p. 39. Dunst., p. 234. 

2 Dunst., p. 240. Wav., p. 367. 3 Wykes, p. 180. 

4 Wykes, pp. 185-187. Ant. Leg., p. 83. Osney, pp. 180-182. 
Dunst., pp. 240, 241. Cf. Rymer, I., p. 4G3. Wykes gives the full- 
est account. Winchester died. Lincoln was finally received to favour. 
"Hen. de Sandwyz, episc. Loud, qui propter familiaritatem Simonis 
de M. . . . in curia dom. Papse perduravit." Dunst, p. 247. 

6 Rymer, I., pp. 458, 462 (1265). 

6 £60,000 Tours of this latter sum were used to pay the debts 
which the queen had contracted in France in behalf of her hus- 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 209 

honours 1 paid him by the king, made it appear exceed- 
ingly doubtful whether his presence would conduce ulti- 
mately to harmony or not. In other respects, however, 
he used his power wisely ; at Axyholm, 2 Kenilworth, 3 
and Ely 4 he favoured arbitration, employing excom- 
munication simply as a means to that end ; the Dictum 
of Kenilworth 5 and the final peace with Llewellyn 6 
were largely due to his influence, and he twice con- 
firmed the royal charters. 7 In many respects his be- 
haviour resembles Gualo's, and in general the parallel 
between the papal policy at this crisis and in the reign 
of John is remarkably close. At neither time did it 
favour English liberty, except in so far as was neces- 
sary to secure its own future success. 

In their search for allies the barons, as well as the 
king, had entered France ; although they ultimately 
lost Louis' support, they had succeeded, nevertheless, 
through the personal ascendency of Leicester, 8 in re- 
band during his captivity. Rymer, I., p. 473. Rish., Chronicon, 
pp. 60, 61. Rish., Chronica, p. 47. Wykes, p. 213. Cf. Dunst., 
p. 244. 

1 Rish., Chronicon, p. 59. At Christmas. Legato in sedili regio 
collocato, singulisque ferculis coram eo primitus appositis, et pos- 
tremo coram rege, etc. 

2 Rish., Chronicon, p. 50. Wav., p. 368. 

3 Rish., Chronicon, pp. 54, 55. AVykes, p. 191. Wav., p. 371. 

4 Rish., Chronicon, p. 62. Dunst., p. 241. Wykes, p. 196. 

5 Osney, p. 191. Rish., Chronicon, pp. 57-59. Ant. Leg., p. 88. 
Winton., p. 104. Wav., p. 372. Dunst., p. 242. 

6 Rymer, I., pp. 467, 473, 474. Trivet, p. 272. Rish., Chronica, 
p. 58. Winton., p. 105. 

7 Ant. Leg., p. 89. Cf. Ant. Leg., pp. 87, 88, and Wav., p. 371. 

8 For the universal respect which was entertained for Leicester in 

p 



210 THE B AEONS' WAR chap, hi 

taining the friendship of many influential men. The 
chief advantage, however, which this fact afforded 
seems to have been the facilitation of many arbitra- 
tions of doubtful utility. 

The assistance of the Welsh was of vastly more im- 
portance to the national party — especially after hostili- 
ties became inevitable. No painful negotiations were 
ever needed to secure the support of these natural 
allies. At the Hokeday parliament of 1258 Leicester 
and Gloucester had blushed at de Valence's charge of 
complicity — although, probably, their complicity at 
this time was limited to a secret feeling of joy at unex- 
pected assistance. When the baronage and king were 
at variance, Llewellyn was apt to break out of bounds ; 
when peace existed between them, he felt that discre- 
tion was valour's better part. 1 It was not until the 
closing days of the Barons' War that Llewellyn was 
formally leagued 2 with de Montfort, but an informal 
understanding evidently subsisted between them at a 
much earlier date. Had de Montfort remained at the 
helm of state, Wales certainly would not have been 
incorporated with England in the year 1284. 

Throughout Henry's reign, the barons had had the 
welfare of England more or less at heart. In the 
earlier periods, while Langton was primate and an 

France, vide ex grege, the offer of the regency (Mat. Par. V., pp. 371, 
372, 415), and the French estimate of de Valence's speech to Leicester 
in the Hokeday parliament (Mat. Par., V., p. 703). Perhaps it was 
on account of the Sicilian affair that Anjou was his friend. Mat. 
West., p. 385. 

1 Mat. Par., V., p. 727. 2 Rymer, I., p. 457. June 22, 1265. 



fart in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 211 

earl of Pembroke or a Hubert de Burgh headed an 
undivided baronage, they had actually wrought great 
good. Later came an era of confusion. No permanent 
union existed between the barons and the national 
party in the church ; the king was in the hands of 
aliens ; the church was plundered by both king and 
pope ; the baronage had no acknowledged head, and 
constant jealousies and bitter rivalries except at rare 
intervals divided their ranks and destroyed their power. 
It was not until the multiform aggressions of the king 
upon both state and church had become utterly unbear- 
able that the barons definitely and finally took their 
stand upon the technicalities a of Magna Charta as the 
basis for resistance ; and it was not until the behaviour 
of Rustand had roused the prelates and the clergy to 
a pitch of desperation that the national wing of the 
church yielded to the solicitations of the baronage and 
formed with them a permanent union. 2 At the open- 
ing of the Mad Parliament the national party was 
apparently a unit. All the elements which are indis- 
pensable for a great revolution were then present in 
England. Magnificent aspirations for political free- 
dom and national rights were accompanied by distinct 
grievances which pressed heavily upon the members of 
all classes, from the greatest of the barons to the least 
of the "populi minuti" of the cities. There were plenty 
of leaders to voice the general discontent, whether at 
the corners of the city streets, in the remote country- 

i Mat. Par., V., p. 520 (1255). 
2 Ibid., V., pp. 525, 553 (1256), 



212 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

villages and manors, in the convocation of the clergy, 
or the halls of parliament. There was no dearth of 
the military talent necessary to ensure success, and 
zeal for religion and the freedom of the church was 
at the very heart of the movement and promised the 
crown of martyrdom to all who fell in the strife. Un- 
fortunately, but inevitably, there were also present, 
especially among the leaders, all the lower motives of 
selfish gain and personal aggrandizement and petty 
jealousies. It is true that a considerable period elapsed 
before these made their appearance in the light of day, 
but, in reality, almost from the first the baronage was 
divided by fundamental differences into two camps : * 
when these differences became apparent, the lower mo- 
tives accentuated them and led to hopeless disunion. 

The keynote of the constitutional and military con- 
flicts of the reign of Henry III. is the aspiration for 
separate national existence and for a government na- 
tional in both form and spirit and in the personnel of 
the administration. Without this aspiration the Barons' 
War could no more have come to pass than the First 
Crusade could have occurred without the fundamental 
inspiration of religion. From the contest against for- 
eign elements the whole reign gets its colour, literature, 
and politics alike. 

Among prose writers, Matthew Paris, the first great 
national historian, makes his appearance, and around 
him is clustered a whole galaxy of lesser lights. Of 

i Vide infra, pp. 218, 219. 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 213 

all contemporary English historiographers Thomas 
Wykes alone is deeply royalist in sympathies, — yet 
even he seems forced to take Prince Edward for his 
hero and excuse the king. In the poetical literature 
the same tendency is still more deeply marked. With 
scarcely an exception the poems which are extant deal 
with political subjects, and without a single exception 
these favour the national side. In connection with the 
Barons' War the first political poem in English makes 
its appearance, for the first time the English language 
is used 1 in public documents, and knowledge of the 
English tongue is made in certain sections of the coun- 
try the test of patriotism. 

The central political issues of the reign are also 
deeply national : first, the protection of the church 
from the ravages of a denationalizing king and an alien 
head ; second, the maintenance of the inviolability of 
the Great Charter — the pledge of national freedom 
and the concrete expression of the spirit of the laws ; 
and third, the administration of the government by 
men of English birth and education. The second issue 
involved all political interests of permanent value ; a 
successful struggle for the third was the necessary 
prelude to the attainment of the second ; and the asso- 
ciation of the religious question with them both, lent 
to the revolt of the barons the aspect of a holy war. 2 
The maintenance of the Charter with all which it in- 
volved was the most important issue, as being in itself 

i In 1258. 2 Cf. infra, pp. 223, 224. 



214 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

the supreme end; the third issue, however, was the 
only direct means to that end and, as such, was closest 
to the heart of every patriot. 

It was upon this point, too, that the national pride 
had been most aggrieved. The alienation of London 
from the crown, the king's ill-treatment of Simon de 
Montfort, his general misgovernment and prodigality, 
his costly foreign wars and even the trebly foolish 
acceptance of the Sicilian crown, pale into insignificance 
as a cause of revolution compared with his denational- 
ization of the English church and state through the 
introduction of aliens. Was not this the root of the 
evil ? They supplanted the native English in the affec- 
tions of their prince, usurped their places at the council- 
board and in the church, outraged the personal dignity 
of the English barons by their pride and arrogance, 
invaded the rights of the people, fostered the king's 
unnational visions of greatness abroad, formed the 
nucleus of almost every governmental abuse in the 
treasury and the department of justice, sought to warp 
the English constitution from its natural Anglo-Saxon 
tendencies and to substitute mere absolutism, and 
finally, through their mastery of the royal castles, 
threatened to make their power permanent. Inter- 
marriage with these aliens, though the king's own rela- 
tives in part, was held to contaminate the ancient 
English blood. 1 

All patriots were therefore determined that England 

1 Mat. Par., V., p. 363. Also the Petitions at Oxford. Vide supra, 
pp. 75, 76, and n. 2, and p. 167. 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 215 

should be ruled by Englishmen. Upon this plea Simon 
de Montfort himself was once driven from the seat of 
council and from the land by less worthy men than he ; 
and after he had won the highest place in the gift of 
the nation, specious treachery renewed this charge to 
justify itself. It was largely this question which gave 
the decisive turn to the constitutional struggles of the 
reign and determined their outward form. Because 
Henry drove the great officers from power and substi- 
tuted for them at the treasury, chancery, and council- 
chamber commissions of men of lesser note and often 
of alien extraction, the barons were directly forced to 
demand the right of nominating the three great officers 
of state. 1 This demand was based, according to baronial 
theory, upon the Magna Charta, was accompanied by 
the determination to purify the royal council by the 
exclusion of aliens, and ultimately expanded, under 
stress of circumstances, to a demand for the appoint- 
ment of a permanent executive committee. This prac- 
tical programme placed the Magna Charta in the 
forefront of the battle ; the regency which existed 
during the king's minority had furnished abundant 
precedents for its unconscious expansion, 2 and the re- 
sult was the Provisions of Oxford. 

This question of the governance of England by Eng- 



1 Vide supra, pp. 69, 70. Cf. Gneist, Eng. Ver. Gesch., p. 269. 
Diese Mreaukratische Gestalt eben gab jeder Einwirkung der Magna- 
ten sofort die Richtung auf Besetzung der Grossamter and des She- 
riff amts. He does not mention aliens in this connection, however. 

2 Cf. Stubbs' Const. Hist, II., pp. 40, 41. 



216 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

lishmen kept increasing in importance as the denation- 
alization of the state progressed, and finally, as the 
practical embodiment of all other questions and as the 
sole means to the supreme end, overshadowed all other 
issues and made the conflict no less directly national in 
outward form than in its spirit. The truth of this 
statement is best attested by certain documents drawn 
up at the most critical periods of the combat. First, 
the Petition of the Barons at Oxford demanded, among 
other things, the delivery of the royal castles into 
English hands. Second, in accordance with this Peti- 
tion it was legally enacted at the Oxford parliament 
that the castles should be restored at once, and that all 
opponents of the Provisions of Oxford should be con- 
sidered public enemies. This was followed immediately 
by the expulsion of the Poitevins and all other aliens 
who refused to take the oath. Shortly afterwards, 
significantly enough, the divisions in the ranks of the 
baronage begin. Third, about the 24th of June, 1263, 
the barons offered to submit the Provisions of Oxford 
to arbitrators who should correct, explain, or expunge 
whatever was prejudicial to the royal power and the 
welfare of the realm, but insisted on the administration 
of the state by men of English birth. 1 Fourth, this 
same condition was inserted in the peace which was 
actually made by the king and barons in London in 
July of the same year. 2 Fifth — and most conclusively 

1 Ant. Leg., p. 54. Cited supra, p. 189, n. 2. 

2 Trivet, p. 252. Ant. Leg., pp. 55, 56. Rish., Chronicon, p. 13. 
Et quod regno de caetero per indigenas et naturales terrse et utiles 
sub. dom. rege gubernetur. 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 217 

— after Louis had made his formal Award at Amiens 
and when civil war seemed unavoidable, the barons 
announced to the king that they would assent to the 
Dictum, provided that he would annul the article 
which allowed the employment of aliens and provided 
that he would remove them from the realm and ad- 
minister the state through English agents. 1 This pro- 
viso was refused, and therefore became the sole cause, 
officially recognized, of the war of 1264. Sixth, the same 
condition forms the basis of the Mise of Lewes and is 
excepted from French arbitration. 2 Finally, it was 
enacted in the constitution of 1264-1265, that all mem- 
bers of the executive councils, all custodians of castles, 
and all bailiffs of the king should be indigenous. 

On all the points which have been mentioned, the 
two wings of the baronage were at first perfectly agreed. 
The surrender of the castles, the expulsion of refractory 
aliens, the appointment by the baronage of the three 
great officers of state, the reform of certain abuses in 
the administration of the treasury, chancery, and de- 
partment of justice, the confirmation of the Charters, 
the rescue of the church from spoliation, and the es- 
tablishment of a permanent council of nobles with legis- 
lative and executive power — these seemed essential to 
all. Experience justified the first five points, and in 
the end they were practically won. As to the sixth, 
however desirable in point of fact the rescue of the 

1 Supra, p. 193, n. 1. Quod alienigenis ab Anglia remotis per 
indigenas gubernetur. 

2 Rish., Chronicon, p. 37. Sel. Chart., p. 335. 



218 TBE BARONS* WAR chap, in 

church might seem to all, yet the members of the 
conservative wing of the party doubtless were think- 
ing more of their lost rights of patronage and their 
added burdens of national taxation than of spiritual 
things, while it was not yet revealed to statesmanship 
that, through the essential weakness of the church as 
a privileged and isolated body possessed of vast wealth 
but destitute of secular means of defence, the day 
would come when rescue from the pope of Rome meant 
simply slavery to the king of England. 1 The insur- 
rection of the barons produced temporary relief for the 
church, but no permanent benefits. 

The last point — the executive council — was wholly 
new in fact, though not in theory. " Under John, the 
barons had sought to organize and legalize rebellion in 
advance ; under Henry III. they endeavoured to organ- 
ize not rebellion, but power, and to win guarantees not 
for war, but for the very constitution of the govern- 
ment. Unable to limit duly the authority of the king, 
they sought to appropriate it for themselves — in a 
word, to substitute for the monarchy an oligarchy." 2 
It was in connection with this oligarchy — that is, in 
connection with the relation of the executive council 
of fifteen to the basis of the state — that the funda- 
mental differences between the two sections of the 
baronage were finally displayed. 

The first of these two sections was the old baronial 

1 B. Cotton, p. 322. Unde clericalis ordo vilissimus et vilior plebe 
reputabatur. 1296. 

2 Guizot, Histoire des Origines, etc., II., pp. 164, 165. 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 219 

party; its leader was the earl of Gloucester, and its 
ultimate tendencies were conservative and aristocratic. 
The second was the national-ecclesiastical party; it had 
been founded by Grosseteste, was led by Simon de 
Montfort in close association with Walter of Worcester 
and Stephen of Chichester, and contained within its 
membership all, or nearly all, the constructive talent 
of the day. Its ultimate tendencies were popular and 
progressive. The final political objects and points of 
view of these two parties were as far apart as the poles. 
The problem of the times, as it presented itself in 1258, 
and afterwards, to the mind of Richard of Gloucester 
and his party, was essentially as follows : In what way 
shall the power of the monarch be so limited as to 
put an end to the evils of alien influence in state 
and church, and to secure the predominance of the 
native English baronage in the councils of the nation ? 1 
Their statement of the problem was selfish and faulty, 
and its solution was therefore incorrect. The terms 
were too limited in application, and the agency for the 
correction of abuses rested upon too narrow a basis. 

De Montfort's presentation of the question would 
have been much broader: In what way shall the power 
of the crown be so limited as to put an end to the evils 
of alien influence in church and state and to secure 
the full rights of all the English nation? 

The problem, however, was far larger than it at first 
appeared, and the key to its full solution could not, 



1 Cf. Stubbs' Const. Hist., II., p. 83. Risk., Chronicon, p. 19. 



220 THE B A RONS' WAR chap, hi 

in the very nature of things, be consciously in the pos- 
session of any man of the time. It was essentially a 
problem of a much more recent period. The growth of 
the nation postulated the growth of the constitution. 
The struggle for the Charter had already developed 
into a struggle for the principles which it implicitly 
contained, and the great council of the barons was 
already inadequate to give expression to the wishes of 
the nation. The twelfth century had developed the 
Anglo-Saxon organs of local self-government, and en- 
dowed the principal towns with charters, — bringing 
both into close connection with the central government. 
The work of the thirteenth century was to complete 
this development by extending the Anglo-Saxon prin- 
ciple of representation in the shire court to the great 
council of the nation, 1 giving to the higher classes 
of the commonalty a voice in all matters pertaining to 
the common weal. Herein lies the culmination of the 
national movement and the great significance of the 
Barons' War. On one side it was a protest against 
papal usurpations and the misuse of royal power; on 
the other, by compelling de Montfort's party to rely 
upon the support of the people against the crown, it 
hastened an almost inevitable constitutional develop- 
ment by broadening the basis of the central govern- 
ment. The smaller struggle, as we can see to-day, was 
inextricably involved in the greater — a fact which 
would alone account for the failure of the Provisions 

1 Gardiner and Mullinger's Eng. Hist, for Students, p. 62. 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 221 

of Oxford to fetter the king and accomplish permanent 
reform. When to this the mutual jealousies of the 
barons, the diversity of their aims, and the friction 
necessarily involved in daily administration are added, 
it causes no wonder to learn that the Oxford plan of 
government completely failed. 

The evidence for the political doctrines at the base of 
the national movement at the moment of its culmina- 
tion between the battles of Lewes and Evesham, rests 
partly upon theoretical, partly on practical grounds. 
Of the latter, the parliament *• which met at London on 
the 20th of January, 1265, is the most memorable and 
significant. Of the former, the poem 2 entitled the 
Battle of Lewes is scarcely less striking. 

This poem is the confession of the political faith of 
the party of Simon de Montfort. As Freeman has so 
eloquently said, 3 the word " baron " in connection with 
this war seems to have reverted to its original significa- 
tion. As the sword was once glorified by Halfred the 
Scald, so throughout this whole poem ring the words 
" communitas " and " universitas." 

" I miss the bright word in one 
Of thy measures and thy rhymes." 
And Halfred the Scald replied, 
" In another 'twas multiplied 
Three times." 

There are no more complaints of the prevalence of irre- 

1 Writ, Rymer, I., p. 449. Sel. Chart., p. 415. 

2 Wright's Pol. Songs, pp. 72 et seq. 

3 Freeman, Norm. Conq., V., p. 728. 



222 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

ligion, as in the songs of former days ; the victory of 
Earl Simon has brought new life to England. 

Jam respirat Anglia, sperans libertatem, 
Cui Dei gratia det prosperitatem. 1 

In a vein worthy of Charles Sumner at his best, the 
author proceeds to magnify the claims of the Higher 
Law. 

An analysis of the poem reveals its division into five 
parts. 2 

Victory, the salvation of England, due to God alone, 
is the theme of the prelude. The party of the king 
deservedly succumbed, for it was perjured, excommuni- 
cate, and guilty on numerous occasions of violence 
against the holy church. 3 

Part II. invokes upon Simon the blessing of God in 
recompense for his liberation of the English people, 4 
and defends 5 him against malicious charges of treason 
and sedition by asserting his faithfulness to the point 
of death, by reciting the all but miraculous circum- 
stances of his victory at Lewes, — the battle of a true 
Gideon, 6 — by ascribing the overthrow of the royalists 

i Lines 9, 10. 

2 I., lines 1-64; II., 65-416; III., 417-484; IV., 485-846; V., 847 
to the end. The poem is about as long as the sixth book of the iEneid. 

3 Part I., lines 1-64. 

4 Lines 65, 66 : 

Benedicat dominus S. de Monte-Forti! 
Suis nichilominus natis et cohorti. 

Lines 79-184. 
6 Elsewhere, line 149, Simon is a David — 

Golias prosternitur projecta lapilli. 






part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 223 

immediately to their pride, cruelty, and filthy de- 
bauchery before the combat, 1 and by retorting the 
charge of unknightly and dishonourable conduct upon 
Simon's adversaries. 2 With the exception of a short 
digression 3 upon the evils attending the presence of 
aliens in England, and upon the baleful character of 
their policy, 4 the remainder 5 of the second section 
of the poem is devoted to the Glorification of Simon 
de Montfort. His equity, 6 steadfastness in reforming 
the state, and utter faithfulness to his oath to maintain 
the Provisions of Oxford, might well be imitated by 
others, His general importance to England could not 
be overrated; in him the stone which the builders 
rejected had indeed become the head of the corner; 7 
to him alone the peaceful unity of England was 
ascribed. 

Fides et fidelitas Symonis solius 
Fit pacis integritas Angiiae totius. 8 

He was the rescuer of the oppressed and the chastiser 
of the proud, 9 fighting a fight enjoined by necessity and 
duty. He was the shield of England and its defence 
against the assaults of the aliens; no time server was 

i Cf . Blaauw, p. 145. 2 Lines 167-170. 3 Lines 281-316. 

* Lines 281-284 : 

Nam quidam studuerant Anglorum delere 
Nomen, quos jam caeperant exosos habere, 
Contra quos opposuit Deus medicinam, 
Ipsorum cum noluit subitam ruinam. 

5 Lines 185-416. 6 Line 185. 

7 Lines 261, 262. 8 Lines 267, 268. 

a Lines 269-281. 



224 THE BABONS* WAB chap, hi 

he, but the type of pure altruism. 1 In fine, Simon was 
God's earthly champion, and his enemies were therefore 
hostile to England, the church, and to God. With a 
devout ascription of all the glory to the Deity and with 
the expression of an infinite yearning that he may 
perfect his good work, the second section of the poem 
closes. 2 

Part III. 3 delineates the character of Edward. His 
cognizance is the leopard, and it is remarkably appro- 
priate. He is indeed a lion for bravery, pride, and 
ferocity, a pard for inconstancy and fickleness. An 
earnest exhortation for a change of conduct follows, 
coupled with a warning. Even the king is not above 
the laws; 4 no man can rule who will not keep the 
laws, 5 nor should the electors 6 choose such a one for 
king. Therefore, 

Si regnum desideras, leges venerare. 7 

The fourth 8 part of the poem discusses the respective 
attitudes of the existent parties toward the constitution, 
and the true relations of any king, council, and people. 

i Lines 345, 346 : 

Non sic venerabilis S. de Monte-Forti, 
Qui se Christo similis dat pro multis morti. 

2 Lines 400-414. 3 Lines 417-484. 

4 Lines 445, 446 : 

Nam rex omnis regitur legibus quas legit ; 
Rex Saul repellitur, quia leges fregit. 

6 Line 450 : 

Quod non potest regere qui non servat legem. 

6 Ad quos spectat. 7 Line 455. 8 Lines 485-846. 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 225 

The first topic is mainly practical; it treats of the 
king's plea, 1 the barons' plea, 2 and the refutation 3 of 
the king's plea by the author. 

The royalist position is as follows. A king desires to 
be free and ought to be so; but unless he can do what- 
ever he pleases, he is unfree, therefore no king. 4 The 
magnates exceed their office, for they rightfully have no 
voice in the appointment of sheriffs, 5 constables, or the 
three great officers of state. All appointments should 
be made at the king's discretion and he should be free 
to select his advisers from all men and from all lands. 
His will should have the force of law. — Each earl in 
his earldom is at liberty to exercise these rights, and 
should a prince be less free than his vassal? 6 The 
magnates are encroaching on the king's prerogative; 
by means of sedition they seek to enslave him, destroy 
his princely dignity, and disinherit him, so that he may 
not exercise the full untrammelled power of his prede- 
cessors. 

The baronial position is as follows. They desire, not 
to injure the royal honour, but to reform and magnify 
the princely office. This they have the right to do, 
for as it is their duty to defend the kingdom and the 
honour of the king whenever the realm is attacked in 
open warfare or endangered by invasion, so also is it 

1 Lines 485-526. 2 Lines 527-626. 

3 Lines 627-700. i Lines 489-492. 

5 Lines 493, 494, " quos praeferret Suis comitatibus" is erroneously 
rendered by Wright, " prefer to his earldoms." 

6 This argument had been used in the parliament of 1248. Cf. 
Mat. Par., V., p. 20. 

Q 



226 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

their duty to protect them both from the more insidious 
attacks of evil counsellors and aliens. These are real 
enemies of king and realm, for they seek by flattery to 
advance themselves, and by lying, to trample on the 
natives. They subvert the constitution, impoverish the 
commonalty 1 for their own ostentation, pervert and 
defeat the ends of justice, humiliate the rightful rulers 
of the land, and are in no respect less injurious than 
an open foreign enemy. Therefore, whether the king 
innocently, but misguideclly, assents to measures which 
are prejudicial to the welfare of the realm, or whether 
he acts with malice prepense in order to set his own 
power above the laws, the baronage in either case has 
an undoubted right to interfere. Further, since they 
are the necessary instruments for securing the safety of 
the state against assaults from without and within, it is 
likewise both their duty and their right to introduce 
reforms which not only tend to purify and regenerate 
the realm, but which also, by lessening the grievous 
rigour of the laws, are pleasing in the sight of God. 2 
" For the oppression of the people pleaseth not God, 
but rather is that mercy pleasing in his sight which 
gives the people leisure to be mindful of him." 3 

Upon this statement follows the author's answer to 
the plea of the king. The latter, wishing to enjoy that 
kind of freedom which the removal of the guardian 



1 Or commonwealth. 

2 Cf . Et ref ormetur status regni nostri secundum quod melius vide- 
rent expedire ad honorem Dei, et ad fidem nostram, etc. Rymer, I., 
p. 373. Sel. Chart., p. 381. 3 Lines 613, 614, 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 227 

barons can alone establish, falls into a double error. 
The first is a misapprehension of the relation which 
his counsellors bear to himself. It is God alone, omni- 
scient and omnipotent, who rules the universe in pure 
majesty, who alone cannot err or be vanquished by his 
enemies. He excels all earthly kings, his ministers, in 
that they cannot by their own unaided wisdom, or their 
own unaided strength, administer and defend the state. 
Counsellors are indispensable to them. The king must 
assent to this, yet requires absolute power over the se- 
lection of his helpers, asserting that otherwise he is not 
free but bound. Herein lies his second error, — a mis- 
apprehension of the nature of true liberty. " All con- 
straint does not deprive of liberty, nor does every 
restriction take away power." 1 A true law, by pre- 
serving a king from a false law, increases his power, 
even as the might of angels is the greater because it 
is impossible for them ever to apostatize. " That a 
king is all powerful for good but dare work no evil," 
is God's special gift to him, 2 and it is in the enjoyment 
of this gift that his counsellors establish him and thus 
preserve his liberty. When a king rules himself and 
his kingdom rightly, then only is he truly free. All 
things whatsoever which advantage the kingdom are 
possible to him, but none which tend to its injury. 
To destroy by resisting the law is one thing: to rule 
according to the duty of a king is another and far 
nobler. " A ligando dicitur lex." 

i Lines 667, 668. 2 Lines 687, 688. 



228 THE BARONS' WAR chap, in 

The discussion of the true relations which subsist 
between a king, his council, and his people is really a 
continuation of the poet's refutation of the royal argu- 
ment. With inexorable logic it is shown that every 
king is the servant of God, and that no obedience is 
due to a king who is himself unfaithful to the service 
of his Master. That service is seeking God's glory in 
reigning, not the satisfaction of personal pride in despis- 
ing one's peers. 1 The subjects of the king are not his, 
but God's, and they are meant to be the monarch's 
profitable helpers. " Let him make himself as one of 
them " 2 and love them. If a prince cherishes his 
people, they will not let him suffer wrong and he 
will in turn be loved by them ; if he reigns justly, 
they perforce must honour him. If a prince errs, he 
should be checked by those whom his injustice has 
afflicted — unless he himself will correct his mistake. 
In that case they should raise him up and help him. 

Ipsam princeps teneat regulum regnandi, 
Ut opus non habeat non suos vocandi. 3 

A wise prince will never reject his people, but an un- 
wise ruler will disturb his kingdom. 4 If, then, a prince 
is less wise than he should be, and yet insists on exer- 
cising his independent judgment, his realm will suffer 
harm. 

Igitur communitas regni consulatur. 5 



i Lines 701-708. 2 Line 713. 

3 Lines 735, 736. 4 Lines 757, 758. 

5 Line 765. 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 229 

The king's best counsellors are men of native race; 
they best understand their own laws, know their op- 
eration by experience, and have a direct interest in 
their maintenance which aliens lack. That wise and 
just and useful men should administer the state is the 
concern of the community at large. The king's anal- 
ogy from the freedom of the earls to his own is next 
answered, and, by implication, turned against himself. 
If individuals err, they are under the law and the law 
is enforced, or should be, lest the strength of the king- 
dom be foolishly wasted. 

Finally comes the conclusion of the whole matter. 1 
First in rank stands the community. 

Prsemio prseferimus universitatem. 2 

Law reigns supreme over the dignity of the king and is 
his guide and stay ; its absence overthrows the king- 
dom. 3 The maxim so often cited, "ut rex vult, lex 
vadit," is untrue — " nam lex stat, rex cadit." The 
sum of this universal, sovereign law is Truth, Charity, 
and Zeal for Salvation : let all royal ordinances be con- 
sonant with these ; then will the people prosper, and 
the king's will indeed be law. No provision which is 
in accordance with this Trinity can disinherit the king 
by depriving him of his ancestral rights, for this Trinity 
is itself but the rightful norm of his actions. Law is 
unending, eadem semper. No beneficial change of cus- 

1 Part V. , lines 847 to the end. 

2 Line 847. 
s Line 864. 



230 THE BARONS' WAR chap, in 

torn, however late it may occur, can therefore be rightly 
censured as an innovation or encroachment. 

The king's private interest must always yield to that 
of the community ; it is for their sake, not his own, 
that he has been ordained as ruler. The name of king 
is relative, and it implies protection. If he accomplish 
the salvation of the kingdom, he plays his part as 
king; but the king who busies himself with his own 
affairs exclusively is ignorant of the duties of the royal 
office. 1 

Even were a king all-wise, he should none the less 
impart his plans to his faithful friends, as Christ to the 
disciples, for they are his necessary agents. It is there- 
fore evident that it becomes a king to take counsel with 
his nobles concerning the governance of the realm and 
the preservation of its peace ; it is also fitting that 
natives, not foreigners, be his companions and advisers, 
for aliens abolish good customs and sow discord through 
the land. The king should uphold the rank of his 
natural subjects and thereby have joy in reigning. If, 
however, he shows himself studious to degrade them and 
debase their rank, he will seek in vain for an obedience 
which would be the part of fools. 

So ends the remarkable poem of a thirteenth-century 
scholar. In the absence of an absolutely certain trans- 
lation of the word " communitas," it is perhaps impos- 
sible to measure accurately the extent of the democratic 

1 Cf. Mat. Par., V., p. 614 (1257). Henry's reply to Edward, ask- 
ing for help in the Welsh War. "Me autem alia negotia detinent 
occupatum." Vide supra, p. 147. 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 231 

doctrines which the poem contains. This is particularly 
true of that essential portion which treats of the consti- 
tution of the governing council. 

Igitur communitas regni consulatur. 

It seems scarcely possible that a philosopher who by 
sheer dint of reason has discovered that the king is not 
above the law, that resistance is a duty if he violates it, 
that the law never changes although human perception 
of it does, and that the law is established primarily for 
the welfare of the nation, — 

Prsemio praeferimus universitatem — 

should then proceed to interpret " communitas regni " as 
the "community of the magnates." This interpretation 
seems still more absurd when we reflect that the author 
of the poem is undoubtedly a Minorite and therefore en- 
dowed with not only theoretical but also practical sym- 
pathy for the commons of the realm ; that his reasoning- 
is evidently based on the observation of actual political 
occurrences, and that he must have noted the very 
patent increase of the political power of the knighthood 
and of the city-communes in general, together with the 
decisive part played by the commune of London during 
the past three years. Moreover, but this is of course 
conjectural, the writ for the parliament of 1265 may 
have been issued before the completion of the poem and 
may have been seen by the author. It is scarcely prob- 
able that a poem so long, so artistically constructed, and 
involving such a wealth of political wisdom, could have 



232 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

been written in a very short space of time. The truth of 
the matter probably is, that the word "communitas" was 
at this very time undergoing a change of signification 
which would ultimately restrict its political meaning to 
the " Commons " ; that in the line 

Igitur communitas regni consulatur 

it is used by the author himself without any definite 
attempt to determine its exact connotation and denota- 
tion, but that he certainly would have included in it all 
authorized representatives of the people — the barons by 
birth, standing, and immemorial right, the knighthood 
by influence and ripening custom. Coupled with the 
poet's broadly democratic convictions, and his explicit 
statements that the interests of the commonwealth are 
paramount, that our knowledge of the fundamental law 
is progressive, and that political actions in accordance 
with our increased knowledge are not innovations, this 
line might well be indicative of a desire for the establish- 
ment of the broadest possible basis for the national 
council. The coincidence of the time of writing with 
the great political event of the half-century cannot fail 
to exercise great weight in behalf of this point of view. 
The poem certainly establishes theoretical conclusions 
broad enough to justify the representation of the higher 
classes of the commonalty in the central council of the 
nation ; it is therefore quite within the bounds of possi- 
bility that the author himself may have had that idea 
more or less consciously in mind, and that his exposition 
of the relation of the voice of the people to the dis- 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 233 

covery of political truth approaches very near the maxim 
" Vox populi vox Dei." 

In how far did Simon de Montfort share the doc- 
trines of the poet? Did his theory keep pace with his 
practice, or was his political action, which forms almost 
the sole standard of our judgment, based wholly on 
practical insight, the drift of the times, and his own 
needs? These questions can scarcely be answered. 
We know that he received his sympathetic education 
largely through his intimacy with the leading Minor- 
ites, and there exists at least one definite proof that 
they had speculations in common on such subjects. 1 
We also know by means of a direct assertion that he 
was well equipped in literary knowledge. 2 As a matter 
of individual opinion, then, one may be permitted to 
believe that de Montfort's political practice was based 
partly upon political theory ; the belief is certainly not 
inconsistent with any known facts, and there is con- 
siderable pleasure in the thought that the man who did 
so much for the popular liberties of England, and who, 
according to the view of so many of his contempo- 
raries, fell a martyr to his duty, the cause of God and 
the church, died in the light of a dawning faith that 
the voice of the people was indeed the voice of God. 

" Inter arma silent leges : " not so of constitutions. 
The Barons' War was essentially a war of principles, 
and its permanent results lay along the line of constitu- 

1 Mon. Fran., Ep. Ad., XXV., p. 110. 

2 Rish., Chronicon, p. 6. Litteraturse scientia commendabiliter 
prseditus. 



234 THE BARONS' WAR chap, hi 

tional progress. The Provisions of Oxford were in 
advance of those of Runnymede in so far as they were 
a legitimate elaboration of the latter's fundamental 
principles, sought to establish a system of administra- 
tion which would ensure the observance of the Charters 
as against the king himself, and laid a stress unknown 
before upon the inalienable rights of native English- 
men and upon the unity of England. The Barons' 
War advanced the constitution immeasurably farther, 
through the spread of democratic doctrines and the 
admission of new classes to the exercise of governmental 
functions. It established the liberties of England not 
only upon a national, but a popular basis. 

With this latter chain of progression the name of 
Simon de Montfort is inextricably interlinked. His 
reluctance 1 to sign the Provisions of Oxford may have 
been due to disapproval of the cumbrousness of the 
executive organization, or to a belief that the basis 
of the constitution was too narrow. He certainly 
favoured both the ordinance of the year 1258 which 
extended to vassals the same privileges which the king 
accorded to their lords, and also the provisions of 1259 
which were wrung from the barons by the unrepre- 
sented knighthood of the realm. Out of four known 
writs 2 which, prior to 1265, summoned knights to 
represent their counties in the national parliament, two 

1 Lanercost, p. 67. 

2 I., Nov. 7, 1213. II., 1254. III., 1261. Sel. Chart., pp. 405, 
406. Shirley, II., p. 179. IV., June 4, 1264. Rymer, I., p. 442. 
The last two are Simon's. 



part in PARTIES AND PRINCIPLES 235 

were due to de Montfort. He was the pride of the 
Minorites, the heralds of the popular movement, and 
the idol of the commune of London. The crowning 
act of his career was the construction of the parliament 
of 1265, with its rich freightage for all coming years. 
His sudden removal from the scene of action seemed to 
destroy in a moment the labours of a life ; but the aspi- 
ration of one age proved to be the promise of fulfilment 
in the next, and the force of his one supreme creative 
act was never lost. 

The true culmination of the national movement in 
the reign of Henry III. was reached in the sphere of 
thought when the poet in his silent chamber realized 
that the royal power was limited by the divine will, 
that the divine will was exercised for the welfare of 
all people on the earth, whatever their rank or station, 
and that of this will the community was the true inter- 
preter ; it was reached in the sphere of action when 
the founder of the House of Commons withdrew this 
thought from the realm of the abstract, and gave it 
concrete existence by giving to the people of England 
a share in the exercise of sovereign power. 



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